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Information and communication technology (ICT) has long been central to modernization in 
the public sector. Socio-political factors within which the technology is developed and used 
play an important role in informing the design of the technology, and determine how it is 
used in public sector organizations. Thai bureaucracy has been constrained by long-
established bureaucratic culture, strict social status, and hierarchical control, which give rise 
to distinctive public administration styles, organizational arrangements, and work practices. 
This dissertation examines how these socio-political characteristics result in distinctive 
patterns of ICT development and adoption in the Thai public sector. 
By analyzing ethnographic fieldnotes, interview transcripts, and government artifacts 
collected from a 12-month period of fieldwork, this dissertation explores three key aspects of 
ICT development efforts in the Thai public sector: (1) relations between ICT and managerial 
control in the public sector; (2) processes of standardization in government information 
infrastructure development; and (3) the importance and complexities of boundary work in 
digital government development efforts.  
Beyond its effects on public administration and service provision processes, the development 
of computerized technology is associated with a series of organizational changes that often 
produce challenges and tensions attending ICT development efforts. The dissertation offers 
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lessons for digital government scholarship and the wider field of information science by 
specifically exploring changes in power structures, work practices, and the roles and 
relationships of government officials within and across agencies resulting from the 
implementation and use of new technologies. Following selected findings extend the 
understanding of technology development and organizational change in the public sector. 
First, information systems are used to reinforce existing hierarchical control power and 
authority, leading to tensions and resistance to the systems and control. Second, 
infrastructure development and standardization are a politically loaded process provoking 
conflict among agencies competing for power and autonomy over information resources. 
Third, the effects of technology adoption on work practices and relationships among officials 
are concentrated among lower- to middle-ranking officials, with relatively little impact on 
the practices of higher-ranking officials. Fourth, computerization does not necessarily 
increase the speed and efficiency of public administration as paper-based practices are still 






Governments worldwide have increasingly turned to information and communication 
technology (ICT)-enabled processes in recent years to reengineer internal and external 
processes of government in pursuit of key improvements in public sector performance: better 
and more efficient information exchange within the government, improved delivery of public 
services, and greater efficiency and effectiveness of government operations through reduced 
transaction costs and times. Such changes have also been associated with increased opening, 
responsiveness, or democratization of government through new forms of citizen engagement 
and democratic accountability and transparency.  
ICT development efforts in the public sector, often referred to as digital government 
development efforts, involve redesigning processes and relationships with internal and 
external stakeholders, which can alter long-standing communication flows and challenge 
classic public administrative principles of hierarchy and rules, centralization, coordination, 
and bureaucratic accountability. Some argue that these changes move public administration 
into a distinctly new era – ‘new public management,’ digital-era governance, or the post-
bureaucratic state, for example [52,53,86,95,145]. A consequence of digital government 
development efforts has been to connect external reform trajectories (e.g., the shifting 
interface between government and citizens, private firms, and social groups) with internal 
reforms aimed at relationships within and among governments (e.g., bureaucratization and 
virtualization) [59,86]. The use of modern ICTs, such as the Internet and web-based 
applications, to reshape programs, service delivery, agencies, and policy networks has 
brought about new patterns of organization in the public sector that go beyond physical 
boundaries. Examples include joined-up government [95], virtual government 
organizations [10,145], government interoperation [71], or virtual states [59]. 
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As a government official working during a period of computerization in Thailand, I became 
interested in the relationship between ICT development and organizational change in the 
public sector. In this dissertation, I examine digital government development efforts and 
their impact on organizations and individuals in the Thai government by addressing three 
central research questions: What are the socio-political factors that affect the development 
and adoption of technology in the Thai public sector? What are the social and political 
consequences of technological introduction and adoption in the Thai public sector? And how 
do Thai government officials adapt to the change and respond to the challenges, limits, and 
tensions brought about by the deployment of technology? More specifically, I investigate 
the development and use of stand-alone and inter-agency information systems to understand 
the organizational impacts at different levels ranging from the individual to group, agency, 
and government units.  
The Thai public sector has long been subject to governance and political institutional 
arrangements influenced by the region’s history of mixed European institutional influences 
– established as a combination of the British model of constitutional monarchy employing a 
parliamentary system, and the French model of local administration. It has been constrained 
by a long-established bureaucratic culture, strict social status, and hierarchical, which result 
in distinctive work processes and practices in both pre-computerization and post-
computerization systems. These socio-political conditions both support and impede the 
adoption and use of technology in the Thai public sector, resulting in work practices that 
diverge from the intended goals of adopting new technologies. This study seeks to 
understand the patterns of ICT development, adoption, and use in the Thai public sector, 
which combine the use of traditional manual work and physical documents and electronic 
processes, forming a mixed paper-electronic ecology of work practice. Such an ecology 
appears to have become embedded in government work across organizational functions. 
This practice has led to technological and organizational challenges and tensions 
accompanying digital government development efforts. The thesis also investigates how 
government officials understand and respond to the changes and tensions resulting from the 
deployment of ICT in their work. 
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1.1 Background: Survey of Digital Government Literature 
Before digital government scholarship emerged as a field of study, scholars in various 
academic disciplines (including social studies of computer-based technology, organization 
studies, management science, and IT/MIS) studied the implementation and use of ICT in 
organizations, and their relationships with organizational change. Unfortunately, the 
majority of the literature on ICT in organizational studies, management, and IT/MIS was 
based on studies of private sector organizations. With the exception of work at the 
University of California at Irvine, early research in public management, information systems, 
or business administration rarely focused on computing in public organizations [103]. Until 
the emergence of digital government scholarship in the late 1990s, digital government 
researchers borrowed theoretical and conceptual frameworks from those allied fields of 
study to explain information system development, adoption and use phenomena specifically 
in public organizations and subsequent transformation. Examples of analysis of technology 
adoption and use in government organizations and the impact of new technologies on 
organizational change are Laudon 1974 [114]; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1986 [27]; 
Bugler and Bretschneider 1993 [30]; Kraemer 1977 [102]; Kraemer and King 2006 [109]; 
Kraemer et al. 1987 [104]; Robey and Sahay 1996 [166]; and Kraemer and Dedrick 1997 
[103].  
For instance, Laudon [1974] and Kraemer and Dedrick [1997], studying the development 
and deployment of information technologies in public agencies, point to social, political, 
historical, and cultural factors within which the technologies are developed as playing an 
important role in the crucial decisions that inform the design of technologies and determine 
how they are used [103,114]. Technologies may be used as tools to reinforce and/or 
reshape organizational structures and control power arrangements (e.g., centralization or 
decentralization), and may redefine the roles and relationships for individuals or groups in a 
bureaucracy. American bureaucratic reform in the 1960s addressed the urban crisis – 
governance and political problems stemming from the inability of federal and local 
governments to collect, store, and process information quickly enough to help executives 
evaluate and redesign programs on housing, welfare, transportation, unemployment, and 
social security [114]. Laudon finds that the sources of crisis in public policy lay in the 
organizational structure of American government. More specifically, Laudon cites 
 
4 
fragmentation of power among political jurisdictions, decentralization of authority, and 
“localistic” attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats [114, p. 48-49]. These organizational 
factors impede information flow within government and inhibit rational decision-making. 
Although technology makes possible bureaucratic reform leading to the redistribution of 
control over information and centralized information systems, traditionally isolated and 
separate organizational structures as well as low social integration among agencies causes 
delay and resistance to information sharing and centralization. Laudon concludes that initial 
social and political conditions taken from sociological literature (i.e., the levels of 
interdependence, internal integration, and homogeneity among agencies) and the histories of 
bureaucratic reform affect how integrated information systems are designed and used in 
those agencies. Additionally, Laudon finds that the levels of centralization in organizations 
associated with these systems are the result of political and bureaucratic forces rather than 
technology. Information technology is a tool whose ultimate social meaning, content, and 
consequences are subject to the influence of the specific political values and interests that 
inform its use [114, p. 311]. In their studies of computing in U.S. local governments, Kling 
[1978] and Kraemer and Dutton [1979] conclude that those with power in organizations 
use computing to reinforce existing power structures [96,105]. 
Kraemer and Dedrick [1997] similarly conclude that managerial action and decisions 
coupled with internal and external factors of public organizations, such as organizational 
history and context, resource availability, and legal as well as political features, are the key 
influences shaping organizational structure [103]. Centralized and decentralized structures 
of computing functions are powerful tools for reinforcing existing power arrangements, as 
well as facilitating trends in organizational restructuring whether centralized, decentralized, 
hierarchical, or networked [103,106,160]. By itself, however, computing is unlikely to affect 
organizational structure [103]. The discussion among scholars regarding changes in 
organizational structure and power distribution appears to conclude that computing 
technology remains a useful instrument of organizational and administrative change in the 
public sector. Such rearrangement involves both intended (or planned) and unintended (or 
unplanned) change in operational, managerial, political, legal, and technical aspects. As a 
result, change often creates limits, challenges, and tensions for digital government 




The question of how ICT affects public sector organizational structure rearrangements, and 
the relationships among government employees, has become central to contemporary digital 
government scholarship. Recent work has tended to focus on the development of ICT and its 
effects on organizational structures at the government or inter-organizational level. This work 
centers on novel forms of government built on new information infrastructures – the 
Internet and near-ubiquitous networked computing technologies. This area of research has 
emphasized organizational change and related issues including information and service 
integration and sharing, collaboration, and standardization, enabled by new information 
technologies, across traditional agency boundary. Examples include Fountain 2001 [59]; 
Bekkers 2003 [10]; Dawes 2000 [48]; Gottschalk 2009 [71]; Kraemer and King 2006 
[109]; Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer 2007 [129]; Pardo and Cresswell 2004 [151]; Pardo 
and Jiang 2007 [152]; Scholl 2001 [173]; Scholl and Klischewski 2007 [174]; and Yang 
2003 [203]. Changes and tensions at the local or organizational level and their effects on 
individuals, however, have been less thoroughly addressed in recent digital government 
scholarship. 
Nevertheless, recent scholarship congruently emphasizes the changes necessary in both 
social and technical elements of government to achieve some of the promising benefits from 
ICTs as well as the advantages of organizational networks over hierarchies. The 
development of cooperative interaction and information integration in and among 
governmental agencies requires restructuring of the institutional arrangements in which 
transactions are embedded [59]. The change involves mobilization of limited resources, 
evolving inter-organizational relationships, establishing collaborative norms and culture, 
establishing institutional incentives to collaborate, and changing coordination mechanisms 
[39,59,153]. It also involves decision and policy change in terms of information and 
technology sharing and integration, information ownership and stewardship, accountability, 
jurisdiction, authority, autonomy, and trust that affect relationships among agencies 
[57,59,95,109,150,153]. 
However, such changes are not universally welcome. Inter-organizational information 
services also rely on information infrastructure and standardization of government 
information processes and formats [95,153]. Efforts at information infrastructure 
development and standardization in digital government involve new work processes, along 
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with significant organizational change in the practices, norms and culture, structures, and 
laws of individual agencies at the local level [152]. These processes are often embedded in 
larger political and institutional environments which shape their goals and circumscribe 
their choices. Therefore, such efforts pose challenges to enterprise or policy domains at the 
inter-agency or inter-governmental levels, and invoke tensions and resistance among 
individuals or groups in the government. An understanding of the process of ICT 
development, adoption, and use in organizations, and the interdependence between 
technology and organizational structure, promises to help both digital government scholars 
and practitioners anticipate and overcome those socio-technical challenges and tensions. 
Most digital government literature has investigated bureaucratic modernization and 
computerization and consequent organizational change in the context of developed countries. 
Much less research work has focused on the developing world. Although governance and 
computerization in developing countries seem to be fundamentally similar to those of their 
developed-world counterparts, differences in the social tradition, political history, and 
bureaucratic culture of individual countries may help scholars and practitioners understand 
differences in ICT development and implementation processes and trajectories. More 
specifically, traditional organizational culture, norms, and practices in each agency constrain 
how the same ICT is implemented and used, which may result in different practices around 
it. Due to the socio-political dissimilarity of developed and developing countries, researchers 
indicate the difficulty in transferring ICT solutions and digital government development 
models, as well as organizational concepts, from developed to developing countries 
[82,84,175,206]. 
Scholars like Heeks [2001, 2002], Schuppan [2009], and Yildiz [2007] emphasize the 
importance of a context- or cultural-oriented approach to digital government development 
and analysis [82,84,175,206]. Schuppan argues that transferring digital government 
organizational principles from Western industrial countries to developing countries 
represents an oversimplified view of efficiency [175, p. 121]. He demonstrates the 
complexity of administrative conditions and contextual factors in Sub-Saharan African 
countries which impact digital government development and functionality. Low-
performance public administration corresponding with low resources in African and other 
developing countries lead to inefficient and ineffective public administration and political 
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will implementation [175]. The low performance is characterized by a rigid centralism with 
a neo-patrimonial leadership style (i.e., personalized power structures based on patron-client 
relationships), rent-seeking behavior of bureaucratic elites, a weakly developed 
administration, corruption, and unmotivated and unqualified officials [194]. 
Schuppan suggests that initial institutional, cultural, and wider administrative contexts in 
developing countries must be considered to avoid unintended effects on the technological 
implementation [175]. These contexts include political-administrative factors such as low 
levels of democratization. Many African countries are governed by military dictatorship, 
rendering administrative reforms difficult. Also, many developing countries do not tend 
toward the types of administration-oriented reform that would help them prepare to 
implement digital government. Another important factor is the values and attitudes of the 
citizens in developing countries regarding political administrative systems. In countries 
where citizens are familiar with the ability to negotiate with government officials, those 
citizens may resist digital government applications because they will lose this ability. Access 
to the Internet and other basic infrastructure in developing countries is still low and costly. 
While the present digital government discussion is still often limited to the advantages of 
providing online services, the problem of Internet access constrains this perspective [82]. 
Therefore, intermediaries may be necessary in the developing-country context [83]. 
Moreover, the personnel expenditures of African administrations are only one-tenth of those 
in western countries [83]. Substituting officials with ICT could, under these conditions, 
lead to a less efficient administration. Therefore, the cost-to-benefit ratio and return on 
investment in developing contexts are different from those in developed countries. 
Digital government development efforts in contemporary Thailand have been understudied 
in both digital government and public administration scholarship. My study aims to address 
gaps in the current literature, and provide researchers with insight and support for further 
comparative studies of ICT development in the public sector. The results also help digital 
government scholars and practitioners understand which elements of the earlier literature 
were general enough to apply to the very different context of Thailand – and conversely, 
what may be observed in studies of other nations that are near Thailand, which have been 
underexplored. Additionally, the study offers practical lessons for efforts at government 
system development for oversight and control implications, information and process 
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standardization and interoperability, and their relationships with existing work practices, 
culture and norms, incentive and reward structures of the public sector in the specific 
national context of Thailand, and in the broader government bureaucratic context.  
I believe that the Thailand case offers an insightful case in the adoption and use of ICT, and 
the effects of that use on government. The findings and implications from my study may 
contribute to the digital government community, and the wider field of information science. 
1.2 Study Overview 
I present my dissertation in seven chapters. This chapter introduces central research 
problems in digital government scholarship concerning the relationships between the 
development and use of ICT and organizational change in public sector organizations. The 
chapter presents a survey of existing issues and arguments in the field of digital government, 
and particularly illustrates the research gap in developing countries. It also lays out the 
main contribution of this dissertation to the digital government research and practice 
communities as a whole.  
Chapter 2 discusses the methodology used in the research. The discussion includes the 
research design of my dissertation and the theoretical significance of ethnography in 
organizational studies, and public sector organizational change in particular, for 
understanding the relationships of organizational members and their interdependence with 
information technology. This chapter also addresses the challenges, limitations, and trade-
offs of ethnography and other means used in the data collection for this dissertation.  
In chapter 3, I outline a historical background of Thai polity and bureaucracy including a 
series of public administrative reforms. This chapter reviews early efforts at computerizing 
government processes and public service delivery, which have led to change in existing 
control power and organizational structures. This change also includes the emergence of 
new organizational and institutional arrangements, in addition to new practices for 
government agencies and employees. 
Chapter 4 describes how ICT is used as a managerial method and tool for improving control 
and oversight in Thai bureaucracy. Based on scholarly work in sociology, communication 
studies, information science, organizational studies, and CSCW, I discuss how the 
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government and agencies develop and use ICTs for managerial purposes. These information 
systems include three major government-level systems and one agency-level system. I also 
explore the barriers, challenges, and resistance brought about by the introduction of 
computerized managerial tools at the government and agency levels, and how individual 
agencies and officials respond to such control. The response involves how officials at 
different hierarchical rankings develop their own workarounds and adjustments to maintain 
their monitoring power and the autonomy of their work through manual and electronic 
practices. 
Chapter 5 examines the development and implementation of four contemporary efforts at 
information and system standardization, integration, and interoperability at the government 
level in the Thai public sector. The development process involves changes in the roles and 
relationships of government officials within and across individual agencies. This chapter also 
portrays the competition over budget, power, and information, and the strategic plans and 
actions each agency employs to avoid losing critical organizational resources. Finally, the 
chapter addresses the social and technological limits and tensions attending information 
infrastructure development and standardization, drawing on literature in sociology, science 
and technology studies, and IT.  
In chapter 6, I adopt the concept of boundary objects to highlight the role of artifacts used in 
government communication and coordination. I extend the boundary object notion to the 
active yet likely invisible roles of human actors in the boundary work, who are identified as 
boundary agents, and the roles of the Ministry of ICT (MICT) and its supervised 
organization – the E-Government Agency, or boundary organization, who performs specific 
tasks in information standardization and integration. I investigate boundary work 
specifically in the development and use of e-Document systems as in-agency stand-alone 
systems, and as interoperable systems for government-wide communication. Such boundary 
work involves the roles of physical and electronic documents, and the work of administrative 
staff in sending and receiving documents; the work of ICT officials in coordinating, bridging, 
and linking global and local systems and practices in the interoperability effort; and the 
MICT’s process of establishing and enforcing government interoperability. As in previous 
chapters, I explore socio-technological challenges and tensions attending boundary work. 
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Chapter 7 summarizes key social, political, and technological challenges and tensions in 
digital government development from my findings. This chapter revisits the questions about 
the relationship between ICT development and organizational change, and identifies socio-
political factors that affect and are affected by the implementation of technology. Lastly, it 
offers practical lessons for and the future outlook of digital government development efforts 
in Thailand as the main contribution of this dissertation to the communities of digital 




Methods and Methodology 
My research centers on the question of how the adoption and use of ICTs affects different 
groups of government officials in their working lives. In particular, my research focuses on 
the change in organizational factors that relate to hierarchical structures and lines of 
command, the roles and relationships among officials within and across organizations, 
autonomy and power of different groups of people in organizations, and work practices of 
officials at different levels in organizational hierarchies. 
My project focuses on organizational factors that changed, and those that did not change as a 
result of the introduction of ICT. The unchanged factors represent long-established 
bureaucratic cultures, norms, values, and work practices that may be barriers to the adoption 
and use of technology, or may alter the initial goals of technology development. 
Furthermore, I am interested in the effect of technology at the individual level. Therefore, I 
examine how technology affected government employees; how they changed and/or were 
required to change their work, and the roles and relationships between themselves; and how 
they adapted or developed workarounds to deal with change. 
In this chapter, I describe the qualitative research methodology and its challenges, 
limitations, and trade-offs for this dissertation. The adoption and use of ICT in the public 
sector give rise to change that may be categorized into two broad approaches. From the 
public policy perspective, on the one hand, the adoption and use of ICT impact the 
relationship between government and its citizens. ICT promises to improve public sector 
responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. On the other hand, 
ICT brings about change within public agencies including organizational forms and 
structures, hierarchies, cross-agency information integration, and information and service 
standardization. As existing research suggests, different groups of people both affect and are 
affected by technology development and how technology is used in their organizations 
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[7,59,61,99,143,144,207]. The literature presented in chapter 1 outlines organizational 
change resulting from the implementation and use of ICT in the public sector of developed 
Western countries. This literature also suggests that the adoption and use of various 
computing technologies – mainframes, microcomputers, and client/server applications – do 
not produce significantly different results in terms of organizational operation [44,109,114]. 
However, modern ICT such as ubiquitous networked computing and the Internet has 
brought about novel forms of public sector operation, organizational structures, and public 
service delivery. I use this literature to suggest guidelines for what I should consider when 
entering field sites and analyzing data. 
For this project, I conducted exploratory research that seeks, through qualitative data 
analysis, to holistically understand organizational change in the Thai public sector that 
occurred as a result of the adoption and use of government ICT. Ultimately, I propose a 
theoretical framework for ICT adoption and organizational change in the public sector. 
2.1 Qualitative Research Methods 
For this research, I wanted to gain an in-depth understanding of the experiences of study 
respondents regarding the adoption and use of ICT in the government. Yildiz [2007] 
surveys digital government literature and notes that output-focused studies focus their 
research on the output of digital government efforts, artifacts such as websites and online 
government services [206]. On the other hand, outcome-oriented studies explain how a 
particular digital government effort positively or negatively affects a certain governance 
performance indicator, such as cost savings, transparency, efficiency, participation, 
responsiveness, or accountability. However, research that examines end-products of digital 
government efforts does not tell us what is happening inside the black box of digital 
government [206 p. 660]. Congruent with Yildiz’s finding is Heeks and Bailur’s [2007] 
criticism that the stage models of digital government give some insights into what is 
happening in digital government but offer little understanding of why things are happening 
[85, p. 255]. They further argue that such literature often ignores institutional, political, 
organizational, and cultural contexts, which either facilitate or constrain the development of 
digital government applications in particular societies. Yildiz emphasizes the importance of 
process-oriented methodology because it helps researchers understand and explain digital 
government processes and generate theory [206]. This methodology involves extensive 
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fieldwork and a variety of data collection methods such as interviews, participant 
observation, and archival analysis.  
To understand the practices and patterns of ICT development, adoption, and use, and their 
relationship with organizational change in Thai bureaucracy in this project, qualitative 
methodologies were used to capture a range of variation in ICT practices and their impacts 
on government agencies and officials. I employed an ethnographic study which included 
ethnographic observations and semi-structured interviews. The project started as part of the 
requirements of a course, SI 724 – Qualitative Methods, taught by Professor Elizabeth Yakel 
in Winter 2010. In that study, I focused on two central questions: 
1) What are the current patterns of ICT development, adoption, innovation and use in 
the Thai public sector? 
2) What are the principle organizational barriers, limits, and consequences of ICT 
development, adoption, innovation, and use in the Thai public sector? 
In the preliminary study, I examined the processes and patterns of ICT adoption in the Thai 
public sector, focusing particularly on the sociology of technological development, 
implementation, and adoption processes, and the use of ICT in public organizations.  
The preliminary investigation was conducted between January and May 2010 through semi-
structured interviews over Skype and via email communication. 10 interviews were 
conducted in total with eight officials in two government agencies – the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Land Development Department. Details regarding site selection and 
respondent recruitment are discussed in later sections of this chapter. Moreover, I examined 
documents related to ICT development such as the agencies’ ICT master plans. This small-
scale research project enabled me to frame my research questions for the ethnographic 
observations [42] and in-depth interviews during my subsequent fieldwork.  
The main body of fieldwork for this study was conducted in two rounds, first between May 
and August 2010, and thereafter between May and August 2011. The first round of 
fieldwork (May – August 2010) involved 60 interviews with 55 respondents at six 
organizations. The initial findings from this preliminary study provided me with an 
overview of public sector ICT development and use, an understanding of individual 
information systems and standards used in the government, and helped me scope my 
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fieldwork research regarding which organizations and information systems I should pursue 
when entering the field and what questions I should ask in the semi-structured interviews. 
During the subsequent round I examined the development and use of three main 
government functional information systems – the financial management, personnel 
management, and documentation management systems. I also examined the government’s 
collaborative effort at integrating and standardizing information systems and practices for 
cross-agency interoperability among these three major systems.  
The second round of fieldwork focused on follow-up interviews and observations to confirm 
the ICT practices and patterns discovered during my previous fieldwork. I conducted in-
depth interviews with the same 18 informants from the first round of fieldwork in addition 
to other respondents on the same and additional information systems. I also expanded the 
study from common government applications to specific-purpose applications developed 
exclusively for internal use. Between these two rounds of fieldwork, conducted one year 
apart, I tracked ICT development and implementation efforts and progress. A certain 
number of ICT collaboration projects quietly faded out or were discontinued. Government 
structures and authorities among organizations involved in digital government development 
also changed. As a result, the number of sites studied was expanded from six to 11 agencies. 
In addition to interviews and observations during the fieldwork, I also reviewed information 
provided publicly on the government agencies’ websites, formal and informal documents 
used within the organizations including meeting minutes, ICT master plans and budget 
plans, and annual reports. Also, I studied information and system use through the agencies’ 
intranets and knowledge-sharing sites. This combination of multiple forms of data collection 
through interviews, document investigation, and ethnographic observation allowed me to 
achieve a form of triangulation, and form the basis of the categories elaborated in chapters 3 
through 6 of this thesis. 
2.2 The Study Sites and Recruiting Process 
During the preliminary study, I carried out interviews with officials at the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) and the Land Development Department (LDD). The MOC is 
representative of Thailand’s six ministry-level agencies, all of which are located in the same 
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geographical location with the MOC. The LDD represents departmental agencies that are 
under the supervision of a ministry, and have field offices throughout the country.  
The selection process during the 2010 preliminary project reflects how I gained access to 
the organizations. Contacting a government agency for interviews, research, or other sorts 
of cooperation within my time constraints requires a personal connection with someone 
inside of the organization; such a connection should be initiated at the higher levels of the 
agencies. Without an informal connection, I would need to submit request letters to 
individual agencies waiting for their response, which could have taken months, and likely 
would have concluded with denial. Personal connections helped me conduct ethnographic 
observations and interviews in agencies where formal requests were unlikely to yield the 
same result. Therefore, one of the site selection criteria was my level of accessibility to 
individuals within the agencies. As my goal was to uncover government efforts of 
interoperable and integrated technology development and use, and to explore the 
underlying practices of government officials, a selection process based on personal 
connection to the studied subjects did not seem to pose a severe limitation to my study. 
As a government official myself, I used this inside connection to my advantage. I asked my 
supervisors to initiate contact with the executives and directors of ICT Centers in other 
agencies. Such informal or personal connection among officials is typically initiated through 
attending formal meetings and seminars organized by government agencies or software 
vendors. In ICT-related events particularly, ICT officials share experiences and stories 
about their ICT implementation practices. They exchange contact information for future 
cooperation, and request site visits if they are interested in the work their colleagues are 
doing. As one of my initial contacts, I was connected with the chief information officer of the 
LDD, who assigned an official to help coordinate my interviews with officials at the 
organization. My supervisor also connected me with the MOC’s ICT Center director. The 
Commerce Ministry and Land Development Department represented different agency levels 
– The MOC represented small-sized ministerial level agencies, and the other represented 
large-sized departmental level agencies according to their annual budget, and the number of 
personnel in their agency. This was useful for establishing my project as a case study. These 
selected agencies were also good representative of government agencies regarding the 
development and use of common government ICT applications for internal use, such as e-
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Document systems, personnel management and finance management information systems. 
The agencies also had electronic applications to deliver their public services throughout the 
country. 
Both agencies also served as the starting point for my recruiting process through snowball 
sampling [13]. At the Ministry of Commerce, the director of the ICT Center introduced me 
to both ICT and non-ICT officials who were involved in the use of various information 
systems including three main government applications – e-Document systems, the 
government’s fiscal management information system, and the departmental personnel 
information system – and other specific-purposed applications. Both agencies also 
participated in the MICT’s pilot project on integrated e-Document systems. My fieldwork 
extended my samples to the MICT and relevant agencies for broader ethnographic 
understanding of ICT practices at the national level in the Thai public sector. As such, I 
interviewed the staff at the MICT on the integrated information system effort and 
interviewed the consultant to the MICT on the development and adoption of the national 
standardized information framework. From the MICT, I was introduced to the Customs 
Department and its efforts at integrating national trade-related processes through the e-
Customs and National Single Window system. 
Throughout my multi-phase, yearlong fieldwork, I employed ethnographic methods at 10 
government agencies consisting of four ministerial agencies, four departmental agencies, one 
state-independent agency, and one public organization. The organizations I studied include 
(Figure 1): 
• Ministries (The Permanent Secretary’s Office): 
o The Ministry of Commerce 
o The Ministry of Interior 
o The Ministry of Transport 
o The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
• Departments: 




o The Land Development Department under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives 
o The Customs Department under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance 
o The Department of Provincial Administration (Ayutthaya Provincial Office) 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior 
o The Office of Public Sector Development Commission under the supervision 
of the Prime Minister’s Office 
• Judiciary and independent agency: 
o The Administrative Court and its Office 
• Public organization: 
o The E-Government Agency under the supervision of the MICT 
Structurally, Thai government includes 20 ministries. In each ministry, the permanent 
secretary of the agency is the highest ranked executive official and performs organizational-
level administration work of the ministry. At each ministry, two main offices serve the 
minster and the permanent secretary – the office of the ministry and the office of the 
permanent secretary. The ministries oversee and monitor their dependent departments’ 
operational plans, performance, and budgets, and play a role in integrating operational plans 
and budgets (including ICT master plans and budget plans) among all departments. With 
around 200 officials each, the ministerial agencies are smaller than the departmental 
agencies in size. This is because they perform the roles of policy maker and monitor while 
the departments execute plans, implement policies, and deliver public service, as well as 
interact with citizens throughout the country. A summary of information about each studied 
agency is as follows: 
The Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is in charge of trade-related affairs including internal 
and foreign trade, business development, trade negotiation, consumer protection, export 
promotion, intellectual property, entrepreneurship, and insurance. There are seven 
departments, one state enterprise, and two public organizations performing specific tasks 
under the MOC’s supervision. For example, the Department of Export Promotion’s tasks 
are central to promoting goods in other countries worldwide. Although these departments 
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are physically located in the same area as the MOC, they each have their own autonomy over 
the budget and organizational resources management.  
Like the MOC, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) consists of six departments and 13 state 
enterprises. Its work is related to transport affairs including land transport, highways, 
railway, mass transit, ports, airports, and airways. The levels of system integration and 
cross-agency ICT development at the MOT and its dependent departments tend to be 
higher than at the MOC. The ICT Center at the MOT has played a significant role in ICT 
development. The ICT Center has developed several information systems and has 
distributed applications to the organizations they supervise depending on their willingness 
and readiness for technological adoption and maintenance. From the interviews and 
observations during the first week of my fieldwork at the MOT, I found that the Permanent 
Secretary’s Office of the MOT exerted greater influence on ICT development over other 
agencies within the MOT boundary. Under the MOT’s supervision, the Department of Land 
Transport (DLT) is equivalent to the U.S. Department of Transportation in Thailand.  
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is one of the largest and most powerful organizations in 
Thai bureaucracy as it has a wide range of responsibilities including local administration, 
internal security, citizenship and registration, disaster management, and public works. The 
MOI is also responsible for appointing governors of 76 provinces throughout the country. 
The governors are appointed from the central office through the Department of Provincial 
Administration (DOPA). Among elected politicians, the MOI is considered important 
because of its nation-wide authority and responsibilities, which require a large budget and 
significant administrative resources. However, the Ministry is also known for its closed-
system of administration with a long tradition rigid structural hierarchical. This strong 
organizational culture limited my access to the ministry.1 
The Administrative Court is a judiciary agency established according to the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2540 (1997). This Constitution stipulated that the 
Administrative Court be separated from other courts. According to the Constitution, the 
Administrative Court has the power to try and adjudicate administrative cases. It adopts the 
                                                
1 A senior official at the Ministry required me to submit a request for access grant letter to the permanent 
secretary before I could conduct my research at the General Division. The ICT official interpreted that as a 
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inquisitorial system as opposed to the adversarial system adopted by the Court of Justice. 
The Office of the Administrative Courts (OAC) performs the administrative duties necessary 
to support the Court and the judges. The OAC is a state-independent agency and has a 
status equivalent to a ministry. There are about 300 judges and 2,000 officials working at 
the Supreme Administrative Court, the Central Administrative Courts, and other nine 
Regional Administrative Courts and their Offices. 
The Land Development Department (LDD) is a departmental agency responsible for soil 
analysis and improvement, as well as land use planning and development to assist farmers in 
soil and water conservation practices. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
oversees the Department. 
The Customs Department is a large-scale department under the oversight of the Ministry of 
Finance. The role of the Customs Department is to collect national revenues through 
imports and exports, facilitate global trade, and exercise control over imports, exports, and 
transit goods. 
The Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) is also a departmental 
agency under the supervision of the Prime Minister’s Office. The Commission is responsible 
for analyzing and improving government work processes and management through 
organizational redesign and restructure, and for monitoring and evaluating public sector 
performance. The OPDC is classified as a central technocratic unit providing technical 
assistance for the government regarding public sector development. The OPDC 
implemented the redesigned government performance evaluation and improvement 
programs, as well as the nation-wide performance management information system that 
allows each agency to enter and update their strategic plans and goals. 
Lastly, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) is responsible 
for public sector ICT development and implementation, otherwise referred to as digital 
government or e-Government projects, and for other ICT-related issues of the nation. Its 
role involves planning, developing, and implementing public sector information 
infrastructures and standardization. The MICT spearheads government ICT integration 
programs such as the development of integrated and interoperable e-Document systems 
across agencies. In addition, it formerly led the development of the trade-related National 
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Single Window before the project was transferred to the Customs Department. The MICT 
has faced major issues such as understaffing and a lack of technical expertise among its 
officials. These issues have made it difficult for the MICT to develop and implement ICTs in 
the public sector. In February 2004, the government established the e-Government Agency 
(EGA), a public organization under the supervision of the MICT, whose main duties involve 
developing and implementing e-Government projects, providing the government with 
information infrastructures, integrating public sector information systems such as the e-
Document systems that were previously under the direct authority of the MICT. Most of 
the EGA staff are computer engineers. Thus, while the MICT has become the ICT planning 
and regulating unit, the EGA has become the implementer. 
 
Figure 1 Government agencies studied in this research 
Most of the agencies listed above are located in Bangkok, except for the MOC, for which the 
head office and its supervised departments are located in Nontaburi province. For the 
Ministry of Interior and the Administrative Court, I also conducted interviews with officials 
at their regional offices in Ayutthaya and Rayong provinces, respectively. 
Though the initial selection was based on personal connections and snowball sampling, I 
selected these agencies based on the characteristics of the organizations including their 
annual budget, the number of their staff, and the nature of their work. This selection allowed 
me to cover a wide variety of organizations based on those characteristics. For instance, 
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Ministries of Commerce and ICT are considered small ministries due to their small annual 
budget of less than 0.5 percent of the government total budget, while the Ministry of 
Interior is the largest Ministry in terms of the budget with its 309 billion baht 
(approximately $10.3 billion) or 12.9 percent of the total budget.2 The Administrative Court 
is representative of another type of government agency – state-independent agencies with 
small block grant budget. 
Agencies 
Budget (million baht) 3 
Number of Staff 
as of 20074 
2012 2013 
The Prime Minister’s Office 22,123.7 25,246.8 6,587 
OPDC 268.4 295.5 N/A 
Ministry of Interior 285,255.0 308,835.0 44,177 
Provincial Administration 34,307.9 34,795.9 14,295 
Ministry of Commerce 6,592.7 7,430.3 4,106 
Ministry of Transport 88,852.7 95,948.7 15,778 
Dept. of Land Transport 2,320.9 2,511.4 4,011 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 76,721.3 72,882.9 38,604 
Land Development Dept. 4,247.1 5,337.8 N/A 
Ministry of Finance 191,415.1 180,707.9 32,529 
Comptroller General’s Dept. 1,184.0 1,348.1 N/A 
Customs 2,757.4 2,815.0 N/A 
                                                
2 “Budget documents of 2013 (B.E. 2556),” The Bureau of Budget. Retrieved from 
ครมhttp://www.bb.go.th/budget_book/e-Book2556/ on February 3, 2013. 
3 “Budget documents of 2013 (B.E. 2556),” The Bureau of Budget. Retrieved from 
http://www.bb.go.th/budget_book/e-Book2556/ on February 3, 2013. 
4 “Government personnel 2007 (B.E. 2550),” The Office of Civil Service Commission. Retrieved from 
http://www.ocsc.go.th/ocsc/th/files/Stat/BCCD/kamlungkhon_civilt_50_1th.pdf on February 7, 2013. 
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Agencies Budget (million baht) 3 Number of Staff 
as of 20074 
Ministry of ICT 3,761.7 7,598.8 839 
E-Government Agency 579.3 1,536.3 N/A 
Administrative Court 1,466.8 1,794.6 1,931 
Table 1 Studied agencies' annual budget5 and number of staff 
Regarding the ICT development and deployment, I considered various types of systems 
including the stand-alone and inter-organizational, as well as integrated and standardized, 
information systems they have implemented. The agencies represent varying degrees of 
proficiency regarding ICT. For example, the Ministries of Transport and Interior are very 
well-funded due to the nature of their work involving nation-wide infrastructure 
development and the national citizens registration database. These ministries have their own 
information networks throughout the country, and thus have a greater degree of freedom 
from close supervision and in utilizing their own networks. They are also subject to greater 
freedom regarding compliance with the government’s ICT policies compared with other 
agencies. Furthermore, they tend to be ready and willing to spearhead national-level 
information system development projects. 
Departmental agencies, on the other hand, are constrained by both government policies and 
those of the supervising ministry for ICT strategies. At the same time, they must maintain 
their autonomy in developing their internal systems and associated practices. Studying the 
development and use of ICT in agencies at various levels provided a more thorough 
overview of how agencies compete for autonomy over their ICT-related budget and 
development projects within the same ministry, and how they formulated strategies in 
response to national- and ministry-level policies. 
I also studied the use of ICT at selected provincial units of the agencies. These provincial 
offices faced limited organizational resources, specifically regarding personnel and IT-
related expertise. However, they were required to adopt technologies and systems deployed 
                                                
5 Thai government's fiscal year begins on October 1st of the previous calendar year and ends on September 30th 
of the next year. For example, the 2013 (B.E. 2556) fiscal year is from October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013. 
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by the supervising agency. Studying these provincial units demonstrated to me how they 
allocated internal resources to maintain their work while being obligated to meet their head 
office’s top-down requirements. I hypothesized that due to limited personnel resources, the 
adoption of systems is prone to failure among provincial units. 
The study of system development and use at various agencies allowed me to compare how 
each individual agency developed, implemented, and used the same systems. This 
comparison revealed contrasting and complementary findings about how each agency 
responded to government policies given different levels of autonomy, freedom, resources, 
and power to negotiate and comply with the MICT in the national efforts of integrated 
information system development. 
Studying these 11 agencies provided a range of ICT development, adoption, and use 
patterns and practices and their impacts on public sector organizations. Many of the 
agencies were participating in national information system integration efforts while facing 
distinct technical and social challenges within their own agencies. The effects of the 
development, adoption, and use of ICTs varied based on existing organizational factors and 
officials’ perceptions, norms and culture, values, and work practices. As indicated earlier, 
however, this limited set of selected samples may impart a selection bias to the study. This 
thesis does not intend to generalize the findings about ICT development for use in other 
organizational settings, or to digital government development efforts worldwide or 
nationwide, although the findings here may also have important implications for digital 
government development efforts elsewhere. Rather, it aims to explain and interpret ICT 
development and use in the Thai government. Moreover, I believe that this particular study 
set constitutes a representative sampling of Thai government agencies at all levels, ranging 
from ministerial to provincial offices. Each of the agencies participated in both stand-alone 
and interoperable systems for major government functional systems. A more detailed 
discussion of unit selection is provided in the next section. 
2.3 Data Collection Process 
During my fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 113 government officials 
in different positions ranging from the chief information officer, to the deputy secretary 
general, the division directors, and administrative staff. Their work involved developing 
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and/or using ICTs as part of their organization’s work processes. The interviews were 
conducted in Thai. I also interviewed consultants to government agencies, software vendors, 
and contractors, six in total, about the ICT development and implementation efforts at the 
national and agency levels. Eighteen informants were interviewed more than once for 
follow-up interviews when I needed to confirm information about their work and practices. 
Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two hours, with most lasting about one hour. The 
interview protocol and example empirical questions are shown in the appendix. I flagged 
about 30-40 of the most relevant interviews to be fully transcribed for future reference and 
quotes. The recorded audio files of those flagged interviews were transcribed and translated 
(from Thai to English). 
I also conducted ethnographic observation during government business hours. The 
observation sessions included shadowing ICT officials when they went to provide service in 
other divisions to investigate how ICTs were used in the agencies; what issues the system 
users had; how ICT officials interacted with the users; as well as the social status of the ICT 
officials in the agencies. On the system user side, I observed how users interacted with the e-
Document systems, the government fiscal management information system, and the 
departmental personnel information system, in addition to interviewing them about their 
perceptions of and practices around the systems. Also, I wanted to evaluate the computer 
literacy of the users – whether they knew how to do initial troubleshooting, and whether 
they developed workarounds for such systems in response to changes in their existing 
practices. Additionally, I followed artifacts including physical and electronic documents 
officials used in their day-to-day communications within and across agencies, and case 
dockets and case docket logbooks administrative case officials used for their case 
management at the Administrative Court. I followed how administrative staff used 
information on the official documents, and how they worked with the documents before 
forwarding them on. I also observed how the documents went through and across the 
organizational hierarchy for agency communication and coordination. 
On the days that I conducted my ethnographic fieldwork at particular agencies, I also 
scanned each agency’s intranet to understand how the officials shared information, and what 
types of information were posted online or circulated physically. Some organizations 
provided the number of readers in each news thread, such that I could see what types of 
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information were of greater interest than others. The observation of online information use 
in the agencies supplemented the data from my interviews regarding communication 
patterns and ICT practices in the public sector. I also asked ICT officials for permission to 
see the network and disk utilization logs between internal and external communication. The 
reason for my interest was that I wanted to compare the amount of information (the number 
of pieces of information) posted online with that circulated in a physical format. However, 
most agencies I studied did not have such reports available, as these types of information 
were not mandated or were not a major concern for ICT utilization.  
I also employed participant observation at the MICT’s seminars on government information 
security, and at the public hearing on National Single Window development organized by 
the Customs Department, where I met ICT officials from several agencies, as well as 
software vendors who were involved in the project. I was invited to attend the seminar on 
Enterprise Architecture held by the MOT where I conducted informal interviews with ICT 
officials from other agencies and many other software vendors. 
During the 12 months of fieldwork, I took notes and recorded audio for all of the interviews, 
recorded my observations in writing, and photographed relevant artifacts used in the work 
of government officials. While following the workflow of materials, for example, I 
photographed different types of official documents – external documents and memos for 
internal use, for example. I sometimes recorded video with a digital camera showing how 
officials interacted with the artifacts and worked with the e-Document systems. There were 
some restrictions on taking photos and recording video on case-relevant documents at the 
Administrative Court. The documents were used strictly inside of the courthouse by the 
judges and the case officials who were involved in the case. The informants did not allow me 
to take any photos or make a copy of their documents, but I did request a copy of empty 
forms and documents for my own reference. 
2.3.1 Units of analysis 
Most of the ministries and departments in my study have adopted information systems that 
facilitate three major government operational functions – documentation, financial 
management, and personnel management. However, these systems differ across individual 
agencies in terms of computer platforms, information structures, network protocols, and 
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work and system practices. Individual agencies have developed and used customized e-
Document systems, financial management information systems, and personnel management 
information systems. The agencies have outsourced their system development to over 30 
different software vendors. As a result, these systems have been operating in stand-alone 
versions at individual agencies. Until the late 1990s, the government made an effort at 
integrating common operational information systems under standardized information 
structures and technologies in order to facilitate information sharing across agencies and 
centralize the control of public sector resources. The technological and social change 
resulting from this integration effort raises questions about whether and how individual 
agencies have been required to change their existing ICT-related and organizational 
practices. My interest in addressing these questions led me to study the development, 
adoption, and use of e-Document systems, financial management, and human resources 
management information systems as stand-alone and inter-agency systems at the agency 
and national levels. 
In the inter-agency realm, the integration of e-Document systems employs a gateway 
strategy, using the government standardized information framework called Thailand 
electronic government information framework or TH e-GIF. The TH e-GIF has been 
employed in various government applications related to integrated information and services 
for interoperability across local legacy systems. For example, the MICT initiated the 
development of an integrated e-Document system project aimed at connecting various e-
Document systems developed and used by agencies with different information and 
technology platforms. Work practices around e-Document systems at the agency level, 
therefore, remain varied. On the other hand, the government has implemented government 
fiscal management information systems, developed by the Comptroller General’s 
Department (CGD) in 2004, to maintain financial and accounting procedure standardization 
across agencies at all levels, and to centralize control of government expenditures in real 
time for decision-making and planning purposes. The government has also adopted the 
departmental personnel information system, developed by the Office of the Civil Service 
Commission, to standardize government-wide reporting and procedures around recruitment, 
evaluation, promotion, salary, and benefits. Both national-level systems require agencies to 
adopt the new systems and practices at the local agency level. 
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At the national level but on a smaller scale, I also investigated the e-Customs and National 
Single Window (NSW) implementation efforts among trade-related agencies. The 
development of NSW was originally carried out under the MICT’s leadership using the TH 
e-GIF framework before the government transferred the project to the Customs 
Department. The associated efforts at integration and inter-organizational system 
development and use allowed me to examine cross-agency cooperation and competition over 
budget, power, and other organizational resources, as well as relationships among different 
interest groups of officials and politicians in the public sector. 
Moreover, I wanted to examine the development and implementation of specific-purposed 
systems at the agency level. This would help me understand how the implementation and 
use of such systems affects relationships among officials within the organizations, and how 
their use has changed existing work practices related to power and decision-making 
structures. One of the informants at the Ministry of Transport (MOT) recommended that I 
visit the Department of Land Transport (DLT) to see how the DLT reengineered its vehicle 
registration process and implemented the corresponding system. There, I witnessed how 
implementation of the vehicle registration system has transformed authorization and control 
structures within the department. 
Lastly, I studied the development and use of the case tracking and management system at 
the Administrative Court and its Office. This examination revealed attempts at managerial 
control through computerization within the organization, which officials at lower levels, 
who were required to adopt a specific system, responded to with resistance. These officials 
developed workarounds and adjustments in response to the attempts at control. 
To summarize, I carried out my research on the following systems across the agencies I 
studied: 
• e-Document systems (as stand-alone systems) 
• Inter-organizational standardized information structures (TH e-GIF) with 
interoperable systems using this framework, i.e., the National Single Window (NSW), 
and the interoperable e-Document systems 
• The government fiscal management information system (GFMIS) 
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• The department personnel information system (DPIS) 
• Specific-purpose systems: 
o The vehicle registration system; and 
o The case tracking and management system 
• The performance management information system to support the key performance 
indicators and performance management quality award (PMQA) implemented by the 
Public Sector Development Commission and its Office (OPDC). 
 
Figure 2 Systems studied in individual agencies 
My research was not meant to be a constructed series of mini-research projects through 
varied systems. Rather, these systems were common applications that most government 
agencies have been implementing and using. The study of the development, deployment, and 
use of these applications enabled me to unfold recurring themes of ICT development and use 
in the public sector. 
2.4 Data Analytical Process 
The data analysis in the dissertation was derived from a mixture of sources – semi-
structured interviews, ethnographic observation, and document analysis – to ensure data 
triangulation. In my empirical analysis, I combined data from all sources. However, data 
collected from the interviews proved most influential in my analysis since the interviews 


















































of one informant by comparing them with others. The empirical examples provided by the 
informants and which I myself observed played a key role in verifying responses from the 
interviews. 
During the fieldwork, I took notes during every interview I conducted, and recorded them in 
an observation journal. These written interview and observation materials served as the 
main media for data analysis. As ethnographic researchers suggest, written notes or field 
notes in ethnography are objects to be studied; they are reordered and rewritten, selected, 
and incorporated for analytic purposes [56,125]. I reviewed my notes several times to 
discern key themes. As suggested by Charmaz [2006] and Strauss and Corbin [1990], I 
analyzed my interview and observation notes via a process of iterative thematic coding and 
marked emerging themes of interest during the coding process [38,186]. Some of these 
themes concerned the persistence or change in the nature of hierarchical authority in the 
content of new system development: for example, required tasks, skill, and authority in 
computerization; changes in the relationships between supervisors and subordinates; change 
in organizational structures; interagency information systems; managerialism and control 
through computerization; limits and challenges of control; and resistance to hierarchical 
control. Others related to the premises underlying information systems and organizational 
properties. These themes included, but were not limited to, misalignment of technologies 
and organizational properties; barriers, challenges, and tensions attending the adoption of 
ICTs; resistance to new technologies; and the development of practical workarounds and 
adjustments. Still other emerging themes involved the context of government ICT 
development, such as the notion of boundary objects, agents, and organizations, information 
standardization, and information infrastructure development. As the coding schemes evolved 
over time, I did not restrict myself to a closed set of coding schemes or themes. 
2.5 Limitations and Complexities of My Research Methods 
Ethnographic methods helped uncover insider perspectives and behaviors on ICT 
development, adoption, and use through observation of formal and informal interaction 
among officials, and through observation of Thaksin ICT-related practices of government 
staff. Empirical evidence captured from insider perspectives in ethnography helps highlight 
causal links that add credibility to support emergent theories [8]. Moreover, if other forms 
of data are suspect, lacking, or missing, ethnographic approaches are often the most reliable 
 
30 
and practical means of collecting data. Ethnography enables research to focus at the micro-
level, a level of analysis that is often ignored or assumed to be insignificant. 
Ethnographies for this particular research field are, nevertheless, subject to limits and 
challenges. Firstly, ethnographies typically study only one organization and/or a limited 
number of samples, undermining generalizability to grander theory [8,79]. For my 
particular research project, an ethnographic study of ICT development and adoption in the 
Thai public sector may not be generalizable to other organizational settings with different 
political and administrative contexts. Similarly, data based on interviews and observation 
notes are a product of the researchers participating in the field; they are constructed through 
the process of analysis and the writing of the ethnographer [79].  
Secondly, the recruiting and sampling process for this research does not rely on statistically 
random sampling. Rather it depends on mutual trust and snowball sampling. Ethnographic 
data has been criticized as being inherently biased, both in a statistical and normative sense, 
hence limiting its reliability [8]. This limitation was very much present in my recruiting 
process. There may have been informants that were ignored in the study due to the non-
statistical sampling process. As a consequence, there may have been stories or cases that 
were not included in the findings. 
Thirdly, ethnographers have been accused of being “native,” which leads to normative bias 
[8]. Familiarity with the community being studied, that is, with informants at the micro-
level, may lead researchers to adopt insider viewpoints without critical self-reflection. 
Researchers need to recognize this challenge when collecting data. To produce richer 
understandings and enhance the validity of their findings, the researcher must combine 
other data collection methods with ethnography for triangulation. For example, researchers 
may employ interviews, participant observation, and document analysis in combination. In 
the field of digital government scholarship, moreover, researchers may use quantitative 
methods such as surveys to gain a broader understanding of how ICTs are used in the public 
sector before narrowing their research and questions to specific systems or practices.  
My study intended to gain a deep understanding about social and political factors and 
consequences of technology development and deployment. The rationale for using 
qualitative methods for data collection and analysis was based in the larger questions 
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motivating the study: whether and how do those consequences result in tensions and 
challenges to ICT development efforts of the Thai government, and how do the government 
officials deal with those issues? To answer these questions, it requires a prolonged 
ethnographic observation to see emerging patterns of how government officials interact 
with technology. The semi-structured interviews were employed to help validate the data 
collected from the observation. The interviews also enabled me to ask the officials for 
explanation and clarification of the rationale for their practices associated with particular 
information systems and artifacts in their work. Furthermore, the interviews helped me ask 
the officials to think back and compare their current practices with those after the 
computerization efforts. The mixed qualitative methods consisting of ethnographic 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and artifact analysis I adopted allowed me to 
uncover and understand the changes caused by the introduction of technology, and how the 
people make sense out of such changes that affect their routines and work practices, as well 
as how they respond to the tensions and challenges resulting from the use of technology. 
My project was exempted from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review because it did not 
include identifiable private information about individual members of the organizations 
studied in the research. However, with the data collection methods I employed I 
encountered a certain number of ethical and logistical challenges. First, similar to other 
ethnographic researchers, I faced a dilemma between data collection and presentation and 
the ethical treatment of research participants. Some questions that were related to political 
issues in the agency or in the government as a whole were considered sensitive and some 
informants were reluctant to express their opinions. Questions about corrupt actions 
regarding ICT procurement and development were also sensitive. Although informants 
wanted to tell me about that information, they were afraid that it would be traced back to 
them, and that they would suffer negative consequences. Therefore, it was imperative for me 
to ensure informants that their personal information would never be revealed. Sometimes, I 
was asked to stop recording an interview or taking notes when informants wanted to talk 
about their bosses or about corruption. In such cases, I needed to rely on my memory or my 
shorthand notes instead. 
A second issue I encountered is related to informants’ creditability and willingness to talk. 
Some informants were more willing than others to explain how a particular system worked, 
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how they used the system, and how the system had affected their working life. I found that 
lower-level officials tended to be more willing to talk about specific systems than higher-
level officials. Lower-level officials often provided vivid empirical examples of particular 
situations where they had to adjust their existing work practices. Higher-level officials, on 
the other hand, did not interact directly with the systems, or used them only at the 
administrative level, such as reading summary reports and approving transactions in the 
system.  
Some middle-ranked officials who supervised particular divisions and systems were trying to 
maintain a good image of the organization, but were not familiar with the systems in detail. 
Thus, they may have intentionally or unintentionally avoided saying negative things about 
the particular systems. Because of this, I always had to check with lower-level officials or 
staff who worked directly on the systems. 
A third issue common to ethnographic studies is unbalanced level of depth. To gain access 
and earn trust among informants require that the researcher take time and effort to make 
the informants comfortable with their presence. At the Administrative Court, many people 
were still familiar with me from the time I spent working there, although six years had 
elapsed since that point. I was able to receive honest responses about how officials felt about 
the organization, the executives, the current administration and control, and the systems. 
Respondents were candid in their responses about how they used the systems and developed 
workarounds during implementation. I also generated a significant amount of observational 
notes data at the Court as I could walk around the agency freely without making 
appointments. At other agencies, I was a complete stranger to the informants. Thus, I had to 
rely on the coordinators’ communication skills and their personal connections with the 
informants to initiate contact and to help me establish my identity and research objectives. 
Some informants hesitated to tell me how they felt about using the systems. Consequently, 
the data I generated about the Administrative Court was much more detailed than that from 
other agencies. When I analyzed the data, I had to be careful to balance out the details and 
depth of the findings across all agencies and informants. 
Fourth, I was a Thai government official myself, having worked at the Office of the 
Administrative Court’s ICT Center for over 10 years. As a former ICT official, I experienced 
 
33 
the insider/outsider tensions central to the ethnographic role acutely. Fox [2008] explains 
that as a member of the community where one is conducting his or her research, conflict 
arises between the researcher’s dual role as a member of the community and as a detached 
scientist. She notes that there is always a trade-off in being a native and insider between the 
issue of moral basis of the observation element and the head start provided by the participant 
element of the participant-observation task [62, p. 4]. I had to exercise caution not to let my 
own opinions, attitudes, or judgments affect the way I evaluated other officials doing their 
work when I was collecting data. I had to enter field settings with a fresh eye rather than as 
a government official. However, I could take advantage of having served as a government 
official as it gave me a deeper understanding of the hierarchical structures of the public 
sector, and about how official documents travel across divisions and agencies both in 
horizontal and vertical directions. I entered the field with prior knowledge about 
government structures, ICT planning, budget approval, and procurement processes, what 
common government applications were, and how they had been implemented. This allowed 
me to save a significant amount of time during the preliminary investigation and fieldwork.  
Fifth, one might argue that a four-month preliminary study and eight months of fieldwork is 
quite short for an ethnographic study. As discussed earlier, unlike many ethnographic 
researchers, I did not have to learn the language (Thai); nor did I need to learn the functions 
and responsibilities of individual agencies, divisions, and positions in the public sector; 
technical terms used in the government; or culture, norms, and hierarchical structures of the 
public sector. My professional background provided me with a basic understanding that 
would have required a great deal of time to acquire. Each round of my preliminary study and 
fieldwork confirmed and verified the findings drawn from previous ones. This has 
emphasized the data triangulation. Moreover, my professional status as a government 
official helped me gain access in the organizations relatively quickly. As the informants knew 
that I had also served as a government official, they were generally comfortable talking to 
me. Sometimes they asked me about ICT practices at my former agency to compare with 
their own practices. Therefore, I was able to situate myself in the studied sites easily and 
quickly. 
Lastly, I encountered the issue of site accessibility. While most studied sites welcomed me 
and allowed me to conduct my research and interviews freely, some sites limited my access. 
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For example, the Ministry of Interior (MOI)’s ICT Center allowed me to interview ICT 
officials regarding ICT development, implementation, and use, including the development of 
an e-Document system at the MOI. The documentation section head of the General Division, 
on the other hand, did not allow me to carry out my interviews and observation about how 
their administrative staff used the system until I had an official request letter approved by 
the ministry’s deputy permanent secretary. The level of accessibility at the sites played a 
meaningful role in the site selection process. 
In this chapter, I described the methodology, study sites, recruitment process, data 
collection, and analysis methods employed in my thesis. I also discussed the importance of 
process-focused methodology and ethnography in digital government research, particularly 
as they relate to this study. This chapter has provided an overview of the government 
agencies and information systems studied in this research. Finally, I have addressed the 
potential methodological challenges, biases, and limitations of the study, as well as how I 
overcome such issues. 
In the chapters that follow, I explore three key themes that emerged from the empirical 
program outlined above. The first involves ICT and bureaucratic control and managerialism 
in the public sector. This thematic analysis touches on several government information 
systems at both the agency and government levels. The second theme relates to information 
infrastructure development and standardization in the government’s interoperable 
information system development efforts. The third theme incorporates the concepts of 
boundary objects and boundary work in government communication to analyze the use of e-





Histories of Modernization, Development, and Reforms in the 
Thai Public Sector 
Considering the particular kinds of history and relationships the Thai government 
bureaucracy has developed over time is crucial for contemporary efforts to develop 
technologies to support administrative practices and reforms. The way bureaucracy has 
developed in Thailand greatly affects the nature of technological development and adoption, 
and has implications within the realm of digital government scholarship. However, digital 
government scholarship has tended to neglect these important historical dimensions. 
Therefore, in the following section, I offer a nuanced historical account of bureaucratic 
reforms and technological transformation in the Thai public sector. This account 
demonstrates the process of modernization in Thai bureaucracy and its relationship with 
information technology deployment in the public sector. 
3.1 Thai Polity and Bureaucracy: Historical Background 
The current political system and the bureaucracy of Thailand are the result of major regime 
transitions, first from an absolute monarchy to a bureaucratic polity in 1932 (B.E. 24756), 
and then to a democratic polity in 1973 (B.E. 2516). From 1855-1932, Thailand, or the 
Kingdom of Siam, was under absolute rule of the kings. The notion of modernization in 
Thailand emerged by way of external forces and threats such as colonialism in countries to 
the west of Thailand. However, the process of modernization was initiated and controlled by 
the kings and ministers appointed by the kings. Because Thailand had never been colonized, 
the kings were able to claim their centralized power, and change the political and 
bureaucratic systems as they wanted [170]. Modernization in Thailand, therefore, was 
criticized as the process of state-building rather than nation-building because the rulers and 
                                                
6 B.E. stands for Buddhist Era, which is 543 years ahead of Christian Era. 
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bureaucratic elites used social resources to expand their power, roles, and authority while 
citizen participation was neglected [170, p. 4-6]. Under absolute monarchy, the bureaucracy 
was the kings’ means of exercising ultimate governing authority over the country [23,162]. 
Bureaucrats were royal servants who served the kings [23].  
Although a democratic revolution brought about by a small group of military and civilian 
elites broke out in 1932, and Thailand became a constitutional democratic monarchy with a 
prime minister as the head of government, the nation did not yet transform its government 
and political system into a democratic polity. Rather, the revolution, led by westernized 
bureaucrats and the tradition-oriented military, simply freed the bureaucracy from the 
control of the king [170]. As a consequence, political power changed hands from the king to 
the bureaucratic elites. After the revolution, therefore, the country had entered the 
bureaucratic polity. Throughout this era, bureaucrats and military elites retained their 
higher social status over other groups in society because they controlled the use of capital, 
military, and other resources of the country. Thai politics had become a matter of 
competition between bureaucratic cliques for the benefits of government [197]. These 
bureaucrats were appointed as cabinet members and members of parliament. Career 
advancement of bureaucrats relied heavily on the power of their respective patrons and 
cliques, which is a clientelistic characteristic of Thai political and public administration 
[161]. Bureaucratic elites were the patrons in Thai society, exclusively controlling and 
administering public policies, while the interests of the people were not developed 
[164,170,177,197]. The state was dominated by small groups of business and bureaucratic 
groups, who enjoyed revenue factions gained from state enterprises and favored companies 
[168]. The patrimonial structure of administration led to policy and legal changes that 
reflected the interests of those in the coups, and limited the state’s ability to respond to other 
social and political groups outside that structure [168]. Therefore, Thai social and economic 
development lacked a political participation dimension [170]. Rather, development focused 
on two other dimensions – national security and social development. These dimensions 
promoted the deep-rooted influence and power of the bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), across the country during the 1960s. 
The initial transition of the Thai government from a bureaucratic polity to democracy 
occurred in late 1973 (B.E. 2516) when economic, political, and social change and conflicts 
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arose. The transition primarily resulted from an increase in demands for public services and 
increasing expectations for the government from the private sector and citizens throughout 
the country [170]. Mass uprisings in 1973 overthrew the military government, and had 
shaken the Thai bureaucratic polity [23]. The revolution symbolizes the beginning of the 
end for legitimacy of military rule and coups, while marking a major step towards 
democratic rule. Politics had separated from bureaucracy and taken a role in controlling the 
public sector. Politicians had interfered with the decision-making power and responsibilities 
of the bureaucracy. In the meantime, the public sector, following Weber’s bureaucracy which 
is characterized by division of labor, hierarchy of formal positions, rules and regulations, and 
jurisdictional areas, was criticized for its structural inflexibility and insensitive adaptability 
to new circumstances [170]. But it was expected to deliver public services as the public 
demand increased. Consequently, the public sector continued to increase the scope of its 
structure in response to the increase in duties and responsibilities. The bureaucracy had 
issued many rules and procedures to empower individual agencies to perform public 
administrative functions. These rules and procedures were inflexible, thereby becoming 
restrictions and limitations to public administration in return. The problems of structural 
rigidity and legal restrictions diminished the public administrative efficiency of the 
bureaucracy. 
As the nation transformed from a bureaucratic polity to a democratic polity, the political 
arena moved away from bureaucracy and military to general elections [23]. The major 
cabinet positions had been occupied mostly by businessmen, rather than former bureaucratic 
elites. The military elites had lost their political role and power, social status, as well as 
secondary incomes. However, military and other societal forces still managed to retain their 
economic privileges and be closely interconnected with bureaucratic and political elites 
through mutual business interests [149]. 
Meanwhile, democratic polity had brought about a struggle of political power among 
political parties [23]. In Thai politics, within a party, the competition for ministerial 
positions is based on the seniority of elected politicians. Moreover, elected politicians and 
political appointees had replaced bureaucratic elites as the new heads or superiors of 
bureaucrats in Ministries. Bureaucrats perceive elected politicians and ministers as new 
patrons who can support their career advancement within the bureaucracy [23,170]. 
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Empirically, the interviews with seven senior officials in four ministerial-level agencies 
reveal that political interference in bureaucracy has grown even more strongly in the past 
ten years. Appointment of the senior ranks from division director to permanent secretary 
positions in ministries and departments rarely depends on traditional merit and seniority 
systems. Rather, the purchase and negotiation of taking office in these positions are now 
commonly conducted among politicians and bureaucrats. Officials who offer better deals and 
who show their loyalty to the elected government and ministers tend to be rewarded with 
top positions, power, and authority, whereas those who are more senior yet politically 
neutral are usually titled in non-authoritative positions such as consultants or inspectors. 
Those who do not follow the politicians’ orders are likely to be punished by being banished 
to service in regional units. To remain in their positions or to be promoted to higher 
positions, high-ranking bureaucrats are forced to take sides politically and to serve the 
politicians’ demands, willingly or otherwise. Cases illustrating this reward-punishment 
system of career appointments are found in the large-project procurement processes at most 
studied agencies in my thesis. 
Thai politics have been dominated by money politics partly due to the rapid economic 
transformation in 1968 through the end of the Cold War [157]. The Cold War left behind 
suppressive controls and a hegemonic antagonism to popular political movements. This 
allowed politician-businessmen, especially those in rural areas, to control elections and 
monopolize parliament through extensive use of cash, intimidation, and pork barrel. 
Politicians competed for support from the citizens by embracing populist economic policies 
targeting people with lower socioeconomic status in rural areas, who represent the majority 
of Thai voters.  
The foremost politician who succeeded in gaining a majority of supporters using these 
policies is Thaksin Shinawatra. Other political parties and later governments copied and 
adopted similar models of political positioning. Various forms of subsidies and giveaways 
figured prominently in the most recent election of July 3, 2011. Political parties promise to 
increase incomes and develop a better quality of life by lowering tax rates, offering tax 
rebates for first homes and first cars, reducing public debt, raising the minimum wage, 
creating new jobs, and guaranteeing the price of rice, while simultaneously freezing gas 
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prices; offering free Internet in public areas, providing free medical services, free education, 
and free electricity for low-income earners.  
3.2 Public Administrative Reforms 
Public Administrative reforms can be viewed as the primary instrument that Thai political 
leaders have historically uses to further their political goals [26]. Early public 
administrative reforms in Thailand during the 1890s were initiated by King Rama V or King 
Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) to strengthen his authority and legitimacy, and to facilitate the 
goal of state-building [170]. Public administrative reforms during the absolute monarchy 
concentrated on “government reform” rather than “political reform.” The MOI and the 
MOD had been empowered directly by the King to perform a leading role in creating a 
unitary state. Structures of the public offices were organized following Western principles – 
based on a hierarchy of formal positions and the division of labor and specializations rather 
than personal connections [170, p. 59-63]. The result of public sector modernization and 
state-building was that the military and civil servants expanded their authority in the 
government. Decision-making power in domestic and foreign affairs, policing, national 
security, finance, and justice was incrementally transferred from the kings (King Rama V – 
King Rama VII) to the ministers from 1892–1932. 
After the democratic revolution in 1932, the first written constitution was promulgated in 
Thailand. Additionally, the military coup aimed to rearrange the relationship between 
executive and legislative powers. To that end, the coup established a committee to draft the 
Civil Service Act of 1933 (B.E. 2476) and the Government Organization Act of 1933 to 
separate and control executive power from political power for the first time [170, p. 105]. 
Influenced by French government organization, Thai public administration was organized 
as a combined system of centralized, deconcentralized, and decentralized functions. Since 
1892, the MOI had been central to government power. The government organization model 
in 1933 ultimately resulted in the organization that exists today. That is, ministries and 
departments located mainly in Bangkok perform centralized administration functions by 
formulating and executing policies. Most of the ministries and departments form regional or 
provincial administrations in Thailand’s 76 provinces. These units undertake 
deconcentralized functions by translating the government’s policies into practice, delivering 
public services to citizens in these regional areas, and reporting back to their own head 
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offices. The provincial units authorize certain decision-making responsibilities under the 
guidelines and supervision of the ministries and departments. Provincial governors 
appointed by the MOI head these provincial units. Local administration is self-governing 
and is characterized by a decentralization of functions. There are two distinctive types of 
local government: provincial and district municipalities and special administration areas, 
which include Bangkok Metropolis and Pattaya City. 
The MOI has had administrative power in the regional or provincial areas of the country 
over other agencies with limited interference of the elected governments since King 
Chulalongkorn’s reign. Therefore, it has developed a deep-rooted autonomy in the Thai 
bureaucracy through a number of government reforms for over a century [170, p. 136]. 
After the 1932 revolution, moreover, Thai government was typically comprised of 
bureaucrats and military leaders. Military leaders took turns assuming political power, and 
administrative reform centralized power in the hands of military rulers [26, p. 42]. Political 
change in Thailand focused on the separation of executive power between bureaucratic 
officials and political officials who were also bureaucrats [170]. In the bureaucratic polity, 
the power of bureaucracy was strengthened through the Civil Service Act, the Government 
Organization Act, and other relevant acts. The prime minister’s authority had been 
expanded to various areas of responsibility including government budget, civil servant, 
ombudsman, economic and social development, and the council of state. Following the Office 
of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister was established in 1959 as a centralized 
unit of major civil service authorities. The Office consisted of supervised units such as the 
Bureau of the Budget (BOB), the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), the Office 
of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and the Office of the 
Ombudsman, among others. Executive or decision-making power had been delegated from 
the prime minister to these organizations, particularly the Bureau of the Budget and the 
National Economic and Social Development Commission, whereas the cabinet of ministers 
was assigned to make decisions about administrative work rather than strategic matters. 
Bureaucratic autonomy has been enhanced by institutional weakness in the system of 
political control [146]. Moreover, the number of staff agencies under the supervision of the 
Prime Minister’s Office rapidly increased from 1959–1971 [37], demonstrating the 
centralization of executive power under a prime minister who came from the public sector. 
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From 1959–1975, the power of the prime minister had been emphasized through the 
Government Organization Act of 1959 [170]. However, the prime minister was designated 
and perceived as a chief executive officer rather than as a chief politician [170, p. 164]. 
The Thai public sector had gone through comprehensive administrative reforms focusing on 
personnel management system, and government downsizing and privatization throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s [22,146]. During the 1990s, notions of globalization and 
democratization from Western countries and international institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) were major forces for the promotion of good governance in Thailand 
[191,201]. Principles of democratic governance including accountability, citizen 
participation, decentralization, smaller central government, and strong civil society became 
dominant [26]. The 1997 Constitution of Thailand laid the foundation for a democratic 
governance regime, and provided accountability mechanisms such as the establishment of 
the Constitution Court and the Administrative Court. A series of reform commissions 
including the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) were established to impose a modernization 
strategy of staffing, administration, management and financial reforms. A mix of new public 
management programs and structural adjustment downsizing measures was recommended 
[147]. As a result, a 1999 Public Sector Management Reform Plan was initiated consisting 
of five main priority areas: revision of roles, functions and management practices of 
government departments; budget, finance and procurement management reform; personnel 
management reform; legal reform; and reform of cultural and public values (ethics and anti-
corruption). Further, after a military crackdown in 1991 (B.E. 2534), the Government 
Organization Act and the Organization of State Administration Act decentralized executive 
power from the prime minister down to ministers, permanent secretaries, and section heads 
in the central units and chief district officers in regional offices [170].  
However, scholars have criticized that the solutions implemented to address the issues of 
inflexibility, inertia, and complexity of government hierarchical structures in the Thai public 
sector did not adequately address structural issues [170, p. 168]. While the problems 
resulted from large, complicated, and inflexible structures, the solutions rather focused on 
various forms of decentralization and autonomization instead of reorganizing the 
problematic political and bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, the reforms did not address 
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fundamental problems systemic to the culture of the Thai bureaucracy – bureaucratic inertia 
and legal and bureaucratic complexities [23,25]. The bureaucracy resisted the change and 
remained true to its longstanding culture [23,147], defined by factionalism, 
departmentalism, and a tendency to preserve the status and autonomy of individuals, cliques, 
and departments [177]. Thus, reforms were criticized for representing a combination of 
political convenience and superficial transplantation of new public management ideas to 
strengthen the power of politicians and political institutions while failing to consider the 
impact of persistent bureaucratic culture [23,25,26]. Though elected politicians had become 
more powerful, bureaucrats still retained power over ministers because political power was 
diffused among elected coalition governments. Moreover, officials still performed their work 
on a traditional law- and regulation-oriented basis. 
Since the most recent public administrative reforms in 2003, the bureaucracy has 
substantially changed in its organizational and power structures, and in terms of decision-
making power and managerial control in traditional Thai bureaucracy. The new 
managerialism and reforms have integrated the development and use of ICTs in the public 
sector. The deployment of new ICTs has affected the role and relationships of government 
agencies and officials, the emergence of government organizational innovation, and the 
development of government information infrastructure and standards. 
3.2.1 Recent public administrative reform 
Since the country entered democratic polity in the 1970s, elected politicians have challenged 
the bureaucrats and traditional elites for executive and legislative power and for a greater 
share of control over patronage and procedures. In particular, Thaksin Shinawatra (in office 
from 2001 – 2006) and his allies have sought to assert greater political control over 
executive procedures [146,147]. Thaksin determined to implement his populist policies 
through his national election platform. Coming from the business sector, Thaksin demanded 
the implementation of modern business principles into the existing bureaucracy. The new 
demands from both citizens and politicians had put bureaucrats under pressure to increase 
the quality, speed, and efficiency of service provision and public administration. 
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The Thaksin Government launched a public sector reform program including a series of 
public administrative, managerial, and technical reforms in 2003. 7  This most recent 
administrative reform program was announced as the Strategic Plan for Thai Public Sector 
Development under the charge of a new Public Sector Development Commission and its 
Office (OPDC). The OPDC was established specifically in order to speed up the reform 
agenda that had long been delayed by the Civil Service Commission and its Office (OCSC) 
[92]. In addition to the strategic plan, the Royal Decree on Good Governance of 2002 was 
also promulgated. The results of the reforms included restructuring of the bureaucracy and 
implementation of instruments of public management reform. These new instruments 
included results and performance management standards; key performance indicators (KPIs) 
that shift the orientation of public administration from legal and regulatory to goals and 
results; result-based budgeting systems, finance, and procurement reform; personnel 
management reform; and reform of civil service core culture and values. 
The performance management and KPI programs have been widely implemented. The 
OPDC was established to be the prime minister’s assistant in determining budget allocations 
and in exercising discipline and control of all government agencies by deploying a 
performance agreement and management program. The program helped the Prime 
Minister’s Office, which supervised the OPDC, coordinate and control bureaucratic 
management, as well as evaluate the performance of each agency. The OPDC reported 
directly to the prime minister. 
Some scholars criticize the reform agenda, finding that it is best viewed as part of a 
politicization strategy aimed at centralizing political control over bureaucracy [26,147,158]. 
Additionally, these new reform instruments still emphasize centralization rather than 
promoting autonomization or decentralization to regional units or local areas. The 
principles of democratic governance initiated in the early 1990s were reversed by reforms 
that aimed to consolidate government power in the hands of the prime minister [26]. The 
power of ministers, politicians, and bureaucrats had been minimized, and the model of 
                                                
7 My periods of observation (2010 - 2011) took place long after the Thaksin administration. However, many 
administrative reform programs and subsequent ICT initiatives from the Thaksin government have been 
carried over into recent administrations up to my observation periods. 
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government had changed from power distributed among multiple centers to a hierarchy 
with a single center of authority or “CEO government” on top. 
Viewed as a politicization program rather than as a managerial one, these reforms were 
deployed to redistribute bureaucratic power to the chief political executive [147]. The 
reform efforts included four main strategies: revision of the budgetary process, the 
establishment of CEO governors, the restructuring of government, and revision of personnel 
and performance management.  
Budget reform 
Traditionally, Thailand’s budget system has been highly centralized at the Bureau of the 
Budget (BOB) and based mainly on a rule-driven approach [202]. The BOB based budget 
allocations on historical precedents, modified by adjustment factors. Interviews with senior 
officials at six government agencies indicate that every agency has an obligation to spend 
their entire budget before the end of the fiscal year (September 30) because the benchmark of 
good budget management depends on whether the agencies make use of the funds as 
proposed. If not, it is very likely that the next fiscal year, the agencies will have a budget cut. 
Moreover, agencies are given little responsibility for how funds are spent, and hence assume 
little responsibility for spending wisely [202]. Therefore, agencies have historically tended 
to not develop the accounting and budgeting capacity to allocate funds more effectively or to 
deliver outputs using fewer resources. 
Budget reforms were accomplished when a proposal for an output-based performance 
budgeting system replaced the traditional rule-based system [147]. The Thaksin 
Government wanted a budgeting system with the capacity to shift resources quickly in 
response to changing political priorities. As a result, the budget reform agenda has relocated 
approval authority, as well as the finalizing and submitting of budget bills, from the Bureau 
of the Budget to a Budget Commission, chaired by the prime minister, and consisting of 
ministers and Members of Parliament (MPs) appointed by the PM’s cabinet. Under the 
reformed system, the Budget Commission would sign a public service agreement (PSA) with 
each minister on fiscal and service delivery targets that were aligned with government 
strategy targets [149]. Each departmental head would then sign Service delivery 
agreements (SDAs) for the delivery of the required outputs. The performance of portfolio 
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ministers was evaluated against the PSAs, while departmental heads were accountable for 
the SDAs. These new budget systems have transformed performance management in the 
government, and have influenced new measurement techniques for official performance or 
KPIs at the individual level. Moreover, the development of GFMIS was also a result of 
budget systems reform. 
Replacing the rule-based, item budgeting system, output-based budgeting has shifted the 
focus of budgetary politics from negotiations between department heads and the BOB to a 
new system where ministers enter into performance agreements with the Budget 
Commission. Senior ICT officials in four agencies in my study reported during interviews 
that the Budget Commission and its sub-commissions automatically cut down each ICT 
proposal by 15%-20% regardless of how carefully the agencies prepared their proposals to 
meet standardized technical specifications and prices. Many ICT projects, as a result, need to 
be downsized, downgraded, or even terminated due to insufficient approved funding. In one 
interview, an ICT center director who has worked for the government for over 25 years 
expressed that he and his staff have to ask for budget approval from and explain the need 
and complexities of information systems to the MPs, many of whom are not experienced or 
knowledgeable about ICT-related matters. Moreover, many MPs are wealthy, young, low-
educated people who happen to be locally powerful and influential in some districts or 
provinces. Yet, they have a higher status and more power than senior government officials. 
According to the ICT director, the comparatively lower status and power of government 
officials bothers him and his colleagues because senior officials, although typically more 
experienced and having higher levels of education and expertise, must abide by the decisions 
of inexperienced politicians. Further, agency budgets and career advancement depends on 
the goodwill of those inexperienced people. Nevertheless, the new reform agenda has locked 
in ministerial and departmental expenditures to the government’s strategies [147]. The 
agenda has been criticized as being aimed at top-down politicization of the budgetary 
process, providing Thaksin with levers to assert his political control at a micro-level, and 
thus entailing a challenge to the dominance of the strategic planning and budgeting process 




The current Thai public administration is a combined system of centralized, 
deconcentralized, and decentralized functions. These functions are divided into three 
administrative levels according to the Organization of State Administration Act of 1991 
(revised 2002 and 2007), the Government Organization Act of 1991 (revised 2002 and 2007), 
and the Civil Service Act of 1992 (revised 2001 and 2008). The Ministry of Interior appoints 
provincial governors, whose roles include handling general interior affairs in the provinces 
and supervising local government, while other ministries and departments still oversee their 
field offices in the provinces.  
Reform of the public sector in 2003 engendered the new concept of CEO-governors. The 
CEO-governors were considered to be the prime minister’s assistants, acquiring their 
controlling power and authority from other central agencies [147]. According to the 
Cabinet resolution of February 25, 2002, the Bureau of the Budget authorized budgetary 
control of individual regional offices in each province to CEO-governors. In this manner, the 
CEO-governors assumed control over provincial budgets from individual ministerial and 
departmental field offices. Other central agencies also granted CEO-governors their 
authority in provincial areas. As a result, CEO-governors perform cross-ministerial and 
departmental, integrative, and executive roles in planning and coordinating provincial 
development, and are accountable for overall provincial affairs. Moreover, the cabinet issued 
resolutions on the integrative role of the CEO-governors, directing that the appointment of 
CEO-governors is under the authority of the cabinet and that the governors can be selected 
from among senior officials at any agency instead of solely within the Ministry of Interior as 
usual.8 
Government organizational restructure 
The Thaksin Government also implemented a major government reorganization of 
ministries and departments in October 2002. This restructuring resulted in 20 ministries 
and 143 departments, an increase from the 14 ministries and 126 departments that existed 
previously. The Ministry of ICT was one of the newly established agencies along with the 
Ministries of Social and Human Security Development, Tourism and Sports, Natural 
                                                
8 Cabinet resolutions of April 22, 2003, and July 22, 2003. 
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Resources and Environment, and Culture. The reorganization also resulted in an increase in 
the number of newly-created top positions for both politicians and bureaucrats [147]. The 
emergence of top positions and the reallocation of functions were perceived as a key part of 
Prime Minister Thaksin’s political legacy. He exercised the power of patronage to 
strengthen his control of the Thai bureaucracy through the appointments and transfer 
process. 
In addition, the Public Administration Act of 2002 (B.E. 2545) allowed ministries to form 
clusters of supervised departments with related functions. Clusters are headed by a deputy 
permanent secretary, who can be delegated the permanent secretary’s executive powers over 
the cluster departments. The long-term objective of this arrangement is to more closely 
integrate ministerial services, functions, management, and budgeting processes [147]. 
In addition to the reorganization of central coordination, the administrative reform strategy 
also introduced the notions of service integration, cross-departmental operation, and 
information sharing to other facets of the public sector. The OPDC proposed the idea of 
integrating service via service delivery units or service links, whereby agencies within each 
ministry provide their public services at the same physical location and/or electronic 
services at the same virtual site. A service link office gathers public services and officials at a 
single location to deliver all services. Service links are part of the new service improvement 
strategy under the performance agreements between each individual ministry and the prime 
minister. 
Personnel and performance management 
In the pre-Thaksin period, the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) started gathering 
information from all agencies about senior officers who would be qualified for appointments 
and promotions in the public sector. Although the primary criteria were seniority and 
selection from within the agency, the OCSC and sometimes the agency ministers exerted 
their influence on the appointments screening process, selecting the chair of the committee, 
and expanding the pool of candidates [147]. Personnel who appeared on the qualified lists, 
called Senior Executive Service (SES), would be considered for promotion and additional 
training. The implementation of this system was linked to proposals for performance review, 
merit pay, and recruitment. 
 
48 
The Thaksin Government, in 2003, approved a fast-track system of senior appointments to 
external applicants, across agencies and from the private sector, to encourage the movement 
of existing officials between ministries and departments [149]. The resulting need for 
centralized databases of cross-agency senior officials led to the development of a national 
personnel information system known as the Department Personnel Information System 
(DPIS). In addition to the SES of the OCSC, the OPDC and the Comptroller General’s 
Department implemented KPIs and performance ratings associated with the performance 
management reforms discussed previously. The government also allocated pay raises and 
monetary performance awards to high-performing agencies. Evaluation at the agency level 
is based on the progress and final reports in the performance management information 
system, developed by the OPDC and implemented at most of the ministries and departments 
throughout the country. 
To address the limits of the Thai bureaucracy’s traditional legal and regulatory approach, at 
the individual level, the OPDC has prioritized performance review and evaluation as key 
reform targets. The OPDC demands that all government agencies set up their annual plans 
as contracts between agencies and the prime minister, between divisions and the permanent 
secretary, and between officials and the directors. At the beginning of each fiscal year, for 
instance, an official and his or her division director reach an agreement about what tasks the 
official is committed to achieving over the coming year. The contract contains performance 
indicators for each task to help both parties measure whether the official meets the 
commitment at the end of the year. Higher-level officials, from division directors to 
permanent secretaries, sign two such performance agreements – one governing individual 
performance and one governing the performance of the agency, including its compliance 
with plans and strategic priorities at the national level. Ministers convert relevant policies 
into agency operational goals, which are then divided and assigned to specific divisions. 
Division directors in turn assign these to individual officials, where they show up as features 
of individual performance contracts. Some agencies have developed performance 
management information systems to track the performance of individual officials throughout 
the fiscal year, whereas others still rely on physical reports. 
As indicated earlier, these reform strategies have resulted in the development and 
deployment of centralized and integrated information systems at the national level. The 
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implementation of these systems has resulted in changes to existing decision-making power 
and organizational structures, relationships between officials within and across agencies 
(and sometimes between officials and politicians), and practices in the public sector. 
3.3 Early Computerization in the Public Sector 
The history of ICT introduction in the Thai public sector has been largely absent from 
scholarly work on Thai public administration and politics. The majority of research to date 
has focused on public administrative reform and on changes in political and bureaucratic 
power, decentralization, and autonomization [22-26,92,139,146-148,162,164,169,170]. 
Although a handful of scholars have studied the development and implementation of ICTs in 
the Thai public sector [40,122,133,167], their work has generally considered information 
technologies from the early 1990s such as networked computing, software development, and 
digital government initiatives. As discussed earlier in chapter 2, such output-oriented and 
model-based studies have been criticized for their failure to fully address the process and 
rationale of organizational change resulting from adoption of the new technologies [85,206]. 
Moreover, the history of traditional information technology development in the public 
sector in earlier periods, including processes related to document and file management, have 
for the most part been overlooked by scholars. 
Before the era of computerization, individual government agencies developed document and 
file management systems for internal use. Each agency established documentation and 
archival procedures to manage their physical documents. These procedures varied from 
agency to agency. In 1953, led by the Prime Minister’s Office, the government formed a 
committee to draft the Government Documentation and Archives Procedure. The 
Procedures of the Prime Minister’s Office addressed three main concerns: the process of 
document circulation and archiving; standards for official document formats and printed 
papers; and directories and cataloging for statistical and reporting purposes. The cabinet 
approved the first two sections of the Procedures in January 1954, and the third section one 
year later.9  
                                                
9 “Instructions on official document writing,” Cooperative Promotion Department. Retrieved from 
www.cpd.go.th on November 10, 2011. 
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In late 1963, the cabinet approved the revised Procedures on Government Documentation. 
The Procedures were issued and enacted on January 1, 1964, and were observed for nearly 
20 years until the next revision in 1983 (B.E. 2526). The Procedures identified six types of 
official documents, the components of each document type, and the officials authorized to 
sign each document type; the urgency levels of official documents and associated protocols; 
the procedures for document delivery and receipt; and preservation, cataloging, and loaning. 
The Procedures required that all official documents be preserved for at least 10 years at each 
agency.  
Agencies were allowed to determine their own individualized documentation practices as 
long as they complied with the criteria spelled out in the Procedures. This resulted in 
different practices from agency to agency. For instance, while general practices on internal 
documents (memos) were that supervisors may write down their comments or additional 
directions at the bottom of a document (Figure 3), an agency might determine that the 
memo would have a specific space on the right side of the page for supervisors to do so 
(Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3 Traditional documentation practices in which comments and commands are written 




Figure 4 A memo with a space on the right for additional comments and commands 
During the computerization period, the government adopted modern information 
technologies mainly for data processing. Computerization in the Thai public sector 
essentially began in 1963 when two mainframe computers were installed at the National 
Statistics Office for processing census data, and at the Faculty of Commerce and Accounting 
at Chulalongkorn University to support educational programs [121,122]. In the early 
period of computerization, government agencies sent their data to the National Statistics 
Office for processing. Later, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many agencies established 
computer centers to process their own data. For example, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), 
which handled a large volume of operational data, started to develop computer applications 
to support their routine functions. Influenced by computerized operations in the private 
sector, individual agencies that could afford computer applications outsourced their ICT 
projects to private sector software vendors. These applications addressed three major 
government back-office functions – personnel record management, financial management, 
and documentation management. Among the most common applications were electronic 
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document management systems (e-Document systems). While the Office of Prime Minister’s 
Documentation Procedures did not define electronic forms or procedures related to 
government documents, many agencies started using their own e-Document systems, and 
introduced internal Electronic Documentation Procedures incorporating new practices of 
electronic documentation work into traditional procedures. Other agencies implemented 
their own versions of e-Document systems. As the Government Procedures did not yet 
acknowledge electronic documents as official documents to replace the physical ones, 
individual agencies adopting the e-Document system could not and did not terminate their 
existing manual practices. As a result, the adoption of e-Document systems involved 
creating additional steps for scanning documents, entering metadata, and forwarding 
electronic documents. 
Individual agencies had outsourced e-Document system development to as many as 25 
different software vendors, resulting in different system versions and a variety of associated 
practices. One of the interviews I conducted with a senior computer official revealed that 
even for the same vendor, different system development groups offered different versions of 
e-Document systems, resulting in issues of interoperability and interagency coordination 
during later stages of government computerization. 
Individual agencies had developed their back-office information systems independently, 
resulting in disconnected systems and uneven development programs. Therefore, the Thai 
government started incorporating ICT development plans into the country’s modernization 
initiatives through a series of administrative and technical reforms. In 1992, the government 
established the National Information Technology Committee (NITC), chaired by the prime 
minister, consisting of ministers, permanent secretaries, and high-level officers from both 
the public and private sectors.10 The National Electronics and Computer Technology Center 
(NECTEC) performed the secretarial work of the NITC. The committee promoted the 
development of a national ICT infrastructure to improve public administration services [40]. 
As a result of its efforts, the committee issued the first national information technology 
policy framework for a 10-year period (IT2000), endorsed by the cabinet in 1996, and later 
                                                
10 “National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) (2001),” Country Paper: Thailand. The 
12th International Workshop on Information Policy and Management in the Public Sector. Retrieved from 




created the National ICT Master Plan (2002-2006). Additionally, Government Information 
Technology Services (GITS) was established to provide information and telecommunication 
infrastructure, including the Government Information Network (GINet) in 1997. GINet was 
the first government ICT platform for government web-hosting, high-speed Internet 
connectivity, and cross-agency information communication channels.  
The second national information technology policy, for 2001-2010 (IT2010), aimed at 
developing the e-Thailand initiative composed of five major flagships: e-Society, e-Education, 
e-Commerce, e-Industry, and e-Government. The Thaksin administration addressed policies 
concerning e-Government development, and emphasized the use of appropriate and 
inexpensive ICTs for good governance – accountability, transparency, and efficiency [40]. 
Reviewing NECTEC’s progress report on the e-Thailand project, however, one would argue 
that the government’s ICT development efforts for public administration and services, at 
least in the initial stages, tended to focus on creating agency websites to provide the public 
with information and electronic services rather than transforming the agencies’ internal 
operations through the use of ICTs. Moreover, the ministries and departments expanded 
their ICT development to include information sharing and integration of their services and 
applications within the agencies. The government’s focus during this period was to build a 
shared network infrastructure within each ministry. Well-funded and geographically 
distributed units such as the Ministries of Transport and Interior developed their own intra-
ministry physical networked infrastructure to share information among Department- and 
Provincial-level sub-units. Other agencies that could not afford their own physical networks 
leased telecommunication lines from either state-owned or private service providers for 
intra-ministry information sharing. These networks were disjointed, costly, and duplicative 
across agencies. 
I would argue that the national digital government initiatives before and through the 1990s 
served as roadmaps for less technologically advanced agencies to catch up with their 
counterparts, and for the government to provide technical and financial assistance to those 
agencies. Agencies that were more advanced in adopting ICT, such as the Ministries of 
Commerce, Transport, Interior, and Revenue already had a head start implementing ICT 
projects for service delivery and administration. Their projects, such as e-Tax filing and 
vehicle registration renewal, were used as showcases for the government to report to the 
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World Bank, the United Nations, and other international financial institutions.11 As a 
consequence of the ICT adoption gap among agencies and the misalignment of ICT projects 
of individual agencies with national digital government initiatives, government agencies 
later encountered issues related to service and system interoperability. 
To summarize, there are three themes from the history of public administrative development 
which contribute to the current form of bureaucracy, politics, and digital government efforts 
in Thailand. First, the Thai public sector has long been subject to organizational tensions 
between the push for hierarchical control and accountability and contradictory demands for 
discretion, autonomy, and freedom. These tensions have emerged as the result of periodic 
waves of bureaucratic reform. The current political regime and bureaucracy are the result of 
the transitions from an absolute monarchy to a bureaucratic polity in 1932, and again to a 
democratic polity in 1973. These transitions redistributed political control of state 
apparatuses, first from the monarchy to the military and bureaucratic elites, and then again 
from the elites to elected politicians. Social and political history greatly impacts the 
development of technology in a country’s governmental organizations. Therefore, the study 
of ICT development, adoption, and use in organizations should not ignore history and 
founding conditions as explanatory variables. The history of political and bureaucratic 
development or “modernization” has significant consequences for the ongoing structures, 
practices, cultures, and norms of public sector organizations. Therefore, any efforts to 
introduce new technologies in this space need to consider historical developments in order 
to foresee and avoid problems of structural misalignment and technological resistance, as 
well as unintended consequences of the adoption of new technologies. 
Second, the Thai public sector has long been criticized for its inefficiency and resistance to 
innovation. Critics decried public sector organizations as having excessive rules and 
regulations, slow and redundant procedures, rigid and conservative decision-making, and 
byzantine administrative complexities – all of which undermined both the efficiency and 
transparency of government operations. Pressured by its citizens and the principles of 
                                                
11 Some examples can be seen in reports the government provides to international financial institutions such as 
on the United Nations Public Administration Network (UNPAN) website. Retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan012807.pdf  
on November 12, 2011. 
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globalization, good governance, and democratization, the Thai government introduced a 
series of public administrative reforms in the early 1990s focusing on five main areas – 
revision of roles, functions, and management practices of government agencies; budget and 
financial management reform; personnel management reform; legal reform; and reform of 
cultural and public values [147]. However, these reforms were criticized as representing a 
combination of political convenience and superficial transformation. The public sector 
remained operationally and structurally the same. 
Nevertheless, the conservatism of the Thai public sector provides a balancing force for 
reform. Charles Lindblom [1959] argues in his classic justification of policy and decision-
making through “muddling through” that bureaucratic inertia may be necessary for the 
stability of administrative practice [120]. Incremental change maintains traditional practice, 
structures, and cultures of the public sector. And policy change through successive limited 
comparisons, social incremental values, and the actual experience of public administrators 
reinforce existing behavior patterns of the bureaucracy [51]. Incremental change may allow 
for certain forms of learning across change, whereas rapid change may result in obsolete 
routines and procedures [200, p. 91]. 
Third, the introduction of modern ICTs in the Thai public sector parallels public 
administrative development, back to the 1960s when the first computers were used for data 
processing. Since the late 1980s, the development of information systems and infrastructure 
has taken place first at large ministries and departments such as the Ministry of Interior, the 
Ministry of Transport, the Revenue Department, and the Customs Department. Among 
others, first government applications are three major government back-office functions – 
personnel record management, financial management, and documentation management. The 
systems have become a vital part of the infrastructure of government agencies as the design 
of these systems was integrated with work processes of the organizations. 
The design of Thai government applications reflects centralization or decentralization of 
authority and control in organizations. The relationship between socio-political and 
organizational conditions of particular governments and digital government development 
efforts calls digital government scholarship’s attention to the causal relationship between 
the use of information technologies and change in power structures – it leads to either more 
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centralized or more decentralized structures, or reinforces the existing structures – and 
change in existing organizational forms. The use of interoperable and interagency systems 
also brings about new organizational and institutional arrangements, as well as 
requirements and practices for government agencies. This chapter has laid out the social and 
political background, and modernization histories through administrative reforms and 
computerization of the Thai government, which have a significant impact on the design and 
development of government ICTs. Therefore, digital government may be understood as the 
collision among four major forces – government process expedition, centralization or 
decentralization of decision-making structure in daily operations, information and service 
integration and interoperability, and managerial control. In the next chapters, I examine 
how the Thai government and its agencies deploy information systems for their service 
delivery, public administrative performance improvement, and managerial control tools at 




ICTs for Managerial Control in Public Administration 
Large and complex organizations face problems of control and coordination. Managerial 
methods and tools including information and communication technologies have been 
developed to improve control and oversight in organizations. ICTs have played a central 
role in public sector reform efforts for the past 20 years as they by improving administrative 
efficiency and the quality of service delivery. However, the implementation of new ICTs 
brings about a new set of barriers and challenges resulting from old practices, legacy 
systems, and traditional power structures in the public sector. These tensions lead to 
adjustments and workarounds intended to limit and deflect the deployment and impact of 
new technologies. Digital government advocates have largely neglected the issues around 
resistance to ICT adoption and deployment efforts. 
4.1 Bureaucracy, ICTs, and Control 
Bureaucracy emerged in the first nation-states with centralized administrations, such as 
Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt, and became more sophisticated in the preindustrial 
empires of Rome, China, and Byzantium [11, p. 13]. Bureaucracy has served as the primary 
means to control large social systems. The goal of bureaucratic organization is to coordinate 
and control collective activities through explicit and impersonal commitments. Scholars 
studying management and control in organizations have long recognized Max Weber’s 
[1968] ideal type of bureaucracy, which displays six characteristics as follows [193]:  
1. The principle of official jurisdictional areas, which are ordered by rules, that is, by laws 
or administrative regulations. Bureaucratic agency or enterprise is comprised of 
collective activities assigned as official duties. The authority to give the commands 
required for these duties is distributed in a stable way. Only persons who qualify 
under general rules are employed in the organization;  
2. The principles of office hierarchy of formal positions impose a clearly established system 
of supervision and subordination;  
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3. The management of the office is based on written documents (the “files”). Written rules 
and standardized operating procedures further the rationalization of bureaus and 
offices as they demote personalized decision-making;  
4. Specialized office management presupposes thorough division of labor and training in 
a field of specialization;  
5. Official activity demands the full working capacity of the official; and  
6. The management of the bureaucratic office follows general rules and regulations, 
which are stable, exhaustive, and can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents 
the officials’ possession of special technical expertise. Weber notes that the stability 
and permanence of bureaucracy are assured through regular career promotion based 
on objective criteria [193]. 
The ideal type of bureaucracy may be used as a reference point enabling us to determine in 
which particular respects an organization is bureaucratized. For Hall [1963], bureaucracy is 
a form of organization which exists along a number of dimensions [78]. But not every 
formal organization possesses all of the characteristics of the ideal-type bureaucracy. Udy 
[1959] finds that these characteristics are not either all present nor all absent in any single 
organization [190]. 
Bureaucracy is seen to resolve some of the shortcomings of traditional organizational forms, 
such as feudalism, where authority arises either from tradition and custom (i.e., traditional 
authority) or from loyalty to the personal qualities of the ruler (i.e., charismatic authority) 
[41]. To the contrary, bureaucratic organizations are developed through rational-legal 
authority where acceptance is bounded by the rules and procedures of the organization with 
a clear technical qualification. Weber stresses that the rational-legal form is the most stable 
for both supervisors and subordinates as it is reliable and clear, yet allows subordinates a 
certain degree of independence and discretion. The features of bureaucratic organization 
allow the authority of officials to be subject to written rules and practices [41]. As a result, 
Weber argues that bureaucracy is able to handle more complex operations in large-scale 
organizations, and to attain a higher degree of efficiency than other forms of organization 
[41,176]. Bureaucratic organization is thus the most rational means of exercising 
imperative control over human beings [41]. But such order, for Weber, depends on the flow 
of formal authority and key advances in information technology – the invention of modern 
filing systems, without which such order and cohesion were impossible. 
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Nevertheless, scholars (including Weber) point out important weaknesses or dysfunctions of 
bureaucracy [41]. The most widely recognized weakness of bureaucracy is the increased 
rationalization inherent in social life, or what Weber refers to as the “iron cage of modernity.” 
Decision-making is likely to be categorized and programmed, and thus discourages the 
search for alternatives or tailored operations. Standardization of inputs, outputs, individual 
roles, and procedures makes adaptation difficult when circumstances change. Moreover, the 
exercise of control based on knowledge leads to the development of experts with technical 
competence, whose opinions and attitudes may clash with those of managers and supervisors. 
Rational-legal authority works ideally when supervisors have more knowledge and skills 
than their subordinates [41, p. 27,72]. Bowker and Star [2000] liken the notion of 
bureaucratic control through standardization to the concept of classification [20]. 
Classification systems are historical and political artifacts, as well as part of modern 
bureaucracy. The creation of classification schemes preserves control, enhances 
comparability, and makes visible what is wrongly invisible [187, p. 205]. Embedded with 
classified and standardized forms and procedures, information technology operates through 
a series of displacements, from action to representation, from the politics of conflict to the 
invisible politics of forms and bureaucracy [20, p. 320]. For Bowker and Star, Weber’s iron 
cage of bureaucracy constrains humans’ true freedom of action through a set of rules [20]. 
Freedom is traded off against structurelessness; too much freedom may be confusing, or may 
lead to breakdowns in comparability across settings, thus impairing communication [187]. 
On the other hand, too much control and enforcement renders an information system 
unfriendly to its users. Information technology, as information infrastructure, adds another 
level of depth to/ the iron cage. As Bowker and Star note, “In its (information infrastructure’s) 
layers, and in its complex interdependencies, it is a gossamer web with iron at its cores” [20, p. 320]. 
4.1.1 ICTs and bureaucratic control 
Subsequent studies have built on this insight, emphasizing the use of ICTs as a tool for 
bureaucratic control and coordination. Goody [1986] asserts that the rise of modern and 
pre-modern state forms of development of writing allowed a new centralization in the 
exercise and function of administrative power [70]. Writing is essential in the development 
of bureaucratic states because it enables the administration to grow and maintain direct 
authority throughout the hierarchical order. Contact between rulers and ruled in a large-
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scale organization is indirect, carried out through a hierarchy of officers distributed 
throughout the nation, relying on intermediaries to transmit messages between them. 
Writing standardizes communication between geographically dispersed members in a large 
bureaucratic organization. Furthermore, the written word enables subordinates to 
communicate in a formal manner with their superiors from a distance [70]. The separation 
characterizing organizations of the Weber-type bureaucracy depends on the increased 
formalization of administrative procedures that writing promotes, as evidenced in the Near 
East empires [70]. 
Yates [1989] makes a similar point about control and organization technologies for 
complex bureaucratic organizations [204]. Internal and external growth and systemization 
of organizations require new methods of management that can help achieve efficient 
coordination of large, multifunctional organizations. Systematic management was developed 
to eliminate confusion and oversight, coordinate efforts, and return organizational control to 
higher-ranked people in organizations [204, p. 9-10]. Organizations sought to achieve 
better control of processes and outcomes by imposing systems of standardized procedures, 
formal communication, and record-keeping. Standardized systems and procedures, rather 
than reliance on individualized practices, enabled the managerial class to exercise control 
over the working class. Moreover, records, reports, and other documents became a collective 
repository of organizational memory and freed organizations from relying on individual 
memories. 
Besides written documents, hierarchies providing downward and upward flows of 
communication are another essential tool for managerial control of finances, facilities, 
materials, and processes [204]. Processes were recorded in handbooks and other written 
records, and passed down the hierarchy to govern work methods. In this way, work 
processes became institutionalized and independent of the individuals performing them. 
Likewise, records and reports documenting actual operations were sent up to higher levels 
for operational analysis and performance evaluation. Cost accounting systems were invented 
to help management compare operational performance among units. All performance 
evaluation and production control systems depended on documentation and upward flows of 
information to allow middle and upper management to monitor, control, evaluate, and 
improve operations at lower levels. Additionally, horizontal flows of written records and 
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communications across the hierarchy within organizations enabled coordination of activities 
between functional areas. 
As organizations grew in size, structural complexity, and geographical dispersion, other 
information and communication technologies than just written documents were 
implemented to support organizational management. Yates argues that filing systems 
served as tools for organizing work and the division of labor [204]. Filing technologies in 
many forms such as flat files, folders, and vertical files affect the function and form of 
communication within modern organizations. Yates discusses the impact of filing systems on 
the function and nature of internal communication. Vertical filing systems, in which 
documents were organized by intended use on their edge in folders made papers easier to 
arrange and to use, thereby creating an accessible corporate memory to supplement or 
supersede individual memories [204, p. 56-62]. Filing systems enabled organizations to 
handle increased documents and correspondence by increasing the efficiency of storage and 
retrieval. The enhanced accessibility of records and internal correspondence facilitated the 
use of internal communication as an effective tool of systematic management. The early 
years of the twentieth century witnessed the creation of centralized filing departments to 
handle the files of large organizations, in addition to decentralized filing and local files for 
ready reference at departments and subunits of departments [204, p. 62]. 
Regarding the use of information for social control, Beniger [1986] argues that bureaucratic 
organizations themselves are information processors and controllers [11]. For Beniger, 
bureaucracy serves as the generalized means to control any large social system [11, p. 13]. 
Like Yates, he asserts that control is achieved through hierarchical supervision and 
administration. The rise of bureaucratic control is enhanced by innovations of information 
technology for creating, recording, storing, and processing information and communicating 
with and possibly controlling its internal and external environments. In his analysis of 
control systems, Beniger refers to rationalization as preprocessing of information and argues 
that computerization employs this information preprocessing to serve control through 
Weber’s notion of rationalization [11]. Through rationalization, he notes that, “control can 
be increased not only by increasing the capability to process information but also by decreasing the 
amount of information to be processed” [11, p. 15]. Beniger further examines the implications of 
rationalization for control. In Weber’s time, control was realized through bureaucratization 
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and standardization, whereas today it is accomplished through computerization [11]. Rapid 
growth in the amount of information to be processed results in the development of 
standardized paper forms within a bureaucracy to convert unstructured, nuanced, and 
detailed information into the limited range of formal, objective, and impersonal information 
represented by standardized forms. 
The use of information and communication technologies for control and coordination in 
organizations brings about tensions and challenges for workers at lower levels, whose work 
practices are forcibly affected. A thorough examination of tensions around computerization 
and control at the organizational level can be found in Zuboff [1988], who emphasizes the 
roles and goals of management in using information technology to reinforce its sense of 
control over both production and organizational functions, thereby reinforcing hierarchy 
[207]. The “informating” potential is built into new computer-automated work systems, 
codifying organizational functions, events, and processes and displaying them as information. 
Zuboff refers to this process as “textualizing” the organizational environment [207, p. 126]. 
The informating power of technology results in radical change in the ways in which 
organization carries out its tasks and in which the organizational members use information. 
It gives managers new resources of oversight and control by making the performance of 
subordinates more visible through more accurate, timely, and detailed records of ongoing 
work practices. Informating systems automatically, continuously, and transparently record 
almost anything the management wants to capture. They thus become a monitoring tool 
called an information panopticon, a concept derived from the work of Jeremy Bentham [12]. 
For subordinate workers, this produces new forms of surveillance. It challenges the 
employee’s role and undermines the sources of authority on which his/her influence depends 
with direct consequences for work life quality and workplace power. It may also spark new 
and subtle forms of resistance, as workers seek to limit, undermine, or work around the 
“informating” tendencies of the new technologies. Conversely, information systems are also 
used as technical means of subordinates’ defense against their superiors. When subordinates 
lack confidence in the shared values of the authority relationship with their superiors, they 
rely on technical means of self-protection [207, p. 344]. 
Electronic text is the result of a more radical centralization as information is gathered and 
codified in a single computerized system. However, this radical centralization enables an 
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equally radical decentralization [207, p. 180]. In principle, the contents of electronic text 
can be constituted at any time from any place, and thus can infuse an entire organization at 
any time anywhere. In Zuboff’s study of a banking institution, the database environment 
changed the structure of the banker’s role by reintegrating those functions. Although the 
banker did not oppose the new technology, they resisted this reintegration of their roles 
because they were concerned about loss of self-protection from shedding routine activities 
and the dependence on others. Another issue concerning the new technology’s 
implementation related to how bankers were evaluated and rewarded [207]. The database 
environment was perceived by the bankers as turning performance evaluation from 
subjective to objective by quantifying their ability to generate profits. Individuals were 
judged and their mistakes were discovered. The account officers, thus, resisted the notion of 
the database environment. Furthermore, the database environment resulted in the banker 
losing control over the information infrastructure. As data was automatically generated 
from business transactions, it became available and accessible to everyone. The bankers’ 
influence derived only from knowledge about the data, not ownership. Therefore, the 
integrated database challenged the preeminence of upper-level managers in their role as the 
organization’s thinkers. 
In this way, informating technology poses challenges to organizations and their 
environments, causing organizations to change their traditional behaviors to align with the 
premises underlying the technology to be implemented. Otherwise, mis-aligned 
organizational environments can become a major barrier to the adoption of the technology. 
Moreover, workers at different hierarchical and functional levels may resist the 
implementation of the technology. 
4.1.2 The limits of control: Tensions and resistance 
A number of scholars in the field of technologies and organizational change speak to 
tensions and challenges attending the adoption of technology and resistance to technology 
in organizations. Markus [1983] offers social scientific theories of social resistance to 
technology in order to inform Management Information System (MIS) professionals about 
better system implementation strategies [127]. Markus is an organizational politics analyst 
in segmented institutionalism, as categorized by Kling [98]. She builds her theories on 
Kling’s theoretical perspectives and conducts a case study on organizational impacts 
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surrounding the implementation and use of management information systems to evaluate 
her theories and their assumptions. 
Markus’s three divergent theories explain why resistance of individuals or organizational 
sub-units to technological change occurs [127]. Her people-determined theory finds that a 
person or sub-unit resist because of factors internal to the person or group. People 
intuitively resist all changes. Secondly, Markus’s system-determined theory finds that a person 
or group resist because of factors inherent in the application or system implemented. 
People’s behavior is determined externally by the environment or by technology. They tend 
to resist systems that are not ergonomically designed, technically deficient, or not user 
friendly. Markus further explains that these two theories can be held simultaneously. A 
compound theory gives an explanation about resistance that “there is always a tendency for 
people to resist systems, but, other things being equal, they are less likely to resist ones that are well 
designed” [127, p. 431]. Finally, her interaction theory asserts that people or groups resist 
technological systems because of an interaction between characteristics related to the people 
or features of organization and social context and characteristics related to the systems. One 
aspect of social context involves politics and power dynamics among groups and divisions 
within an organization. A system in which characteristics are not aligned with 
characteristics of the organization or the people in the organization is likely to be resisted. 
For instance, organizations with decentralized authority structures resist systems that 
centralize control over data. Similarly, people who stand to lose power will resist systems 
that alter the balance of power in organizations, whereas those who look to gain power will 
accept them. Additionally, relationships among individual or groups and incentive schemes 
that may facilitate or hinder organizational change and the implementation of systems need 
to be identified. Incentive schemes that do not reward desired behaviors or punish undesired 
behaviors when a system is implemented will create resistance to the system. 
Concurring with Kling, Markus refers to technological systems as vehicles for creating 
organizational change [127]. Greater implied change is more likely to create resistance. The 
interaction theory can explain different responses by the same group of users to the same 
system, and different outcomes for the same system in different organizational settings. The 
theory consists of variations. First, the socio-technical variant focuses on the distribution of 
responsibility for organizational tasks across various roles and on organizational 
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communication and coordination around this division of labor. New information systems 
may result in change in a division of roles and responsibilities. Another variant is political 
version, which explains resistance as a product of the interaction of system design features 
with the intra-organizational distribution of power. 
In order to evaluate those theories, Markus argues that we cannot test theories directly 
whether people resist technology because of internal factors, external factors, or interaction 
effects [127]. However, we can examine and compare basic assumptions underlying the 
theories with actual cases. Then, we can test predictions derived from theories against 
observed occurrences. The basic assumptions of the theories involve assumptions about 
information systems (system-determined) and assumptions about the nature of the 
organizational setting (people-determined). A third assumption is beliefs about the nature of 
resistance. 
Assumptions about information systems describe purposes of the systems. The rational 
theory of management, for example, holds the assumption that the purposes of information 
systems are to rationalize work or achieve predictable outputs with consistent units of input, 
to enhance managerial decision-making and planning, to control and motivate the 
performance of employees, and to improve intra-organizational and inter-organizational 
communication and coordination among organizational members and their relevant social 
parties such as customers, suppliers, and competitors [127]. Non-rational systems theorists 
like Kling [98] and Markus find that the purpose of non-rational systems is to change the 
balance of power in an organization in order to gain control over or reduce dependence on 
members of a different occupational group. 
Assumptions about organizational settings describe organizational contexts of the 
workplace in which information systems are used in terms of structure, culture, and 
employment contracts. These assumptions help explain how people and groups are affected 
by proposed information systems and how resistance occurs. The rational theory of 
management believes that all organizational members share common goals for the 
organization and will collaborate to achieve these goals [127]. In contrast, the non-rational 
theory assumes that different individuals or groups have different goals depending on their 
location in the organizational hierarchy. Thus, they can be expected to try to achieve local 
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objectives rather than global organizational objectives. This assumption is aligned with 
Kling’s class politics analysis which assumes the existence of competing intra-organizational 
goal systems. 
Assumptions about the nature of resistance define resistance as behaviors intended to 
prevent the implementation or use of a system, or unintended behaviors resulting from 
ignorance of the system’s existence [127]. The interaction theory explains that the interests 
and intentions of users and designers are identified and compared. When these interests are 
similar, resistance is unlikely to occur. As the difference between their interests increases, 
the possibility of resistance also increases. 
Drawing on an empirical case study, Markus concludes that people-determined and system-
determined theories cannot make accurate predictions about eliminating resistance to a new 
computer-based system. Rather, she argues that the interaction theory can predict 
resistance-generating conditions as “mismatches between the patterns of interaction prescribed by a 
system and the patterns that already exist in the setting into which the system is introduced” [127, p. 
438]. 
Studies of technological resistance are also substantially discussed in the world of 
Computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) research. Grudin [1988] studies the 
adoption of electronic calendars featuring automatic meeting scheduling on a networked 
system [73]. His findings suggest that electronic calendaring applications are resisted 
because of the disparity between those who will benefit from them and those who must do 
additional work to support them [74,75]. While managers who call a meeting benefit from 
such systems, subordinates do not perceive a direct benefit from the use of the applications. 
They perceive that the costs of using the applications outweigh the benefits, and thus do not 
want to use electronic calendaring systems [73]. Grudin summarizes that the design 
processes of the electronic calendar and automatic meeting scheduling systems fail because 
the intuition of the decision-makers is poor. Managers see the potential benefits for people 
similar to themselves, but ignore the implications for others, such as subordinates who will 
need to do extra work [73]. To avoid application resistance, Lucas [1975] suggests that 
system developers need to get top management support as well as multi-level user 
involvement in the design process [123].  
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Furthermore, Grudin argues that social, political, economic, and motivational factors affect 
the adoption of technology [75]. Actions of organizational members are implicitly and 
unconsciously guided by these factors, and by awareness of the personalities and priorities of 
surrounding people. Technology that interferes with the existing social dynamics and 
political structures of users in organizations tends to be resisted. From a design perspective, 
Grudin suggests that technologies which ignore the sensitivity of certain social conventions 
and motivational concerns of organizations and users, which lead to undesired social 
processes or work practices, are likely to be resisted. For instance, a work management 
system that automatically forwards employees’ priority problem reports to the chief 
executive officer violates the sensitivity of certain communications. The unintended result of 
implementing such a system is that employees may stop reporting problems. Moreover, 
technically savvy employees may practice workarounds such as writing a program to change 
the dates of the reports in order to satisfy the automatic monitoring system.  
Consistent with Grudin, Kraemer and King [1988] also find that most efforts to develop 
supportive decision-making technology have focused on the relatively narrow, rational view 
of the decision process [108]. As experience shows and as decision behavior models suggest, 
however,  
“This rational viewpoint is limited in its utility to real-world decision making because it 
specifically excludes the baffling nonrational or quasi-rational behaviors individuals often 
exhibit” [108, p. 135-136].  
Such ambiguities in decision-making processes make system design for group decision 
support systems difficult. Ackerman [2000] refers to this gap between social practices and 
technological feasibility of technologies as the social-technical gap – a gap between social 
requirements and what technological artifacts afford [1]. While social activity is fluid and 
nuanced, networked electronic systems often have considerable difficulty handling this detail 
and flexibility [1, p. 181]. 
Orlikowski [1992] studied the adoption and use of Lotus Notes groupware and 
collaboration technology in a large consulting firm [142]. According to her findings, 
structural properties of organizations, consisting of reward systems, policies, work practices, 
culture, and norms, need to be aligned with the underlying premises of the technologies. If 
the premises are incompatible with the organization’s structural properties, it is unlikely 
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that collaboration technologies will be used and workers are likely to exhibit resistance to 
the desired use of the technologies. The organizational failure to adopt Notes exemplifies the 
alignment issue. While Notes was introduced in an organization to promote the 
coordination of activities, the organization’s competitive and individualistic culture and rigid 
hierarchical career path did not support cooperation or sharing of expertise and knowledge 
with peers.  
Moreover, the consulting organization’s reward systems and incentive schemes were not 
aligned with the premises of Notes [142]. In an organizational environment where 
knowledge is power, consultants feared that sharing their expertise would hurt their chances 
of generating a unique contribution [144]. They worried that their use of the collaborative 
properties of Notes would threaten their status within the firm. Also, the firm’s time-based 
billing structure did not allow consultants to bill their learning or using of Notes to clients, 
requiring them to sacrifice their personal time to learn it. They were therefore unwilling to 
spend time with the software.  
Finally, a lack of explicit procedures and policies, and ambiguity about the nature of 
responsibility and liability around Notes, led to the difficulty of enforcing policies and 
implementing Notes organization-wide [142]. When an organization deploys a new 
technology that does not fit with the organization’s structural elements, those elements will 
likely require substantial changes. 
Another obstacle of adopting new technology is the absence of communication and proper 
training to help users understand the system’s purposes and how to use it [142,207]. Zuboff 
argues that “computerization should be accompanied by a serious educational effort, if the 
informating capacity of the technology is to be exploited” [207, p. 217]. Similarly, Orlikowski 
suggests that introducing a new technology requires the organization to communicate about 
product information to its employees and to provide a training program to augment existing 
technological frames so that the adoption, understanding, and use of the technology will be 
aligned with the purposes of the technology [142]. 
4.1.3 ICTs and organizational structures 
Scholars studying information technologies and organizational change have debated the 
impact of computerization on control in organizations. This debate concerns whether 
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computerization causes greater centralization or decentralization of authority and control in 
organizations. Some scholars claim that computers encourage centralization because 
information is available and reported upward to higher levels. Decision-making moves 
upward in the organizational hierarchy. Among advocates of this position, Leavitt and 
Whisler [1958] were among the first to contend that the introduction and use of 
computerized information systems leads to the centralization of organizational decision 
authorities [117]. Whisler [1970] noted that when they automate, firms centralize their 
administrative offices; the decision-making moves upward in the organizational hierarchy 
and managers are usually more robust while clerical jobs diminish in scope, variety, and 
autonomy [196]. In the following decades, other researchers conducted empirical studies 
that supported this argument [87,126,136,163,165,199,205]. 
However, other researchers have argued that the use of information systems tends to 
decentralize power and control [5,15,16,31,94,131,156]. Empirical studies supporting this 
viewpoint suggest that computers replace or displace routine decision-making at lower and 
middle levels, thereby increasing the capacity of these levels to handle less routine decisions 
[94]. The consequence is greater decentralization. Blau and Schoenherr [1971] 
demonstrate that computerization plays a major role in bureaucratic and administrative 
control of lower levels. Computer systems are an essential tool for formalizing tasks and 
monitoring lower-level decision outcomes [16]. Although this appears to be greater 
decentralization, it may entail the delegation of more routine decisions whose outcomes are 
more closely controlled through computerization [165]. Enacted by computerization, power 
and control over the premises for decision-making may be more concentrated than 
previously. 
Whether computerization causes centralization or decentralization of decision authorities, 
Markus and Robey [1988] define these positions as variants that both assume a causal 
relationship where computerization causes changes in organizational decision authority 
structures [128]. This view is referred to as the technological imperative. As Markus and 
Robey argue,  
“(T)echnological imperative views technology as an exogenous force which determines or 
strongly constrains the behavior of individuals and organizations” [128, p. 585]. 
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Still other scholars argue that there is no inherent causal relationship between computerization 
and decision authority structure [29,35,49,50,137,165,188]. Computerization can support 
either form of decision authority [49]. Buchanan and Boddy [29] and Carter [35] found 
that the organization of work after automation is influenced by many variables, including 
but not limited to aspects of the individual computers [66]. Based on his study of the effects 
of computer information systems on organizational authority and control in eight 
organizations, Robey [1981] concluded that the instances of no change outweigh the 
incidence of change [165]. He also pointed out that these findings were congruent with 
Kling’s [1978] studies of information systems as an instrument of organizational power 
[96]. Moreover, where information systems do not produce changes in structure, they 
reinforce existing structures [165]. Where changes occur, centralization appears to be the 
most common result as systems produce more centralized control through standardization 
of information, more complete record-keeping, and faster processing.  
A fourth position of the debate over the relationship between computerization and 
organizational change turns the causality around, suggesting that organizations shape 
computerization efforts to conform to their prevailing decision authority structures. 
Researchers in this tradition assume that computerization activities reflect the prevailing 
centralized or decentralized persuasions of the organizations in which they occur 
[43,46,54,96,105,114]. Existing power structures affect the technology rather than vice 
versa [96,103,105,106,160]. Computing technology is viewed as a malleable tool controlled 
by the dominant coalition in an organization and is used by that group to serve the interests 
of the status quo. Thus, the power of those in control is enhanced, and the existing power 
structure, whether it is centralized, decentralized, or a combination of the two, is reinforced 
[43,54]. Robey also notes that computers do not necessarily affect the distribution of 
authority and control. Rather, structural changes appear to be consistent with either rational 
management objectives, political strategies of management, or both [165]. Davis et al. 
[1984] reason that computers are no longer considered as innovations; they have instead 
become integral parts of organizations. Therefore, they do not affect organizations and their 
structures like they did in the past [46]. These findings support the argument about 
reinforcement politics. Markus and Robey categorize these studies as organizational 
imperative, which assumes that: 
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“(A)lmost unlimited choice over technological options and almost unlimited control over 
consequences…(I)nformation technology is the dependent variable in the organizational 
imperative, caused by the organization’s information processing needs and manager’s choices 
about how to satisfy them” [128, p. 587]. 
Markus and Robey’s argument further assumes that systems designers can manage the 
impacts of information systems by attending to both technical and social concerns [128]. 
Systems are viewed as tools for solving organizational problems. 
George and King [1991] underline the importance of managerial intent and managerial 
action as factors shaping the desired decision authority structure in organizations, and call 
this the managerial action imperative [66]. As they summarize,  
“(T)he reinforcement politics argument does not predict a particular outcome from 
computerization. Instead, the existing structure, which usually favors those currently in 
power will be reinforced” [66, p. 69]. 
From an organizational management science standpoint, similarly, computers and 
information technology are organizational resources over which different actors may lay 
claim [17]. Top managers can review the performance of their subordinates and can be 
more involved in decision processes through monitoring and reporting information systems 
[165]. Systems lead to greater centralization and stronger control over lower-level 
decisions and require greater standardization of input data from lower levels. Information 
system modifications may be used to affect a planned change in the social structure, or to 
enhance the relative power of the information systems group [6]. However, George and 
King point out problems with assuming a management imperative. First, there are 
components that constrain the actions managers can take. These constraints involve the 
inertia of the existing technological infrastructure and the traditions of existing political or 
administrative systems [54,198]. Second, external influences affect organizational needs for 
computing systems, and thus constrain managers’ decisions and options on the use of 
technology [66]. George and King emphasize that: 
“(T)his external influence must be recognized as a powerful constraint on any management 
imperative in use of technology, and we assume this constraint extends to the use of technology 
in reinforcing particular decision authority structures” [66, p. 70]. 
Drawing on management science [98] and managerial action imperatives [66], technology 
development and use is determined by the interests of higher-level managers in society or in 
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organizations. Management can exert influence on the specific choices of decision authority 
structure and the uses of computing technology to reinforce those choices through the web 
of opportunities and constraints [100,115]. 
4.1.4 ICTs and change in public sector power and control 
Early work in computers and bureaucracy, or in what would later come to be called the 
digital government field shared these critical concerns. Scholars like Laudon [1974], and 
Kraemer and Dedrick [1997] emphasize tension around managerial control as a key factor 
shaping patterns of centralization and decentralization in public sector computing 
[103,114]. Managerial action and decisions coupled with internal and external factors of 
public organizations, such as organizational history and context, resource availability, and 
legal and political features, are the key influences shaping organizational structure [103]. 
Centralized and decentralized structures of computing functions are powerful tools for 
reinforcing existing power arrangements as well as facilitating trends in organizational 
restructuring whether it is centralized, decentralized, hierarchical, or networked 
[103,106,160]. By itself, computing is unlikely to affect organizational structure [103]. 
Laudon [1974] finds empirical support for these claims [114]. He finds that the levels of 
centralization in the organizations associated with computerized systems are the result of 
political and bureaucratic forces, not necessarily of technology. Information technology is a 
tool whose ultimate social meaning, content, and consequences are highly subject to the 
influence of the specific political values and interests that inform its use [114, p. 311]. Kling 
[96] and Kraemer and Dutton [105] studied computing in local U.S. governments and 
conclude that those with power in organizations use computing to reinforce existing power 
structures, or to consolidate information needed for decision-making under the control of 
higher management. Kling, and Kraemer and Dutton demonstrated in their studies that 
systems for policy analysis in cities serve as political, power-reinforcing instruments. In 
contrast, automated upward-reporting systems may cause data providers (in this case, local 
officials), to lose power to data collectors, (here, mayors and city managers). Similar effects 
were found to accompany the introduction of computer modeling into government 
operations at the federal level [104].  
Drawing on these analyses, Kling concludes that the technical features of the system as well 
as the political dynamics of the setting in which it is to be utilized must be understood in 
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order to predict the probable impacts of computing [98]. Moreover, Danziger et al. [1993] 
argue based on their survey results from 46 U.S. cities that the structure of managerial 
control is more emphasized than the structure of computing facilities and services whether it 
is centralized or decentralized [44]. They find that centralized and decentralized computing 
can prove equally effective. They further suggest that the real concern of advocates for both 
centralized and decentralized computing functions is political power and control within the 
organization rather than quality of computing services. If an organization views information 
as power, then centralized computing will be deployed to concentrate power at higher levels 
in the organization. Public managers understand the potential of IT when it comes to their 
own interests, and they exploit it in the pursuit of those interests [109]. 
Nonetheless, Kraemer et al. [1981] note that trends toward centralization and 
decentralization of computing functions in public organizations have continued to swing 
back and forth independent of trends in computer technologies [106]. At the broadest level, 
efforts at computerization in the public sector therefore constitute a particular kind of 
‘computerization movement,’ subject to tensions around work flow and employee re-skilling, 
workplace discipline, and a wide variety of interpersonal, intergroup, and institutional 
relationships and power dynamics [99]. 
In the previous chapter, I illustrated the struggle over political and bureaucratic power and 
control in Thailand, and emphasized the centralization of information and decision-making 
power through public administrative reforms. In this chapter, I discuss the most recent 
program of public administrative reform. This recent reform program has resulted in major 
changes to traditional forms of bureaucratic power and control, has impacted relationships 
between the bureaucracy and political executives, and has promoted the expansion of the 
prime minister’s power in day-to-day administration. Later, I lay out the development and 
use of computing and information technologies in the public sector as stand-alone systems 
for daily operations and managerial control in individual agencies, such as the Court, 
drawing on both existing published work and my own empirical study. As a consequence of 
the most recent public administrative reform agenda, the concepts of information and service 
integration and interoperability were introduced to the Thai bureaucracy. Moreover, 
managerialism at the national level has been imposed through computerization efforts such 
as the fiscal management information system, and performance evaluation and management.  
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4.2 Managerialism through Computerization in the Thai Public Sector 
Government agencies have worked to increase government efficiency through a series of 
bureaucratic reforms and New Public Management (NPM) strategies and instruments. Since 
the 1990s, agencies have introduced modern ICTs aimed at improving public service 
delivery and increasing the quality, speed, and efficiency of basic operational procedures. 
Major operational functions such as budget and financial management, human resources 
management, and documentation work were computerized through digital government 
applications. However, these ICT developments were implemented at the agency level, and 
remained disjointed, inconsistent, and uneven, marked by local proliferation and weak 
linkages [89]. The recent reforms of the early 2000s brought about the concept of 
information and service integration, interoperability, and centralization. Through 
computerization, the recent reforms also gave rise to the development and adoption of ICTs 
as administrative and political control tools for the elected government to monitor and 
control information and other resources. I discuss government managerialism through the 
implementation of four information systems resulting from the most current administrative 
reform efforts – the Government Fiscal Management Information Systems (GFMIS), the 
performance management information system, the Departmental Personnel Information 
System (DPIS) implemented at the national level, and the case tracking system at the agency 
level. 
4.2.1 Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS) 
In 2003, as a result of budget reforms during the Thaksin Administration, the Cabinet 
appointed the Commission of Government Fiscal Management System Improvement, 
chaired by the prime minister, and consisting of ministers and officials from the Ministry of 
Finance, the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD), and relevant agencies.12  The 
Commission set up a sub-commission to work on the development of the Government Fiscal 
Management Information System (GFMIS), which integrated the budget procedures of all 
government agencies so that the government could plan, approve, monitor, and manage 
budget allocation and expenditures nationwide in real-time, while each ministry or 
department could monitor and manage the budget within its agency at the provincial or 
                                                
12 Cabinet resolution of January 15, 2002. 
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district level. The GFMIS is one of the first computerized systems employed by the 
government for managerial control at the national level.  
Prior to the GFMIS, agencies submitted requests for treasury payment to the CGD through 
a manual system. Once the CGD approved a request and transferred money to the 
requesting agency’s bank account, the agency would issue a check and notify a vendor that 
their payment could now be claimed. With these manual practices, the CGD struggled to 
reconcile the various non-standardized financial and accounting procedures, formats, and 
bookkeeping entry methods used by individual agencies. Further, the CGD was unable to 
track agency expenditures in a timely fashion. With the advent of the GFMIS, the CGD has 
established new financial and accounting procedures that all agencies are required to follow. 
The GFMIS has standardized government financial procedures and formats and has 
centralized government control of financial management among agencies throughout the 
country. The new system also accelerates financial transactions, including direct transfer 
and deposit from the CGD to vendors. 
The CGD, an agency under the supervision of the Finance Ministry, hosts the GFMIS 
servers and provides terminal computers at ministerial and departmental agencies. All 
transactions and processes are conducted on the CGD’s central servers. Owing to concerns 
about information security, access to the system requires user accounts and passwords along 
with access cards. Due to the limited number of computers and network bandwidth, the 
CGD can provide each individual ministerial and departmental agency with only two 
computer terminals and two accounts. For provincial offices where the CGD does not 
provide terminals, the CGD provides electronic financial templates in which officials can 
record their financial transactions offline, and upload the encrypted records to the GFMIS 
on the Internet. The government mandated that all agencies adopt the GFMIS. Besides its 
system provision capability, the CGD has financial and budgetary power over other agencies. 
Accordingly, it was able to require all agencies throughout the country to switch from their 
legacy systems to the GFMIS, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In the words of one 
senior financial officer I interviewed: 
“The GFMIS is mandatory. We have to use the system for all budget and expenditure 
requests. Otherwise, our payments to the vendors will never be approved by the CGD.” 
(Informant interview, July 2011) 
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The implementation of the GFMIS has brought about change in government budget and 
expenditure procedures, practices, and budget control structures at both the national and 
local agency levels. The GFMIS has increased transparency and has made transaction 
information instantly accessible to the CGD. This allows the CGD to monitor agency 
expenditures at all times and to discover potential transaction errors more easily. Although 
monitoring has tightened, officials did not express concern about being watched through the 
GFMIS. Rather, they expressed concerns about needing to be more careful and thorough in 
their own work. Previously, payment requests passed through hierarchical levels in the 
financial division before being sent for further approval to the CGD. Several people within 
the division reviewed the requests before sending them to the CGD. The repetitive 
processes required additional review steps, which helped officials detect errors manually 
before requests were approved. In the GFMIS, the system eliminates the repetitive 
processes and paperwork required in the manual system, as the financial section head 
becomes the request approver, and must rely on her own careful review. Middle managers, 
such as financial section heads, do not necessarily welcome the autonomy given by the 
GFMIS because it implies more responsibility and greater liability. In contrast, financial 
division directors may benefit from the autonomy as their accountability is lessened and 
transferred through the delegation of responsibilities. Moreover, since the GFMIS 
automatically transfers money to the vendors listed on the requests, even more careful work 
is required from the officials who have approval authorization. One financial section head 
reported that: 
“I am always anxious when submitting the requests in the system because once I hit the submit 
button, the money is transferred to the vendor’s account by the next day. I have to check again 
and again if that is the correct vendor.” 
  (Informant interview, July 2011) 
The GFMIS has enabled the government to evaluate the cost-efficiency of agency tasks and 
activities at the ministerial, departmental, and provincial levels, as well as comparing costs 
of individual agencies to support the government’s results- and goals-oriented performance 
management objectives. The system requires agencies to identify their itemized 
expenditures into cost categories, such as infrastructure development, upkeep and 
maintenance, etc. These categories help the CGD analyze the expenses of each agency, and 
afford comparison across agencies. In this way, the system serves as an information 
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repository and allows the central agency to reuse the information for analysis, something 
that was difficult to do in the manual system. A financial official noted that: 
“In the manual system, papers did not remember the transactions. When we bought the same 
items, same brands, same models, the CGD could not compare for price differences. But now, 
the GFMIS remembers everything. So, the CGD can compare how much we pay and how 
much the other agencies pay for the same thing.” 
 (Informant interview, July 2011) 
The CGD underlines the importance of activity-based costing – that all agencies must 
calculate and identify the costs of each activity in each division so that the CGD can compare 
figures across agencies. This process requires accounting officials to trace every transaction, 
find its original division, and contact the division to confirm the expense. They then have to 
match each transaction to the cost and activity category to compute the activity-based cost 
accounting. Each year, there are more than 2,000 transactions at a ministerial agency. A 
financial director I interviewed reported that she had experienced higher turnover among 
her accounting staff due to the tremendous amount of work resulting from implementation 
of the GFMIS. 
The GFMIS instituted standardized government financial procedures and practices, and 
centralized control of the government’s budget and expenditures. However, officials at local 
agencies find that the adoption of the system has given rise to frustrations with the limits of 
the GFMIS with regards to supporting the agencies’ internal operations. Due to system 
security and license limitations, the CGD prohibits individual agencies from connecting 
their local financial systems with the GFMIS. The system is designed to be closed, 
unconnected to agencies’ individual financial systems, facilitating the CGD’s objectives of 
budget approval and financial and accounting monitoring and control at the national level. 
The design of the GFMIS does not take into account financial and accounting practices on 
the ground, as it does not support the practices of individual agencies regarding internal 
financial and accounting procedures, reports, and audits. Therefore, most individual agencies 
still maintain their existing computerized or manual systems in order to generate 
appropriate reports and statistics for their internal operations. Moreover, the GFMIS only 
provides on-screen reports for the user agencies and does not allow any report printouts or 
exportable data. Agencies typically must capture the on-screen reports and print them as 




Figure 5 On-screen report printed out from the GFMIS for local-agency use 
Further, the design of the GFMIS does not consider financial and accounting practices on 
the ground. A financial section head at one departmental agency explained the way in which 
the officials actually used the system: 
“The GFMIS is very secure. The CGD determines that there must be a locked room for the 
system. It is not convenient because the financial director usually does not have time to walk 
to the room and work with the system. So, the director assigns me to do her system-related 
job. I am using her account.”  
(Informant interview, August 2010) 
Given security requirements and the limited number of computers and accounts that the 
CGD provides for each agency, officials are forced to rotate their shifts to work with the 
system. This illustrates that while the CGD takes full advantage of system implementation 
for control and management purposes, each user agency is forced to deal with access 
limitations or tensions attending their work practice. The agency has to adapt their work 
around these limitations. Local agencies and officials usually refer to this type of practice as 
a ‘survival system’ in which higher-ranking agencies or officials gain benefits from particular 
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systems or practices, and leave their lower-ranking agencies or subordinates to deal with 
resulting issues. The financial section head described the situation thusly: 
“Every end of the fiscal year, all staff in financial, accounting, and budget sections plays 
musical chairs to get those two seats in the GFMIS room. We need to process all the requests 
before the end of the year. They even have to stay late to 2am to get it done…. The system is 
actually fine, and even better off for the CGD. But the CGD does not think about how we are 
going to do with it. The system does not facilitate our work much. This is what we call a 
‘survival system’ where the higher authorizations get to choose what they want. They get 
want they want. And we have to follow their instructions.”  
(Informant interview, August 2010) 
At the lower levels of the Thai government, a change in roles and relationships within the 
financial divisions of local agencies has accompanied the adoption of the GFMIS. Prior to 
the GFMIS, when a particular division requested a purchase payment, the financial section 
was responsible for making treasury payment requests, whereas the accounting section was 
tasked with bookkeeping and handling the agency’s cost accounting analysis. Once the 
financial section submitted a payment request and a transaction took place, all 
corresponding papers were sent to the accounting section. The implementation of the 
GFMIS has primarily impacted the accounting staff. The financial section now records 
costing accounts when submitting a request, meaning the accounting staff no longer needs 
to carry out this task. Instead, their role has become to audit of the agency monitoring 
expenses of individual divisions within the agency. Accounting officials largely do not 
recognize benefits of the change in their role. Although the new would appear to reduce 
their workload, the accounting staff often finds that the data entered by the financial staff are 
incorrect or incomplete, and that the input process is slow. As a result, the accounting staff 
spends a lot of time verifying and correcting the data in the system before they can perform 
their accounting task. The data verification is tedious and delays their work. Moreover, the 
interagency cost comparison feature in the GFMIS has required accounting officials to come 
up with ways to describe and allocate expenses of the agency within the standard forms and 
categories laid out by the GCD. In this role, they face contradictory interests and pressures 
– from agency management, who want to present costs as low as possible, and from the 
CGD, who wants the itemized costing system to be standardized across agencies. 
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4.2.2 Results-based performance evaluation 
To address the limits of the bureaucracy’s traditional legal and regulatory approach, the 
Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), established in 2003 specially to implement 
and expedite the administrative reform agenda, has prioritized performance review and 
evaluation as a key reform target. The OPDC requires that all government agencies set up 
their annual plans as contracts between agencies and the prime minister, between divisions 
and the permanent secretary, and between officials and directors. At the beginning of each 
fiscal year, for example, an official and her division director reach an agreement regarding 
what tasks the official is committed to achieving over the coming year. The contract 
contains performance indicators of each task to help both parties measure whether the 
official meets her commitment at the end of the year. Higher-level officials, from division 
directors to permanent secretaries, sign two such performance agreements – one governing 
individual performance and one governing the performance of the agency, including its 
compliance with plans and strategic priorities at the national level. Ministers convert 
relevant policies into agency operational goals, which are then further divided and assigned 
to specific divisions. Division directors in turn take these goals and assign them to individual 
officials, where they show up as features of individual performance contracts.  
At the national level, the OPDC provides a performance management information system 
that allows each agency to enter and update their strategic plans and goals in the system. 
Through this system, the OPDC can track the achievements of individual agencies 
throughout the year, and can assess agency performance at the end of the year. The OPDC 
strongly encourages each agency to develop and implement its own performance 
management information system. Most ministries and agencies have outsourced the project 
development to software vendors and consulting groups. Both the systems provided by the 
OPDC and those developed and used in individual agencies require individuals and divisions 
to set up their goals, performance agreements, and tasks. Some systems closely resemble off-
the-shelf project management software. Most systems provide progress reports with a 
variety of visual presentation tools including pie charts and bar graphs. The officials and 
divisions are responsible for updating the accomplished tasks, manually calculating the 
percentage of total goals accomplished, and uploading supporting documents as proof of 
accomplishment. Overall agency performance is calculated as an aggregate of individual 
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division reports. High-performing agencies are acknowledged by the prime minister, and, in 
the early years of the program, received a monetary bonus to be distributed among officials 
within the agency. One of the common findings drawn from the use of the performance 
management information systems is that both the OPDC and local agencies still rely on 
physical site visits and paper-based documents as proof of task achievements. There appears 
to be an implicit mutual agreement among officials that physical documents are more 
important than electronic documents, as paper-based documenting practice has been long 
established and still remained the primary mode of communication and coordination in the 
government work, except when the OPDC requests to see results in the system during fiscal 
year-end evaluation. The interviewed officials find that they often have to create additional 
documents electronically, and feed them into the systems as required by the OPDC. 
Many interviewees outside the OPDC feel that the results-based management initiatives and 
the development of the performance management information systems have affected the 
public sector operation in both positive and negative ways. The government has been able to 
track the work progress of each individual agency through the OPDC-provided information 
system. Similarly, higher-level officials can now track and evaluate the performance of 
lower-level officials and divisions through internal systems. Output-oriented tasks have been 
initiated and accomplished to a greater degree. Moreover, the new evaluation method is 
believed to provide explicitly fairer and more objective performance assessment. 
However, the roles and relationships between management and lower-level officials within 
agency have changed. Before the results-based management initiatives and the development 
of the performance management information systems, public sector managers ranging from 
section heads up to permanent secretaries had performed the role of giving instructions to 
and monitoring their subordinates. Most of their work was related to receiving orders from 
the higher levels, and passing them down to lower-level officials, following up the work and 
acknowledging the accomplishments of their staff, and approving task-related budget 
requests. The managers’ own performance assessments typically did not rely on the 
accomplishments of their supervised units or the collective achievement of the individual 
officials under their charge. Relationships between managers and subordinates were built on 
a one-way, top-down dominant pattern: if a lower-level official failed to meet expectations, 
that particular official would take sole responsibility, reflected in smaller or slower raises 
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and advancements in rank. An official’s success or failure was held to be a matter of personal 
responsibility, and her supervisors’ performance evaluation would not be affected by the 
official’s performance.  
Under the new performance management information systems, in contrast, individual 
performances are attributed to the section, division, and agency levels, spreading the 
consequences of underperformance upwards in the managerial hierarchy. On the part of 
higher-level officials, this builds a clear and obvious incentive for tighter monitoring of 
subordinate performance – a pattern replicated at multiple levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. As a junior ICT official explained to me: 
“If I cannot implement the Knowledge Management system by the end of September, my 
bosses will definitely not let it go because the system is listed on the ICT Center’s performance 
agreement… Approaching the end of the fiscal year, we have to make sure everything on the 
agreements - both individuals’ and the division’s - has been met, and we have appropriate 
evidence to prove the achievements.” 
(Informant interview, July 2011) 
One senior ICT official I interviewed argues at length the performance management system 
as one that discourages a collaborative environment in the agency. ICT staff in the agency 
are typically individualistic; officials do not share or pass on their ICT-related skills and 
knowledge as those are the unique knowledge assets which keep them valuable to the 
organization. Performance agreements and management systems emphasize the 
individualistic characters of the officials, who focus on the facets of their work related to 
achieving their personal goals and agreements. The network and application groups do not 
coordinate on their annual agreements, which sometimes results in conflicting plans and 
tensions among the staff in the division, in turn requiring the supervisor’s attention. The 
findings from another agency mirror the disconnect demonstrated between groups in the 
ICT Center. 
Beyond their implications for incentives, the new performance management information 
systems also supply managers with new tools for the monitoring of subordinate activities. 
Managers can check on the accomplishment percentage provided in the system to know how 
close tasks are to being done, and to see which specific tasks will require more staff. 
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In its current configuration, performance management information systems make all 
agreements, including those of supervisors, visible and accessible to everyone in the agency. 
As evaluation results are tied directly to rewards, this can lead to new tensions around the 
assignment of credit and reward that may undermine rather than advance reform goals. As 
one junior staff member explained to me, 
“We (non-managerial officials) see no point of defining our performance agreements. No 
matter how hard we work to achieve the goals, we get almost the same raise every year. The 
bonus is definitely not great motivation either. We have worked so hard trying to meet the 
goals. But we earn just about 4,000 baht (approximately US$130) max, while the directors, 
deputies, and the secretary general get tens or hundreds of thousand baht each. Most of their 
accomplishments are actually “our” tasks… The time and efforts spent on working, updating 
working progress, and preparing proof of task completion simply outweigh the benefits we 
gain from the evaluation… I would rather not have to do the annual agreements. The bonus 
is just not worth the trouble.” 
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
This imbalance between the workload and rewards of officials at different levels has created 
new organizational pressures and tensions among officials. A middle manager in the human 
resources (HR) division at a ministry in my study concurred with the officials’ response to 
the new management methods. She reported that: 
“Honestly, I have no idea how the performance agreements are supposed to be done. I actually 
think that the progress reports on the system, and evidence of accomplishment got into the way 
and slowed down our actual work. So, I have assigned two newly recruited officials to work 
specifically on this thing.” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
The performance management information systems are not well perceived among non-
managerial officials either, and so have not been widely adopted in the agencies. A staff 
member of the managerial system development section at one ministry described the issues 
concerning the performance evaluation and the use of the systems. 
“Throughout the year, all tasks have rarely been updated. The progress would show at 10% 
completion for ten months. And all of a sudden, the tasks would be completed at the end of 
September (i.e., the fiscal year end). We cannot see the progress through the systems unless the 
permanent secretary demands that he wants to see it by next week or so. Then, we have to 
visit each and every division begging them to update the task progress. We sometimes even 
have to help them do the data entry.” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
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Inevitably, the new performance management methods have been tweaked to satisfy the 
purposes of both lower- and middle-level officials. A vast majority of officials I interviewed 
resist the use of the systems. Executives have been unable to monitor the divisions’ and 
officials’ performances online without notifying them in advance, and the objectives of 
monitoring and evaluating agency and individual performance through the systems have 
clearly deviated from those initially established by the OPDC.  
4.2.3 Departmental personnel information system (DPIS) 
The Departmental Personnel Information System (DPIS), developed by the Office of the 
Civil Service Commission (OCSC) in 2003, is an information integration and interoperability 
initiative designed to standardize government-wide reporting and procedures around 
recruitment, evaluation, promotion, transfer, salary, and benefits of officials across the 
country. It is also intended to provide the OCSC with an overview of government manpower. 
Similar to the CGD, the OCSC has personnel power over other agencies. Changes to 
existing organizational structures or in the number of positions in ministries and 
departments must be approved by the OCSC. Although the OCSC does not enforce other 
agencies’ adoption of the DPIS, it strongly encourages them to do so. The OCSC benefits 
directly from the implementation of the DPIS, as it enables the office to oversee and use 
information about manpower in individual agencies and in the entire government workforce 
at any time. The OCSC allows individual agencies to download the DPIS application and 
install it on their own computer servers. Unlike the GFMIS, the ICT Center for local 
agencies is responsible for providing computer equipment and network connections for the 
DPIS, whereas the OCSC only provides the software and technical support for the 
application. Installation and implementation must be carried out by local ICT officials. The 
DPIS adoption, thus, depends on local agencies’ readiness for the system regarding financial 
resources, technological infrastructure, and technical expertise of their staff. 
The system is meant to support routine operations of the personnel staff at local agencies 
and to provide standardized human resources information for cross-agency information 
exchange and transfer. Therefore, it is designed to imitate the typical personnel procedures 
and practices of government agencies. However, individual agencies have developed their 
own procedures to facilitate their specific needs. For example, some agencies have 
redesigned their organizational structure and job allocation from the official structures 
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approved by the OCSC, in order to better serve their internal operations. This internal 
structure re-organization affects the salary structure of the agency. Agency executives may 
require different reports for making decisions about job promotion and raise consideration. 
Therefore, each agency has outsourced and developed its own personnel management 
information system, or used word processor and spreadsheet software to manage personnel 
information to facilitate their internal management. When adopting the DPIS, the 
information from legacy systems cannot be imported into the national, standardized DPIS, 
and thus requires a new data entry process for personnel records. 
Prior to the use of DPIS, the OCSC dictated the use of physical record cards called OCSC#7. 
When an official starts working with an agency, the personnel division creates a record card 
for her. The card contains personal information about the official including name, address, 
birthdate, educational background, and starting work date. This card is stored at the 
personnel division and is updated to reflect rank and position reassignments, official 
promotions and/or punishments, salary raises, annual performance evaluation records, and 
additional diplomas or training certificates. This personal information is associated with 
physical copies of certificates, official orders, and other documents. Each individual OCSC#7 
is stored in a binder along with photocopies of the supporting documents. 
When an official moves from their current workplace to another one, the official’s OCSC#7 
is transferred to that agency. Otherwise, it is kept at the current agency until the official 
retires or no longer works for the government. The cards are typically kept after officials 
retire for pension purposes until they pass away. The personal information contained in the 
OCSC#7 is considered confidential. Individual officials can request a copy of their own 
record, but are never allowed to change any of the information on the card or to have 
ownership of the physical card. Only authorized staff at the HR division are allowed to 
access, add, or edit the information on the cards. 
The development of the DPIS is intended to gradually replace the use of OCSC#7. The 
DPIS stores the same information as the OCSC#7. Ideally, when an official transfers from 
one agency to another, the information about the official will be transferred electronically. 
Once they have adopted the DPIS, in practice, HR officials enter all information previously 
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contained in the OCSC#7 into the system. A great deal of time and effort is required for 
large agencies to digitize the information of all agency officials into the system.  
As the DPIS system is meant to be a national information system about government 
manpower, its implementation has raised issues of system rigidity and incompatibility of the 
system with local information requirements and practices. HR staff reported that the 
standardized system does not accommodate all information that needed to be entered. For 
example, the DPIS does not include codes for all educational institutions, occasionally 
omitting the small, local, or now-defunct ones from which some officials graduated. 
Individual agencies could identify their own codes to represent those institutions, but as a 
result, the codes are not consistent across agencies. Two institutions may be assigned to the 
same code, or the same institution may be assigned to multiple codes at different agencies. A 
problem occurs when this inconsistent information is shared. In contrast, paper-based 
systems better accommodated such issues as the HR staff was able to write in a school name 
on the OCSC#7 regardless of whether or not a code existed for it. Compared to what they 
have in their physical records, to the HR staff, the information in the system is unreliable 
and inconsistent. As HR information is crucial to the effective operation of government, the 
unreliable information also raises problem of trust in the system. Although the system 
facilitates HR procedures such as issuing orders, the HR staff still prefers manual procedures 
because they are more likely to trust the manually-entered information. A recruitment 
section head at a ministry explained that:  
“We trust the people more than the system. Because the system has the issues of invalid and 
unavailable input options for us, it does not reflect the real-life information about individual 
officials. If there is an error in their personal information, we are liable for that error. We 
could be sued if the incorrect information is used and led to wrong decisions related to the 
officials’ promotion and selection. In contrast, it is easier for us to use our discretion with 
physical records and manual work.” 
 (Informant interview, June 2010) 
Additionally, agencies have specific requirements for personnel reports for internal 
promotions. For instance, decisions may be based on the seniority level of all qualified mid-
ranking officials. The term “seniority,” however, can be defined differently from agency to 
agency. Some agencies define it by the age of the official. Others use in-service duration as 
the defining quality. Still others use the date that an official entered their current position. 
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As the OCSC does not have specific rules for these criteria, the system does not make these 
options available for individualized judgment. Local agencies, then, must work on these 
similar reports manually. Often, the agencies create separate spreadsheets containing 
personnel information they need for reporting purposes rather than using ones provided in 
the DPIS. 
The DPIS also does not fully support personnel-related practices at the local level. As the 
OCSC only needs to have an overview of the personnel in each agency, it does not need to 
see copies of certificates or other substantiating documentation. Therefore, the DPIS is not 
designed to provide a document digitization feature for such supplemental documents, even 
though local agencies still need to maintain them. The personnel division has to maintain 
physical copies of the documents outside of the system. Consequently, the OCSC#7s are still 
maintained, and even remain as the primary reference for personnel staff at every agency. 
When working with personnel information, the HR staff always updates the information on 
the OCSC#7 first, and then enters the information in the DPIS. While the DPIS does not 
change the work of the personnel division at local agencies, the use of DPIS has created an 
additional burden in terms of data entry and management requirements.  
Mid-ranked and senior HR officials reported that they are more comfortable working with 
physical records, as they are more reliable. An official noted that: 
“Between the DPIS and OCSC#7, I still prefer the OCSC#7 because if information is lost 
from the system, I don’t know how to retrieve it. And sometimes information loss happens in 
the system, and the ICT staff cannot be very helpful… At least the OCSC#7 records are still 
there, always. Moreover, I don’t like the way the DPIS handles edited information. Although 
the DPIS keeps logs of who edits what information, it doesn’t explicitly show. It’s different 
from what we have done physically on the OCSC#7. On the system, we don’t see right away 
what particular information has been edited unless we look at the system log. But on the 
OCSC#7, we can see scratches, correction marks, and so on. So we see what information has 
been changed.” 
(Informant interview, July 2011) 
Although the OCSC implicitly requires the use of DPIS so that it can generate a yearly 
summary of the government manpower for the whole country, HR officials have observed 
that the OCSC itself does not fully utilize the information in the system. Every year, the 
OCSC still requires physical reports from local agencies even though the system provides 
the same reports in an electronic form. At the local agency level, the personnel division is 
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the only unit that uses the DPIS. Executives still rely on physical reports provided by the 
division. They do not express a preference for whether the information is retrieved from the 
system or other sources. Therefore, divisions have the freedom to choose which sources of 
information they will use to generate reports. Most of the time, the reports are generated 
from their legacy systems and from offline spreadsheets outside of the system. 
4.2.4 Case tracking system 
At the agency level, the judiciary agency in my study has developed and used a case tracking 
system as a monitoring tool for executive judges (the president and the vice presidents of 
each court). The system shows the historical and current statuses of each case. The 
executive judges use this information to track current progress of the cases; how long a 
particular case will take to be finished; what judges perform better or more poorly than 
others; and to follow up with individual judges. The executive judges of the Supreme Court 
can oversee the performance of individual Courts of First-Instance throughout the country 
based on information from the case tracking system. The system allows the executives to 
know which courts and judges have the most pending cases so that they can better identify 
whether the courts are in need of more judges, case officials, administrative staff, or 
computers, and to determine the performance of individual judges and the efficiency of 
individual courts.  
When a case is filed, the court creates a case docket containing all physical artifacts the 
plaintiffs and defendants have submitted to the court. Documents are accumulated, 
categorized, and indexed into the docket until the case is finished. During a trial, the 
associated docket is kept at the court at all times for security purposes. Judges and case 
officials need to know the whereabouts of the docket at any given moment. Therefore, the 
court created case docket control logbooks to help case officials track the whereabouts of 
dockets. Case officials may send dockets to the subpoena-issuing group to create a subpoena, 
or to the docket management group to store the dockets when not in use.  
The information about case status comes from two sources – case officials, and the docket 
management group. During each trial process, case officials record where and when the 
dockets leave their hands, as well as recording the status of the case into the case tracking 
system. There are 22 major procedures and over 50 minor procedures in the system that 
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judges and officials are required to update when an action is taken throughout the trial 
procedure, while the judges and officials know the status of their own cases. Practically, the 
system does not accommodate the work of non-managerial judges and officials as much, as it 
provides information for oversight and decision-making to the executives.  
Another source of information is the docket management group. After a subpoena is issued, 
dockets are sent to the docket management group, where the staff records the activities of 
the case into the logbooks and enters the same information into the system as well. This 
information is the other part of the dockets’ whereabouts after they leave the case officials’ 
hands. There, the logbooks are stored in binders, and shared among the staff who access 
them when answering phone inquiries about the case status. 
As for ownership of the information about the case status, the case officials who own the case 
and the staff at the docket management group have different logbooks containing different 
information about the case – actions performed in the context of their work. Both groups of 
officials really only need their own information to perform their work related to answering 
case status inquiries. Consequently, neither of them perceives the importance of using the 
case tracking system, and would not care about maintaining up-to-date information in the 
system except that they are ordered to do so. 
Executive judges, on the other hand, rely on both parts of the case status – including 
information from individual and shared logbooks, for managerial purposes. They require 
updated case statuses to enable tracking of the court’s and the judge’s operations. While the 
information in the system is almost useless for ordinary judges and case officials, it is the 
most essential information for the executive judges. As the Court has not terminated the use 
of physical case docket control logbooks, or declared the use of the electronic system to be 
mandatory practice, judges and officials are free to stick with their traditional paper-based 
practices. The information necessary for the executives, consequently, remains outside of the 
system unless it is demanded. 
4.3 Challenges and Tensions Attending Managerial Implications and 
Computerization Efforts 
Computerization as a managerial control tool for higher-level agencies or officials in the 
public sector requires both organizational infrastructure and resources. The implementation 
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of information systems for managerial control usually encounters limits related to 
organizational factors and information infrastructure. Officials may resist what they perceive 
to be control through computerization, and may employ workarounds as a result. The 
introduction of ICTs as surveillance and control tools often imposes managerial limits on 
the government because local agencies and officials develop informal workarounds to avoid 
such control. Similarly, the implementation of ICTs at the agency level provokes 
workarounds and adjustments or even resistance from lower-level officials whose roles and 
work practices are forcibly altered. 
4.3.1 Mismatches of local accomplishments and global goals 
As the case studies show, different system implementations carry different affordances and 
engender resistance to control at various levels of the hierarchy. The implementation of 
performance management information systems across agencies has deviated from the 
purposes of the system and performance improvement initiative. As the system enables the 
OPDC to compare performance scores among agencies across the country, local agencies 
and their executives do not want to score poorly in this implied competition. Not only does a 
poor score signify lower bonuses and other rewards, it also reflects poorly on the agencies 
and executives in the public sector community, thereby threatening their professional 
advancement. A number of agencies have sought ways to improve their appraisal scores, 
while not necessarily improving actual performance. Instead of creating incentives or 
motivating performance improvement in the public sector, the performance management 
program and its systems have resulted in officials from local agencies deliberately 
reinterpreting and misusing systems to suit their own interests. 
The OPDC has intended to use the performance improvement program to enhance the 
performance of government agencies and individuals. Although the OPDC has introduced 
the use of key performance indicators to identify achievements for each task in work 
agreements at the individual level, it does not specify what tasks should be included in the 
agreements or how each indicator should be determined. The OPDC is concerned that if the 
indicators were to be strictly determined from the beginning, the result-oriented 
performance evaluation may pose negative effects to the public sector, and officials may 
initially resist the program. At the agency level, the interpretive flexibility of tasks and 
achievement indicators can result in the reporting of routine work rather than strategic or 
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innovative work in divisional agreements, because units do not want to fail the evaluation or 
score lower than other divisions. Therefore, the permanent secretary has to determine what 
tasks are considered challenging and innovative, and allocate them equally to every division 
so that every division will have similar levels of innovative and challenging tasks to 
accomplish. 
4.3.2 Misalignment of organizations’ structural properties and the underlying 
premises of systems 
The implementation of the case tracking system has encountered barriers owing to the 
misalignment of workloads with incentive structures. By the Court Procedures, the annual 
salary of a judge increases based on at the length of her service at the court. This reduces the 
possibility that executives will discriminate against judges in their evaluations. Therefore, 
judges show little concern for whether a case status in the system reflects the actual status 
of the case, and whether it shows their performance. Further, less productive judges may not 
want the system to include complete information of a case status, as it may demonstrate 
their poor performance. In contrast, leaving the case status unclear may help them escape 
undesirable consequences. Diligent judges are not rewarded for their good performance, 
while unproductive judges are not punished for their poor performance. Consequently, 
judges are unlikely to care about the administrative tasks like updating the case status. They 
do not even require their case officials to help them on this particular task. As a junior judge 
at the Central Court explained: 
“Our payment and raise depends solely on how long we have been at the Court. There is no 
serious punishment if I cannot finish a single case a year. And I will not get higher payment 
even though I am working harder than others either. So, most of us (judges) do not care 
whether or not the case status is updated. The information in the system doesn’t mean 
anything to us.”  
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
All of the judges at the Court have an equivalent organizational status. They only differ 
from each other in their roles. Executive judges have additional administrative duties, while 
the rest of their time is spent working on the cases. The executive judges do not have the 
authority to demand other judges to work on specific tasks, such as updating their case 
status in the system, and cannot exert any pressure on them to speed up the case trail 
process. Court Procedures determine that the judges are to be free from any influence or 
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pressure in order to maintain their freedom to provide justice. Therefore, executive judges 
can only shift their enforcement target to the Office and its case officials instead, and force 
them to perform the administrative work for the judges. 
4.3.3 Two systems problems 
The managerial control imposed by higher levels in the hierarchy through computerization 
is often associated with work practices that are not aligned with system procedures. The 
adoption of computerized systems for managerial control may encounter some challenges 
due to existing work practices. In some cases, such conflicts are unavoidable because of 
deeply-rooted traditional practices and procedures in the organization. Officials may 
perceive the use of ICTs and electronic records as practices outside of their comfort zone, 
and may not trust the new tools. For example, case officials at the Court repeatedly reported 
in my interviews that they always update the flows of the case dockets and the case status in 
their physical logbooks first, and will do so in the case tracking system only when it is 
necessary or demanded. Case officials rely heavily on the case dockets. In their personal case 
control docket logbooks, case officials record where the physical dockets are currently; and 
when the dockets left their hands. They also record the case status. But this information 
does not satisfy their information needs. One case official stated that: 
“The dockets are our hero and our lives. Even if we do not have computers and the system, we 
can still continue our work as long as we have the dockets…. We definitely cannot lose the 
dockets because they contain all relevant documents and artifacts about the case provided by 
both parties. We would have a serious issue if we lost them. So, each of the case officials has 
their own transaction logbook to keep track of what status the case is now, and whom we 
have left the corresponding docket with. The information in the system does not say who 
actually receives the dockets. It just tells which section is supposed to have them. We need to 
deliver the dockets hand to hand, and see “in person” who is having the dockets… My 
transaction logbook has my name, office location, and phone number on the cover in case I 
forget or misplace it.” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
The logbooks fulfill the case officials’ information requirements, and thus the use of the case 
tracking system has become a duplicative and burdensome task. Case officials are primarily 
responsible for entering the information from their logbooks into the system to meet the 
information requirements of the secondary users, the executive judges, but they do not 
perceive the benefit of this extra work. Therefore, the information for the executives is often 
lacking. Case officials have not adopted the case tracking system and its electronic 
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procedures as their primary tool. They deliberately retain their existing practices, and are 
unlikely to replace them with the new computerized versions. 
Besides the performance management information systems and the case tracking system, the 
problem of working on two systems – manual and computerized – in parallel is also 
exhibited in the deployment of DPIS. Officials reported that the primary artifacts they 
depend on for personnel information are physical records and copies of documents. These 
same officials update information in the DPIS occasionally just to serve the OCSC’s purposes. 
The OCSC is aware of this practice, and thus has not been able to discontinue the use of 
OCSC#7. Most HR-related procedures are also conducted in separate applications. As a 
result, this persistent two systems problem [195] represents a limit of hierarchical control 
through computerization. Higher-level agencies and officials have not been able to depend 
on information in the systems for decision-making or planning, as they cannot be sure 
whether the information is up-to-date or correct. 
The design and implementation of the GFMIS and performance management information 
systems intentionally reinforce the control and monitoring power of the central agencies 
(the CGD and OPDC, respectively). The CGD aims at monitoring the government budget 
and expenditures of individual agencies. The GFMIS allows the CGD to approve requests 
for treasury payment, and to make direct deposits to vendors’ bank accounts. At the same 
time, the system allows the CGD to control government procurement across the agencies. 
The system fully supports the operational functions and managerial goals of the CGD. 
However, the implementation of the GFMIS creates tensions around internal management 
and control within the local agency boundary. The system is not designed to fulfill the 
internal management and information requirements of individual agencies. Financial 
information categorization and granularity deployed in the system are likely to vary from 
local agency requirements. The GFMIS provides financial reports annually at the end of the 
fiscal year to serve the CGD’s goals, whereas local agencies need such information bi-
monthly or semi-annually based on executives’ preferences. The agencies also need to create 
different cost accounting categories to suit their internal financial management needs and 
for audit purposes. Many agencies have to maintain their legacy financial information 
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systems in order to serve their managerial purposes and maintain authority within the 
agency. 
The introduction of ICTs to reinforce the control and power of high-level officials in public 
administration gives rise to resistance and workarounds among the lower-level agency staff 
who are required to adopt the systems and change their existing practices. My empirical 
study shows that officials at lower levels often feel obligated to adopt and use new systems 
against their will, and the results are resistance to the systems, the maintenance of legacy 
systems and practices, and the development of workarounds. 
4.3.4 Resistance resulting from disparity of work and benefits 
The Court developed the case tracking system for judges and case officials to use for 
tracking of their cases, and for executives to monitor the performance of the courts and the 
judges. In practice, judges and case officials do not perceive any benefit from the system. 
Case officials have their own docket control logbooks to keep track of case dockets. The 
same information must be entered into the case tracking system for the executives to use it 
for case tracking and performance monitoring purposes. Most of the case officials, thus, 
consider work with the system to be duplicative, burdensome, and valueless. One case 
official explained that: 
 “The system only helps the executives; no one else. We (case officials) do not need any 
information in the system because we have all information we need. But we have to use the 
system as we have to update the case status in the system for the executives to be able to see 
and track all the cases. ”  
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
A middle-ranked case official criticized the system as follows:  
“Among us (case officials), this system is referred to as the 100-million-baht system, 
developed specifically for only three users – the president and the vice presidents.” 
(Informant interview, August 2011) 
Although the executives mandate the use of the system, and use the completion of case 
status as a component of performance evaluation, the structure of the system is not aligned 
with the incentive, reward, and punishment systems of the judges and officials. This 
misalignment leads to resistance of the system, as a middle-ranked case official explained: 
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“The officials are forced to update the case status. Otherwise, our annual performance score 
will be deducted up to five percent. But compared to the performance score of case-related 
work such as writing subpoenas, orders, and judgments, which is over 80%, that five-percent 
does not mean anything to us” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
4.3.5 Tensions in new procedures and practices 
As seen in the empirical cases of the performance management information systems, the 
DPIS, and the case tracking system, officials still maintain their traditional practices around 
physical documents. Furthermore, government officials tend to trust information on the 
physical forms to a greater degree than that in electronic formats. This pattern is consistent 
across the government’s many agencies. For example, physical logbooks remain the primary 
records for case officials even though the case tracking system provides similar features and 
information for its users. A junior case official who has worked as on the case management 
staff reported that: 
“When I first came to work, my senior colleague told me to record case activities both on 
physical records and in the system. I don’t really know why we continue working on both 
things although both sets of information are roughly telling the same thing. Maybe, the 
records on the logbooks have much more detail than the system because we can write as much 
detail as we want in the logbooks…When the party calls in asking about the status of a 
particular case, we run from our desks getting the logbook stacked on these shelves back to our 
desks, and answer it.” 
(Informant interview, August 2011) 
New information systems and information requirements from higher-level agencies and 
officials have forced officials to change their existing work practices to some degree. 
However, practices and beliefs that appear “sticky” [28] have impeded the adoption and use 
of information systems. Officials have found it difficult to transform their work procedures 
from manual to electronic systems. They adopt workarounds to the new systems. At the 
Court, an official discussed how to override the case tracking system for subpoenas with an 
old-fashioned practice: 
“It is so much easier and faster to create a subpoena manually using Word processor. But as 
we are required to update the status, we typically work on the case manually and come back to 
update those processes once in a while. It is like we have to do the same thing twice – 
manually and electronically. So, it’s up to our convenient time; we update the status from the 
beginning to the end of the case on the last day after the court issues its judgment. And so, the 
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case status and the number of pending and finished cases in the system do not reflect the 
actual status along the way.”  
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
4.3.6 Performance deception 
Stemming from the government’s commitment to results-oriented performance management, 
officials at local agencies have resisted new evaluation tools. While high-level officials want 
their subordinates to work hard to achieve the goals set forth in performance agreements, 
they also tend to avoid reporting poor performance of their subordinates, as that also affects 
their own performance evaluation. Some executives or division directors may let their 
subordinates change their agreements when they see a sign of failure.  
As the rewards of new systems are not aligned with the work of the agencies, officials have 
tended to write their routine tasks and operations into their agreements so that they can 
ensure that the work is completed with little additional effort. Similarly, managers list 
routine operations rather than strategic or challenging tasks in their agreements to 
guarantee the fulfillment of goals, and thereby to receive their full bonus. In doing so, 
supervisors do not have to worry about the failure of their subordinates, and their 
subordinates are free from being closely monitored by their supervisors. A junior ICT 
official responded to my request to see her performance agreement that: 
“It is a shame. All tasks listed here are what I am supposed to do everyday – monitoring the 
agency network usage; backing up system data; this and that. If there is a project worth 
mentioning among computer officials in our section, it should be the disaster recovery plan my 
co-worker is working on. That’s it... Although the director is not too happy with the way we 
do with the agreements, she has to play along.” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
4.3.7 Delegation and arm’s-length adoption 
The introduction of ICTs in the public sector requires government officials to learn how to 
use new electronic systems. In practice, most senior officials have encountered difficulty with 
the new systems, as they are often not comfortable using computers. The majority of senior 
officials are not computer literate. Still, learning to live with computers is a basic 
requirement of adapting to new systems. During my observation, older officials with lower-
level positions, such as administrative staff, expressed enthusiasm about using specific 
computer applications. For example, the staff that is working on the e-Document system 
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demonstrated proficient use of the system, although they reported that it took over six 
months of on-the-job training and additional mentoring for them to learn how to use it. 
Before using the e-Document system, these workers had little experience with computers. 
Transforming work from a paper-based to a computerized system obviously represented a 
big step for them. Consequently, they only know how to access and use this particular 
system without having a basic, broader understanding of computers. For instance, they 
cannot create a folder on a computer or move files from one folder to another, and have to 
ask junior staff to help them on such tasks. Similar practices are also exhibited in the use of 
GFMIS among senior staff. Those who could not adjust to the new working environment 
have been reassigned to non-computer related tasks, either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
When there was no transfer option available, particularly in the case of those who were 
eligible for early retirement, they sometimes chose to leave the division or agency.  
In contrast, senior officials in higher positions can require assistance from their subordinates, 
and can compensate for their computer illiteracy with other knowledge or skills. Although 
they do not resist the use of ICTs for managerial purposes, they try to avoid computerized 
tools. The transformation from paper-based to computer-based practices has increased 
senior officials’ dependence on junior staff. My observation reveals that executive 
bureaucrats rarely use any information systems, and are accustomed to requesting 
information from their subordinates. Having assistants represents power and influence in 
public bureaucratic organizations. Furthermore, different training programs offered to 
middle- and high-level officials and lower-level officials underscore the power structure in 
organizations. For instance, the training programs for the GFMIS, DPIS, and e-Document 
systems for higher-level officials aim to provide an overview of the system without requiring 
officials to actually interact with the systems, since the senior officials do not intend to use 
the systems anyway. To access relevant reports from the systems, officials ask their 
subordinates to prepare those reports for them. In the meantime, the primary target users of 
these systems are lower-level officials who interact with the systems. Therefore, they are the 
ones who receive training on how to use the systems. 
In my study of the adoption of the performance management information system, I also 
noted that directors and division heads rarely used the system themselves. A typical way for 
a manager to overcome this shortcoming of expertise is to shift the responsibility for the 
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system to her subordinates. In all of the agencies where I studied the use of the GFMIS, user 
accounts had been assigned to less senior financial officials, as the financial directors were 
too busy and/or computer illiterate. The monitoring and control authorization, however, 
still remains with the director. Physical papers are still used for approval authorization 
within the agency, as the director relies primarily on the physical records. The delegation of 
computer-related tasks reflects the traditional power structure in public sector organizations. 
Higher-level officials may assign to their subordinates specific work that they do not want to 
do, and junior officials cannot question the assignment. The delegation of duties emphasizes 
the importance of the seniority system and authority structure in the Thai public 
administration. 
The delegation of computer-related activities tends to become the norm in the public sector. 
Interviews with three executive officials and two middle-ranking officials revealed that high-
ranking officials typically demand more subordinates and supportive artifacts around them 
in order to represent power, privilege, and high social status. For executives, the use of 
computers is considered to be a lower-level function to be performed by subordinates. This 
norm has negative effects on the implementation of ICTs in the public sector because it is 
widely recognized that the executives rarely use the systems themselves. Lower-level 
officials, then, can develop workarounds to deviate from the intended goal of the systems, 
avoid being monitored by their supervisors, or even manipulate information and reports. In 
the study of the case tracking system, for example, case officials learned that the executive 
judges never log in to the system randomly to check for a case status. Instead, the executives 
would ask the Office to prepare the summary reports. Therefore, the case officials would be 
notified in advance about such a request. In this way, they would have time to update their 
case status in the system. 
4.3.8 Hierarchical audits 
With the limited number of computers and user accounts available to access the GFMIS, 
officials in individual agencies have developed workarounds to delegate transaction-
recording tasks to their subordinates while auditing their operations. The limited number of 
user accounts results in local agencies inventing their own ways of sharing the accounts. 
However, tensions have developed over potential misuse of the accounts. A financial section 
head reported that there had been thousands of lawsuits over account misuse, system 
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misconduct, and fraudulent transactions since the implementation of the GFMIS. In 
response to these limitations, individual users adopted workaround to satisfy local needs. 
One financial section head explained her strategic adjustments around the use of the GFMIS 
to deal with monitoring and inspection: 
“We have only one access card to share among financial staff for payment request submission. 
So, I separate work among my three subordinates by the amount of money in each request and 
assign each of them to this separate group. For example, person A takes care of the requests in 
range of 50,000-100,000 baht; person B is responsible for 100,000-500,000 baht requests; 
and so on. If there is an error, at least I have something to trace back who was doing that 
particular transaction. I have to be extremely careful.” 
(Informant interview, July 2011)  
4.3.9 The invention of misleading reports 
The cost allocation requirement in the GFMIS has given rise to agency tensions around 
achieving cost-efficiency goals of individual agencies. As the CGD can compare the activity-
based costs and cost-per-unit in similar tasks across agencies, local agencies have attempted 
to invent cost calculation methods that will help them show the lowest costs compared to 
other agencies. The CGD leaves some negotiable room when defining the calculation 
methods for each individual agency to interpret their expenses. All of the agencies in my 
study have abused this interpretative flexibility and come up with various methods to bring 
down costs. That is, they use the largest possible number of units as the denominator when 
calculating the cost per unit. A ministry, for example, calculates the cost of outsourced 
cleaning services by dividing the total cost by the number of their officials while a 
Department that has a similar facility size but fewer employees uses the area in square 
meters as a divisor. In this way, both agencies can have smallest possible expense per unit, 
and can thus avoid being charged for overspending. Consequently, the reports are almost 
useless to the CGD. 
4.4 Summary 
Drawing from my empirical studies, as illustrated in this chapter, my findings are congruent 
with earlier arguments that information systems have been used as tools for reinforcing 
existing power and control structures and strengthening authority, making information 
gathered from subordinate levels of organization newly available and accessible to those at 
higher levels of authority [59,96,104,105,107,114,207]. The government can implement 
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new systems as a way of tightening its control over expenditures of individual agencies, and 
can in some cases oversee the government workforce through a single system. It can also 
encourage efficiency improvement among government officials through the use of new 
performance management techniques and tools. These changes have led in turn to changes 
in roles and relationships among officials at multiple levels. The GFMIS and DPIS have 
given a new role to local officials, who must work with transactions and records in the 
government-level systems to provide information for higher-level agencies, while still 
maintaining local practices and records in their own systems for administrative purposes at 
the agency level. The implementation of a new performance management approach and its 
associated systems results in tighter supervision and monitoring tools in the hierarchical 
chain. These changes increase the supervisors’ level of involvement in their subordinates’ 
work and performance. However, it does not necessarily mean that the supervisors, 
particularly middle managers, gain or regain control and exercise power over their 
subordinates. Rather, it implies a greater reliance of middle managers on their subordinates’ 
performance, with greater responsibility and accountability for the achievements of their 
staff. Nevertheless, the system has become a monitoring tool for the government, specifically 
the OPDC, to assign tasks, and supervise the work progress of individual agencies, which is 
eventually related to bonus and other incentive allocation. 
Moreover, the empirical findings from the implementation of the GFMIS, the DPIS, 
performance management information systems, and the case tracking system suggest that 
these systems appear to allow higher-level agencies to exert control over lower-level 
agencies. They promote upward flows of communication and control directly from lower 
levels to the top level, bypassing middle management levels. Nevertheless, the systems do 
not encourage coordination across agencies or units within the same department or agency. 
The changes resulting from the deployment of such systems have also encountered barriers 
and tensions that limit the managerial ambitions of digital government reform. In some case, 
compliance with new electronic information systems cannot be enforced, and agencies opt 
instead to continue using traditional practices and legacy systems alongside the new systems. 
This “two systems problem” has persisted in the Thai public sector for a long period of time. 
Resistance to the implementation of ICTs for managerial control has resulted in the 
development of workarounds at lower levels, such as intentionally reinterpreting the goals 
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and practices of particular systems, delegating relevant work to junior staff, and not using 
the systems. Such limits are inextricably tied to the overall shape of ICT development in the 
public sector. ICTs are a malleable tool for higher-level agencies and officials if they intend 
to use the technologies for managerial control. However, the technologies can also be used 
as a tool for lower-level agencies and officials to manipulate end results, or to avoid being 
monitored. 
The implementation of new performance management information systems has changed the 
relationships between higher and lower officials, tying the performance of subordinates to 
supervisors (and vice versa) in new and ambivalent ways. On the one hand, the capacity of 
new information systems to make agreements and evaluations widely available has increased 
organizational transparency. On the other hand, such transparency has provoked conflict 
among lower-level officials within and across divisions, and inflamed cross-level tensions 
within local agencies, as the previously confidential reports of higher-level officials has 
become newly visible. If properly implemented with clear goals and processes, the 
performance management information systems would be efficient tools for higher-level 
officials to monitor the performance of organizations, and government performance would 
improve. 
Similar changes have accompanied the introduction of the GFMIS, which has imposed new 
accounting and reporting barriers while shifting relations of accountability and 
responsibility around public sector finances. The implementation of the DPIS and the case 
tracking system has created burdensome, duplicative work for officials (that is, the primary 
users) in order to serve the information requirements of the OCSC and executives judge 
(that is, the secondary users) respectively. Such developments have been met in turn with a 
series of adjustments aimed at limiting or undermining the effects of control functions – or 
in some cases simply maintaining necessary bureaucratic operations in the face of externally 
imposed ‘solutions.’  
For digital government scholarship and the wider field of information science, my findings 
carry important implications. The first is the need to reincorporate issues of oversight and 
control as central themes of digital government scholarship, both for the autonomous 
interest such topics occasion, and their likely effects (including negative ones) on the 
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achievement of other digital government reform goals. The second concerns the need to 
study oversight and control in a symmetrical way, with attention being given not only to 
the control implications of any new or potential technological change, but also to the 
practical and strategic limits and resistance such changes are likely to provoke. Finally, this 
study adds additional weight to the general importance of fit between new information 
systems and existing work practices, norms, values, and reward structures. In the absence of 
such consideration, information systems designed to improve efficiency and accountability in 





Infrastructure and Standards in Digital Government 
Development 
Information and public service standardization, integration, and interoperability are central 
to most of the benefits claimed for digital government. Digital government advocates point 
to cost savings associated with non-redundant systems and the centralization of resources 
and expertise in government. Standardization and interoperability can support cross-agency 
cooperation efforts, improving the speed and efficiency of public service. Common or 
interlinked IT platforms may simplify the maze of otherwise separate bureaucratic systems, 
improving transparency and accountability. And standardized systems may support a more 
transparent and navigable window on government, aiding efforts at public engagement and 
participation central to the democratizing promise of much digital government scholarship.  
Work on inter-organizational information integration in the digital government field has 
spoken of the importance of infrastructure development [53,60,69,86,95,124,145] and 
standardization [64,86,95,153,195] in this process. Such changes are often accompanied by 
and predicated upon a shift in the organizational forms of government itself: away from 
traditional bureaucratic silos, functional fragmentation, and innovation-stifling hierarchies, 
and towards forms variously labeled as inter-organizational networks [153], digital era 
governance [53], joined-up government [95], and virtual agencies [59]. Such new forms 
are intended to transform fragmented agencies and systems into a cooperative and 
interactive whole, largely on the basis of standardized inter-organizational information 
systems and services [47,71,86,95,153]. 
But as a growing body of work (mostly outside the field of digital government) has shown, 
standards and standardization are a good deal harder and more complicated than first meets 
the eye. The world is full of missing standards: systems that by any measure of intelligent 
design ought to interoperate, but don’t (save for a good deal of costly intermediation work). 
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The world is equally littered with failed or broken standards: systems that may seem to line 
up, but ultimately don’t. Even standards that ‘work,’ fulfilling (more or less) their stated 
function, may do so in ways unintended or unimagined. And common standards often carry 
implications, fitting more and less smoothly with the interests, aspirations, and lifeworlds of 
the individuals, groups, and organizations encountering them. Similarly, the complex work 
of standardization and infrastructure development in digital government development 
efforts has been understudied in a growing body of digital government scholarship. 
Literature in this field has tended to neglect social and technical challenges and tensions 
attending the process of inter-organizational information infrastructure development and 
standardization in the public sector. 
5.1 Information Systems, Infrastructure, and Standards 
Scholars in many fields of study have examined the relationship between a technology and 
the social systems with which it is coextensive. From science and technology studies (STS)’s 
point of view, it is essential to examine the technology itself as a social object, whose 
meaning and use is determined by relevant social groups [159]. Relevant social groups are 
defined as institutions and organizations as well as organized or unorganized groups of 
individuals [159, p. 30]. Members of a particular social group share the same set of 
meanings, attached to the artifact through its interpretation. Various social groups that form 
around certain technologies interpret and perceive problems with respect to that 
technological artifact differently. The design and development of the technology elicits 
many conflicts to the same problems, such as differing technical requirements for different 
social groups, or moral conflicts. Solutions to these conflicts and problems are not only 
technological, but also judicial and moral [159, p. 38-39]. The design and development of 
systems depends on differing social meanings of the systems determined by the 
organizational members. In other words, the systems and their characteristics are developed 
based on how the members define meanings and content of the systems to solve 
organizational problems. 
Latour [1996], another influential sociologist and theorist in the field of STS, studies the 
power of inscriptions and the relationship between inscriptions of work practices and 
infrastructure and standards. He notes that to understand information technology in human 
organization, it is important to treat human and non-human actors as part of a network of 
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associations [112]. In his discussion, he defines information systems as artifacts that are 
active social actants (or actors). They construct through mediation and delegation shifting 
competencies and affordances back and forth between one another and between human 
agents [111]. Human agents and systems act upon each other symmetrically to produce 
action. For Latour, the interaction of humans with artifacts is a reciprocal exchange between 
actors [113]. Information systems inscribe social arrangements in the form of intentions, 
controversies, activities, and meanings to programs of action through processes of 
negotiating, redefining, and appropriating interests. The inscriptions essentially establish 
the work routines. His analysis of a speed bump or a “sleeping policeman” illustrates that the 
speed bump as a technological artifact translates driver’s goals from “slow down so as not to 
endanger students” into “slow down and protect your car’s suspension.” Also, the non-
human artifact serves as a delegate for carrying out the articulated goals and intentions of 
other humans such as urban planners, lawmakers, and engineers. Thus, the speed bump 
performs a delegation task of translating humans’ programs into artifacts [113]. Once the 
programs are inscribed in infrastructural artifacts, they become invisible yet capable of 
acting [180]. Furthermore, Latour’s concept of human and non-human delegation addresses 
trade-offs and strategic choices involved in selecting human and automated intermediaries in 
the design of information systems [111]. For example, his analysis of choosing between 
implementing door hinges and hiring a porter demonstrates concerns in various dimensions; 
including considering installation and maintenance costs of the hinges versus reliability and 
discipline of the porter, how to delegate human actors’ deskilling to non-human actors’ 
reskilling, and moral and ethical issues concerning delegated action [111]. 
Kling [1991], a scholar in social studies of computer-based systems, also sees computer 
systems as social objects that contain social organization or arrangements of users’ behavior 
[99]. Computing arrangements restrict access to the systems and information by limiting 
access time to the systems, or controlling the way people can use the systems. For example, 
debit cards have a social system of regulation that limits consumer rights to the choices of 
payments, and increases consumer responsibilities compared to the social system of credit 
cards [99]. He further argues computerization is a social and technical process. It is an 
ongoing process that requires some changes in system, social life in organizations (e.g., work 
practices, social choices, values, employees’ skills, etc.), and many key social relationships 
(e.g., reinforcement politics, workplace disciplines, and interpersonal, intergroup, and 
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institutional authority and power relationships) that are coextensive with the system as it is 
introduced and used over time. However, the same system can have different social 
consequences when the associated social arrangements are substantially different [99]. 
Kling’s argument about computerization and social contexts is aligned with the sociology of 
technology’s studies on the relationship between technological artifacts and relevant social 
groups (e.g., Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch [14]). However, he extends the scope of the 
relationship between computer-based systems and social context onto how the systems are 
used, or in his own terms ‘consumed’, and whether and how the use transforms parts of the 
social order rather than just how the system is designed and developed, which is the central 
focus of the sociology of technology [99]. Kling uses a metaphor of a “package” rather than 
a “tool” to represent a computer-based technology that is something more than the physical 
device, as it comes with a diverse set of skills and organizational units to supply and 
maintain computer-based technology [98]. The use of computing technology often 
introduces recurring difficulties and problems in the workplace [97]. Many difficulties that 
users face with computer-based systems lie in the way in which the computing package is 
embedded in a complex set of social relationships [98]. Information systems and their data 
often entail contact with different social groups and when a system is embedded in a 
complex social setting it becomes a social object, and its development and use a social act. As 
a package, therefore, computing becomes more problematic when it is more technically and 
socially complex. 
Bostrom and Heinen [1971] point out that political or power issues arise due to conflicts of 
interest among various groups in organizations and anticipated shifts in the balance of 
power caused by the implementation of a system [18]. The design and development process 
of the system are frequently distorted and overlaid by the political issues. Each involved 
party represents different roles and positions of power, and has its own preferences. The 
social interaction among those people creates system constraints and alternative designs. 
The solutions for alternatives are often based on the mobilization of power resources among 
individuals [18]. 
Furthermore, Bostrom and Heinen argue that organizations constantly evolve [18]. 
Therefore, the development and implementation process of a system is not immediate, and 
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several transitional states may be passed through by the organization. They underline the 
adjustment and ongoing management of the system design and implementation. Meanwhile, 
the action carried out during the design process may also create organizational changes. 
Essentially, the design process is a fluid, iterative process with political/dynamic dimensions 
of system development, and not a linear sequence of steps as in a traditional approach or 
rational/static view where design and implementation are a rational systematic process 
[144]. The rational/static view of the systems development process also assumes that the 
organization has a set of well-defined information processing problems. Implementation of 
solutions to the problems is then assumed to transform the organization immediately into a 
more effective state [18, p. 28].  
Other information system scholars also agree on the joint association between social and 
technical systems in information system development, and the ongoing process of system 
development. Lee [2004], for example, notes that an organization, as a social system, 
requires information from an information technology, as a technical system, so that it can 
function and achieve its goals [118]. The organization and its members also define how the 
technology is designed, implemented, installed, and used to deliver the information the users 
require. Once the system is implemented, moreover, the social system requires new or 
different information requirements. The technical system, thus, is changed to satisfy those 
requirements. On the other hand, the change also triggers new and different organization 
requirements for the technical system. Thus, the social system needs to change its 
organizational arrangements to meet the technical system’s requirements. Lee emphasizes 
that “changes in either the social system or the technical system will be accompanied by changes, 
whether designed or not, in the other system” [118, p. 12]. Therefore, an information system is 
defined as an emergent result of an iterative and mutually transformative process. 
[18,19,118]. 
Researchers whose work discusses technological artifacts and their development and use in 
social systems agree on the nature of social and technical relationships between the 
technologies and their social systems. In the context of information system development and 
use in organizations, this finding emphasizes that information systems encode social 
arrangements including political and historical context, organizational practices, meanings, 
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and values of relevant social systems into them. This point also underscores the importance 
of coextensive social components when studying information systems. 
After the systems are implemented and adopted, they become part of the organization and 
its work. The embedded work practices and social relationships in the systems result in the 
systems becoming working infrastructure or the background for organizational members’ 
work. At the same time, the systems restructure and transform work practices and social 
relations within the organization and among organizational members. Therefore, it is crucial 
to view technological development, adoption, and use and its impact on organizational 
changes as an evolving, ongoing process. Questions arising from this point include questions 
as to when a system becomes organizational infrastructure, what makes it infrastructure, 
and whether and how the system overcomes conflicting values and meanings among various 
social groups in and across organizations. 
5.1.1 Information systems as organizational infrastructure 
Kling’s social analyses of computerization have been widely adopted and extended in social 
studies of technology. Star [1999] extends Kling’s argument about computer systems as 
complex social objects containing social context, built infrastructure, and the distinctive 
histories of social arrangements within which the system is developed. Star notes that 
information systems are repositories of work and procedure, requiring constant tailoring, 
workarounds, and other forms of articulation work to coordinate the activities of 
organizational members and encode organizational decisions in the design, structure, and 
practice of the built environment [179]. For Star and Ruhleder [1996], information 
systems become infrastructure in relation to organized practices [183]. Infrastructure is 
embedded into social arrangements and technologies. In ‘normal’ use, it is transparent to use, 
providing invisible support to the goals of organizational actors. This transparency fails 
(infrastructure becomes visible) primarily when infrastructure breaks down. Infrastructure is 
learned through membership in specific communities of practice, shaping and shaped by the 
conventions of those communities. It plugs into other infrastructures and tools in a 
standardized fashion. It is also built on an installed base and inherits strengths and limitations 
from that base. Partly because of this, changes in infrastructure come in the form of local and 
modular increments through negotiation and adjustment processes rather than all at once or 
globally. An infrastructure, then, forms upon configuration of these dimensions [183]. 
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Star sees infrastructure as a problematic part of human organization [180]. Star introduces 
the notion of fringes in information infrastructure. Strangers or people outside a particular 
social world often have trouble with the fringes of language: the nuances, the historical 
context, and indexicality. Indexicality requires insider knowledge such as history, nuance, 
and context as it cannot explicitly be put into a representation for the outside world. In their 
study on the Worm Community System, Star and Ruhleder define a set of fringes from both 
the design and use worlds of the system [183]. They emphasize the understanding of 
infrastructure on group interactions as they point out the impact of the clashing fringes 
between users and designers who do not have shared meanings of the system. The system 
requires users to acquire a certain level of skill that is taken for granted by system 
developers. They note that despite good user prototype evaluation in the system 
development there are unforeseen, complex challenges to usage involving standards and 
infrastructural and organizational relationships. In addition, fringes change with the 
contexts and tasks surrounding system use through resistance and social movements. 
Therefore, the system is not widely adopted and people switch back to familiar technology in 
their routine work [183].  
Information systems represent and encode organizational work processes. However, they 
are always incomplete with respect to both the complexity and the indexicality of the 
processes represented [180,182]. This causes organizational agents to adjust and work 
around the system to get on with their jobs. Star argues that a partnership between the 
system developers and the ethnographers is an effective approach to studying and 
understanding the relationships and interactions among organizational agents and with 
information systems [179]. This approach allows the system designers to examine the 
organizational problems that the system will solve whereas the ethnographers investigate 
the organizational setting. To study information system adoption and implementation, using 
an ethnographic model can help us understand the interactions between the agents and the 
systems and whether the premises underlying the systems are aligned with the 
organizational practices and structures. If the systems are not aligned with the 
organization’s practices and norms, they are likely to become barriers attending the 
adoption and use of the systems rather than facilitating the organization’s operations since 
they are not embedded in the practices [179]. 
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For designers and ethnographers alike, the nature of systems as infrastructure that inscribes 
work processes and procedures poses distinctive methodological challenges [179]. She 
suggests the methodological implications of infrastructure study, which includes decisions 
about encoding and standardizing, tinkering and tailoring activities, and the observation and 
deconstruction of decisions, is carried into infrastructural forms. As infrastructure has 
relational rather than objective property, it confronts differently placed actors in different 
ways. Information systems may have significantly different meanings, costs, and values for 
different actors. The differences bring about ongoing contests over resources, procedures, 
and efforts to reshape routines and the nature of work in organizational settings. The 
systems may also require real-time adjustments, or ‘articulation’ work, which is invisible in 
the systems, to complete the work processes and weave together organizational routines 
[179]. However, system designers usually cut off the people who carry out the invisible 
work from the systems [180,184]. As a result, there are layers of silence built into the 
infrastructures surrounding organizational tasks. Thus, information system ethnographers 
need to define the invisible work and the support personnel in order to discover the need for 
the adjustments to complete the processes [179,180]. 
5.1.2 Standards in information systems 
Standards in information systems play an important role in organizational communication, 
coordination, and interoperation. Standards come in various forms, such as classification 
systems, communication protocols, restructured work practices, organizational knowledge, 
values, and policies, and are embedded or integrated as modules in information systems. A 
number of researchers have pointed out the duality or structuration of technology in which 
technological rigidity gives rise to adaptations which in turn require adjustment and 
standardization [45,101,141]. Some scholars have extended Latour’s notion of inscriptions 
and their relationships with organizational arrangements to examine technological 
standards. There emerges a tension between local, customized, intimate, and flexible use of 
technology on the one hand and the need for standards and continuity on the other [183]. 
Standards become a challenge in the design of large-scale information technology because 
there are no genuinely universal standards; one person’s standard is another’s nightmare. 
The need for customization and standardization of technologies is different from one 
community of practice to another which may use technologies differently. Standardization is 
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essential in the study of technology affecting organizational transformation as standards 
inscribe organizational practices and are usually deeply invisible, as is the work involved in 
creating and using them (or not using them) [180]. 
In modern organizations, the purpose of standardizing is to streamline procedures or 
regulate organizational behaviors, to demand specific results, or to prevent harm [182]. 
Standards inscribe organizational codes, moral orders, and regulations and are embedded in 
infrastructures such as systems or tools in order to facilitate other tasks. Star and Lampland 
[2009] argue that Max Weber’s concept of rationality and the iron cage of bureaucracy 
have become a socio-technical cage – sticky and partly binding but also complexly 
structured with technological infrastructures and organizational agent behavior [182]. 
Standardized procedures are created and enforced by governmental agencies through legal 
procedures and other authority. For Star and Lampland, Weber’s work on modern 
bureaucracy and complex organizations is related to issues of distribution and enforcement 
of standards through degrees of delegation. 
Star and Lampland summarize characteristics of standards as forms of compression and 
representations of actions [182]. They are nested inside or linked with one another. For 
instance, the standard of having specific content such as a telephone number is linked with 
making an appointment on computerized calendars. Standardized forms drive interactions 
among people. People may need some flexibility, negotiation, and workarounds in order to 
maintain the continuity of the work. Socio-technical standards are distributed unevenly 
according to political regime, class position, and other socio-political attributes. Standards 
and the actions surrounding them are also relative in their impact, meaning, and reach into 
individual, local communities of practice. Standards are always relative to the infrastructure 
within/upon/sometimes against which they are implemented, and thus become a recursive 
problem. They are also integrated with one another and drive actions around them. The 
nature of the integration is global, increasing, and evolving. Lastly, standards codify or 
embody ethics and values, often affecting individuals’ actions and their consequences. They 
embody the fringes and struggles during the development process [182, p. 4-8]. Star gives 
an example in the creation of maps with different granularity degrees: each map 
communicates to a different audience with different granularity needs [180]. 
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Star and Lampland relate standardization to quantification; formal modeling and 
representation; and data mining, reuse, and classification [182]. They argue that 
standardization is a recursive practice, historical and embedded in a series of complex events 
and social structures. The nesting properties of standards converge with human behavior to 
form a complexly ‘imbricated’ whole. Recurring behavioral and technical norms and 
conventions have formed standard infrastructural elements through inscriptions, technical 
delegation and actions both locally and at a distance. Similar to studying infrastructure, it is 
necessary to deconstruct backstage elements of standards during technological development: 
their historical development, their bureaucratic and cultural settings, their political 
consequences, decisions made about them, and the tinkering and tailoring activities around 
them [182].  
Standards are constructed as consequences of negotiation of differences among social groups 
as shown in Bowker et al. [1996]’s study on classification systems in Nursing Interventions 
Classification [21]. Bowker and his colleagues define three areas of challenge in crafting a 
standardized classification scheme for information systems. First, a major purpose of a 
classification system is to provide good comparability across sites to enhance communication 
among members within and across organizations. Second, some areas of activity are 
unclassifiable or intimate, and thus invisible in the system. Intimacy means the system 
acknowledges common understandings among members of the community. Third, there are 
trade-offs between the degree of control and the flexibility of a classification system over 
organizational coordination. The degree of control affects comparability of the system. 
Bowker et al. argue that there are no perfect classification schemes because these three areas 
trade off against each other. For example, maximizing visibility and high levels of control 
threaten intimacy. Comparability and control pull against standardization while 
comparability and visibility work against the manageability of the system. A standardized 
classification system requires comparability across sites while leaving a margin of control for 
its users. Moreover, it needs to uncover invisible work which affects the intimacy of the 
system. These trade-offs become areas of negotiation and sometimes of conflict. Therefore, 
to achieve standardization, a system has to optimize between degrees of intimacy and 
manageability [21].  
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Monteiro and Hanseth [1996] study the role of standards in the context of information 
infrastructure and inter-organizational communication in Norwegian healthcare [134]. 
Their investigation on standards is congruent with Star and Lampland’s analysis; they 
conclude that standards are not just neutral technological components. Rather, they inscribe 
their use, such as communication patterns and actions, that takes place locally in user 
organizations. Thus, standards are crucial aspects in the design of socio-technical networks. 
Standardization involves technological and non-technological elements and the relationships 
between them [134, p. 334]. Monteiro and Hanseth also indicate that the standardization 
process is a combination of technical design, representing translated interests, and 
organizational arrangements, including behavior and practices, into technical details of the 
standard. Standardized artifacts, thus, inscribe the organizational work routines. As 
technology matures, standards gradually evolve. And if the agents in organizations do not 
follow the standards, the technology will cease to work. These particular aspects of 
standards are aligned with the notion of structuration of technology – organizations 
involved in the design process shape the standards, while the standards affect the 
organizations’ practices. For example, general practitioners and pharmacies have different 
interests in and motivations for using a standardized drug identification list. This creates the 
issue of how to inscribe the drug identification number into the form in such a way that it 
will not create additional work for the general practitioners or interfere with existing 
information practices of the pharmacies. The study shows that in the inter-organizational 
communication, the drug item list is tailored to fit the needs of the general practitioners 
while the practitioners’ medical record systems need to be adapted to make use of the list 
[134]. 
Standards can also acquire durability and stability. Once standards are established and 
aligned with the surrounding, heterogeneous network of institutional arrangements and 
work practices through bureaucratic maneuvers or other procedures, they are socially and 
culturally embedded, and achieve what Callon [32] calls “functional irreversibility” 
[134,182]. The institutional embeddedness and inscription of existing social, organizational, 
and technological arrangements into an installed base gives existing standards a certain 
degree of inertia or momentum [88,90,134] and any modification needs to be coordinated 
and organized to avoid collapsing the organizational behavior. Technologies, organizational 
relations, and the practices that connect them may move slowly and/or resist sudden 
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transformational efforts. Standard modifications become increasingly difficult as the 
standards diffuse, creating network externalities, technological lock-ins, and self-reinforcing 
effects [134].  
There are several approaches to changing standards. A standard may be changed by 
developing a new version that is compatible with the previous one, in the sense that all 
implementations of the previous version may communicate with installations of the new one 
as if they were equal [134, p. 338]. However, this kind of change imposes constraints on the 
new version. Another strategy is to introduce a new, incompatible version. This strategy 
removes the constraints, but is difficult to implement: all users may be required to switch 
over to the new version at the same time, at a so-called “flag-day.” However, coordinating 
such a change is very difficult as the number of installations grows. An alternative is to 
develop and install gateways between the old and the new [55,90]. The challenges to this 
alternative depend on the degree of incompatibility between the two versions. Yet another 
strategy is to build up a new separate system based on the new standard [134]. But this 
strategy raises an issue of clashing fringes between users and the new system as users may 
be more familiar with the existing system, standard, and infrastructural and organizational 
relationships, leading to system resistance. As a result, a number of substantial changes are 
necessary to overcome the constraints and challenges during the ongoing revision. For 
example, there has been an attempt to develop a new version of the IP protocol for the 
Internet since 1990. As other standards are nested in the protocol standards, the new 
version requires changes in 58 other Internet standards and a huge number of modifications 
and implementations of these standards [134]. 
Yet another issue of information standardization and system interoperability is what Peled 
[2001] refers to as electronic red tape [155]. He finds that computers and information 
systems often increase, rather than decrease, red tape in organizations. Integrating cross-
agency systems through standardizing data definitions, so that one agency can retrieve data 
from another, creates a new type of red tape. The system integration appears to eliminate 
red tape in the sense that citizens no longer need to fill out the same data twice for two 
different agencies. However, it requires agencies to create an elaborate mechanism to ensure 
the interchangeability and interoperability of data, as well as verify that certain agencies 
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acquire authority over certain types of data. Therefore, citizens have less red tape, while 
bureaucrats have more [9,208]. 
Organizations cannot eliminate a single data element in an old system after a new system is 
introduced [155]. Although organizations realize that duplicating data entry and relying on 
old systems in parallel to the new ones is expensive to maintain and difficult to manage, 
generations of officials have already embedded data processing routines in the old systems. 
Organizations, therefore, accumulate “electronic mounds” [155, p. 414] consisting of old 
systems that live on because they provide critical functionality that newer systems cannot 
provide or replace. These mounds rarely collapse because organizations deliberately embed 
redundant, duplicate, and back up systems in the mounds. Hence, agencies need to continue 
developing and maintaining both the old and the new systems. Over time, the mound 
accumulates “data cemeteries,” i.e., poor data that can no longer be verified and corrected 
[119]. In addition, the electronic mound accumulates massive amounts of rules and 
exceptions to the rule [155]. As computers invisibly accumulate these rules and exceptions 
by inscribing them into program codes, they prevent the bureaucrats from noticing this 
evolving entropy which grows exponentially unchecked.  
Standardization, integration, and interoperability are central to most of the benefits claimed 
for digital government development. Work on inter-organizational information integration 
in the digital government field has spoken of the importance of infrastructure development 
[53,60,69,86,95,124,145] and standardization [64,86,95,153,195] in the process of adoption 
and use of information systems. 
5.2 Information Infrastructure Development and Standardization in the Thai 
Public Sector 
As reviewed in chapter 3, computerization in the Thai public sector began when major 
government ministries computerized their functions to increase quality, speed, and efficiency 
of service provision. Many ministries and departments developed similar systems and 
infrastructures to serve their operational functions and work procedures, including 
developing their own e-Document, human resources management, and financial 
management systems. However, these systems were implemented for internal use within an 
individual agency and there was no connection of systems among central and local agencies 
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within the same ministry or across Ministries, leading to deep problems of interoperability 
across agency boundaries. Throughout the 1990s, therefore, IT adoption was rather 
disjointed and uneven due to local proliferation and weak linkages among individual 
agencies. 
In the late 1990s, ministries and departments started moving to the next step of information 
sharing and integration of their services and applications within the agency. The focus at 
this period was to build a shared network infrastructure within a ministry. Well-funded and 
geographically distributed units such as the Ministries of Transport and Interior developed 
their own intra-ministry physical networked infrastructure to share information among 
department- and provincial-level sub-units. Other agencies that could not afford their own 
physical networks leased telecommunication lines from the service providers for intra-
ministry information sharing.  
Information and system integration efforts in service delivery started in the early 2000s, 
when ministries and departments grouped and provided their services and applications at 
the same physical and virtual places, following the digital government development 
initiatives [40]. Most ministries set up a service link office, gathering public services and 
officials at a single location to deliver all services. At the same time, ministries developed 
portal websites that included all services and applications provided by their supervised 
departments. The Ministry of Commerce, for instance, provided a service center combining 
available services from its dependent departments into one website: 
http://www.mocservicelink.go.th/. The Ministry of Transport also had a portal website: 
http://portal.mot.go.th/indexd.html, and established a service center in Bangkok where 
officials from its supervised departments and state-owned enterprises, such as the 
Department of Land Transport, which provides the vehicle registration renewal service, and 
the Thai Airways International, which provides the air-ticketing service, operated. 
Nevertheless, the work processes and information structures of individual agencies were yet 
not integrated or standardized through these linkages. Most of the government virtual 
service link websites and physical service centers performed as information centers and 
portal sites redirecting users to specific agencies for particular services. Furthermore, the 
integration of information and services was still limited within the ministry. Each ministry 
still defined its own information standards and protocols among the systems of agencies 
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under its supervision. As for information sharing beyond the ministry’s boundaries, 
independent physical networks and applications resulted in incompatible systems, standards, 
and technologies. This limitation obstructed the public sector in inter-ministry integration 
and interoperability of public services, information, and government applications. The 
government needed centralized information, such as government workforces and 
expenditures, from all government agencies for planning and decision-making purposes. 
However, this information was fragmented among agencies and their closed systems. 
In 2005, the Thai Cabinet issued its resolution on the e-Government Roadmap and the 
development of back-office integration systems, identifying a number of central thrusts: 
providing telecommunication network infrastructure for inter-agency collaboration, setting 
up cross-government information exchange standards and channels, developing common 
back-office applications to allow government agencies to share and interoperate, and 
integrating information systems among agencies to facilitate the government’s one-stop 
service initiative.13 
In my study, I examined the development and implementation of four contemporary efforts 
at system standardization and interoperability: 1) the Government Information Network 
(GIN) as the information infrastructure for the government and the national information 
standards – Thailand e-Government Interoperability Framework (TH e-GIF); 2) the 
aforementioned Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS) and the 
Departmental Personnel Information system (DPIS) as the national centralized government 
information systems; 3) interoperable e-Document systems which differ among each other 
regarding information structures and associated work practices, as the national 
interoperable information systems using the TH e-GIF; and 4) cross-agency integrated 
systems developed for specific purposes, such as the National Single Window (NSW) for 
trade-related functions using the TH e-GIF. 
5.2.1 Government information networks and framework 
In September 2006, the MICT announced the Thailand e-Government Information 
Framework as a national information standardization guideline for interoperation across 
                                                
13 The Cabinet Resolution on the e-Government Roadmap was issued on August 16, 2005, and on the 
development of back-office integration systems on July 12, 2005. 
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government agencies. The TH e-GIF has been employed in a variety of government 
applications for interoperability across local legacy systems and platforms including e-
Document systems, and the National Single Window (NSW) for customs and trade-related 
services. The TH e-GIF offers a summary of standards, rules, methods, and regulations to 
be used in information system development throughout government, with the goal of 
achieving national interoperability and integration. It specifies high-level information 
exchange standards in five key areas: organizational process modeling; business information 
modeling; electronic data exchange; technical communication protocols; and the TH e-GIF 
implementation process itself, including standards for reporting on policy, budget, operation, 
and management planning. As individual agencies hire different software vendors to develop 
applications to serve their common functions, the TH e-GIF framework provides a base set 
of requirements and specifications intended to ensure interoperability regardless of vendor 
or government unit. In principle, this prevents agencies from being tied or locked in to 
individual vendors. It also allows development firms to orient to these standards, hiring and 
training personnel in accordance with specific government needs. A pilot project started in 
December 2006 to build the first standardized data set for enabling data exchange of official 
correspondences in e-Document systems. The interoperable e-Document systems were 
implemented for the first time in July 2007 when the government network infrastructure 
was ready for interoperation. 
In January 2007 the Government Information Network (GIN) was launched as a centralized 
high-speed network linking all ministries and departments in the public sector. Its goal has 
been to eliminate the redundant and dispersed information networks of individual agencies; 
increase the speed, reliability, and security of government information exchange; and 
integrate network-level resources to reduce redundant investments in infrastructure and 
operational costs paid to private network providers. The GIN is also intended as the 
primary backbone supporting information exchange for common back-office applications like 
the interoperable e-Document system, centralized human resources management system, 
and centralized financial management information system. The Ministry of ICT (MICT) 
provides this infrastructure by leasing network capacity from two government-linked 
telecommunication providers and reallocating this capacity to all ministry- and department-
level agencies. All costs were borne by the MICT for the initial three-year period, after 
which agencies have been billed on the basis of network utilization. 
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Before the emergence of GIN, most agencies had their own network infrastructure either by 
investing in their own physical networks or by leasing from private service providers. 
Agencies, such as the Ministries of Interior and Transport, that had their own networks 
would never give up their investment, whereas agencies with leased communication lines did 
not want to switch to the GIN either because they would have to change all network 
configurations, resulting in major changes in application configurations. In the meantime, 
the MICT does not have authority over other agencies to order system adoption and 
replacement. As a result, the government has to cover the cost for both the GIN and the 
agency networks. The government is aware of this issue, and thus mandates the Ministry of 
Finance to gradually cut down the network infrastructure budget of individual agencies for 
new budget requests to force the agencies to give up their leased networks and adopt the 
GIN after the initial three-year period. 
During the initial three-year period of GIN implementation, therefore, most agencies 
adopted the GIN, willingly or not, to serve purposes other than main inter-agency 
communication. The agencies adopted the system for network backup, for separate Internet 
connection, or for no purpose at all. An ICT official at a regional office reported that the 
GIN network equipment was installed at the office, and he was just responsible for keeping 
the equipment running. The network had never been utilized because the office did not 
know what to do with it, and the main office in Bangkok did not give any advice on its 
utilization. 
The MICT’s GIN and TH e-GIF implementation plan, from the agencies’ point of view, 
focuses the success of interoperability development more on the adoption rate than on the 
system utilization. A senior ICT official at a ministry noted that: 
“The GIN promises to provide inter-agency communication network. But the MICT never 
has a clear plan on what applications will be running on this network. They basically just 
want us to adopt it, and encourage us to come up with useful applications in order to make 
use of the network and the TH e-GIF.”  
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
Moreover, the same government-owned service providers offer both the GIN and leased 
lines to agencies, though the sales and engineer teams of the GIN are different from those of 
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the leased lines. So the government pays the same companies either way. The project helps 
increase revenues to those companies, as a senior executive at a ministry reported that:  
“The GIN is a 400-million-baht project made by the MICT, which distributes the money to 
those two state-owned telecommunications companies. This project is simply a new money 
making tool for the politicians.” 
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
5.2.2 National centralized information systems 
Among three major common functions, the government has centralized the development of 
financial and personnel management information systems for purposes of higher-level 
planning and decision-making. As explained in chapter 4, all government agencies are 
required to adopt the GFMIS to allow the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD) to 
monitor and control the expenditure of all agencies in real time for decision-making and 
budget planning purposes. The public sector budgeting, finance, and accounting operations 
are then standardized and integrated nationwide. 
A second recent centralized application is the DPIS, developed by the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission (OCSC) to standardize government-wide records and reporting around 
recruitment, evaluation, promotion, salary, and benefits. Although the OCSC does not 
mandate that all agencies adopt the system, it strongly encourages them to use the system 
and requests workforce-related reports in the format available in the system. Here, some 
inter-agency variation is allowed: the OCSC realizes that most agencies’ actual 
organizational structures are different from the one stated by law (e.g., additional divisions 
and bureaus designed to reduce hierarchical layers and speed up vertical command and 
reporting). The DPIS therefore allows the agencies some latitude to tailor the system to 
their own organizational structures and practices. 
The details of both systems and their implementation processes were discussed in the 
previous chapter. It is worth emphasizing that although the systems are intended to replace 
existing financial management and human resources management systems at local agencies, 
individual agencies still use and/or maintain their systems parallel to the GFMIS and DPIS. 
For example, the CGD did not design the GFMIS to facilitate day-to-day accounting 
operations for local agencies, such as managing daily cash flows, suspended accounts, and in-
process reimbursement. Although the system has been improved to include these operations 
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in later versions, it still cannot fully support local requirements as individual agencies tailor 
their accounting management to serve their own purposes. 
Likewise, agencies use the DPIS as a secondary system to physical records, the OCSC#7s, 
and their legacy systems. The legacy personnel management systems are typically 
spreadsheet files consisting of lists of officials categorized based on agencies’ information 
needs. In the interviews, the personnel staff reported that the DPIS is mostly useful for 
managing information about retired officials because the staff needs to maintain their 
records for pensions and benefits until the officials pass. As for current information, however, 
the staff has tended to rely on their locally stored records – either the OCSC#7s or the 
spreadsheets. As discussed earlier in the previous chapter, the HR officials usually update 
information on the OCSC#7s, in the spreadsheets, and in the DPIS respectively.  
Additionally, agencies do not make use of the DPIS per se. Rather, they reuse the personnel 
database stored in the DPIS for other systems. The ICT Center uses a staff member’s name 
and division for systems managing check-in and -out time, leave records reports, and for a 
reimbursement management system, as well as for Intranet web login and access logs. 
5.2.3 Interoperable e-Document systems 
As previously reviewed in chapter 3, most agencies have developed e-Document systems to 
improve the speed and accuracy of documentation work in the organization. As noted by 
Weber, documentation was and remains a central function of every agency because the 
administration requires documents as proofs of orders, reports, and requests throughout the 
hierarchical structure. E-Document systems help the agencies deal with the flood of 
documents coming in, going out, and circulating internally on a daily basis. Traditionally, 
individual agencies have outsourced e-Document system development to as many as 25 
different software vendors, resulting in stand-alone systems with little, if any, compatibility 
between departments. 
To combat this problem, the Prime Minister’s Office and the MICT initiated the 
development of an interoperable e-Document framework in 2006. At the beginning, the 
MICT developed a national centralized e-Document system with the aim that every agency 
would adopt the system. However, over 100 agencies, each of which has specific details in 
document flows and procedures, had already developed and used their own systems. 
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Although each system shares common documentation functions, it embeds different flows 
and practices based on the agencies’ procedures. So, the agencies were not willing to switch 
systems. In response to this challenge, the MICT has adopted a ‘gateway’ strategy, using the 
TH e-GIF information exchange framework to build interoperability between the legacy 
local systems.  
The interoperable e-Document system relies on web services that retrieve information from 
a given system and transfer it to the recipients. Individual agencies are required to specify 
their data elements in an XML schema meeting TH e-GIF standards, and make those 
elements available to web services operating through the GIN. In this way (in principle) 
interoperability requirements are met without interfering with the systems, procedures, and 
information flows adapted to local needs at the agency level. 
The MICT has persuaded a number of agencies to sign a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on implementing the interoperable e-Document systems with the use of TH e-GIF. 
The TH e-GIF gateway retrieves 19 commonly used data fields on correspondence and 
scanned documents from the source agency’s e-Document systems, and then sends them 
through the GIN to the central database where the destination agencies pull these data into 
their systems when retrieving the documents. Using this configuration, individual agencies 
do not have to alter any data structures of their e-Document system. The interoperable 
systems are believed to help reduce data entry and delivery time. 
However, most agencies do not value cross-agency information sharing and time saving in 
the interoperable systems because the data entry and all document management matters are 
jobs performed by administrative staff and thus do not benefit mid-ranked officials through 
executives. The officials merely work on the physical documents once they arrive at their 
desk. Rather, what they want from interoperable e-Document systems is the capability to 
track their documents sent to another agency: they want to know where the documents are 
and who is responsible for a matter so they can contact that particular division or person 
directly. However, this requirement goes beyond technical agreements. Agencies have to 
consent to release the information about their internal document flows and relevant 
hierarchical structure to be shared with other agencies. With different systems and 
configurations, the interoperable e-Document systems cannot achieve such a goal. A few 
 
123 
ministries like the Ministries of Commerce and Transport took a step further in redesigning 
their e-Document systems and distributing the software to their supervised departments 
while still complying with the TH e-GIF information standards for cross-ministry 
interoperability. Both ministries emphasize the significance of intra-ministry more than 
inter-agency document circulation because they tend to have more collaborative business 
conducted among agencies within the same ministry than with other agencies. The 
Commerce Ministry executives demand an integration of e-Document system of 
departments under their supervision so that documents can be sent and traced across agency 
boundaries seamlessly. However, not all departments can adopt the new system due to limits 
on technological resources. The ministry also has to deal with concerns about privacy and 
managerial interference issues raised by the departments. 
5.2.4 Cross-agency integrated systems for specific purposes 
Many ministries have adopted the TH e-GIF framework to integrate heterogeneous 
functions relevant to service delivery across multiple agencies. For instance, import, export, 
and logistics in Thailand involve 28 government agencies including the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Department of Business Development and Department of Foreign Trade, the 
Ministry of Finance’s Customs Department, and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives’ Departments of Livestock, along with private firms such as banks, insurance 
companies, warehouse, and freight forwarders. Although each agency performs different 
functions in the process of service delivery, many of them require identical data elements 
from the businesses. The businesses need to go over the data entry at about 60-70% of their 
interaction points with government because the agencies are unable or unwilling to send the 
information across organizational boundaries. Such duplication delays and complicates the 
logistics process, leading to higher costs and frequent problems of data inconsistency. 
To eliminate these problems, the Cabinet initiated the development of the National Single 
Window (NSW) for import- and export-related functions, and mandated the MICT to draw 
up the development plans.14 In 2005, the first expenditure was approved for over 200 million 
baht and given to the MICT to develop a system prototype and establish the standards for 
trade-related information exchange. Similar to the development of interoperable e-
                                                
14 The Cabinet Resolution on March 9, 2004. 
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Document systems, agencies would not change their existing information structures and 
formats. Therefore, the MICT had to invent a mapping structure that takes different 
information formats and translates them into a standardized one.  
During the first phase of development, several agencies, including the Ministries of 
Commerce and Finance and the Customs Department, tried to gain administrative and 
budget control of the NSW development project by claiming their leading role in and 
responsibility for the trade-related functions. When the new government assumed office in 
2006, the Cabinet reconsidered the project implementation and transferred the project 
ownership from the MICT to the Custom Department. 
The NSW requires integration and standardization of data elements or data harmonization 
throughout the whole process using the TH e-GIF to decrease data redundancy. The goal of 
such harmonization is ‘Single Window Entry,’ in which the NSW will integrate information 
from all relevant agencies into a single shared database. This will require businesses to enter 
data into the system only once, and enable relevant agencies to use and process that 
information without duplication. It also provides an e-Document exchange hub for cross-
boundary trade and transport among agencies in both public and private sectors. 
To achieve this goal, the agencies need to modify their own incoming and outgoing data 
elements, existing work practices and routines, documentation procedures, and relevant 
legal frameworks that previously might not have complied with the NSW’s processes and 
standards. For example, the Department of Foreign Trade still issues permits for export, the 
Customs Department issues export declaration, and the Thai Chamber of Commerce issues 
product quality certificates. All of them have internal processes and systems to perform their 
routine tasks, encompassing about 60 different laws and procedures. Moreover, each 
system’s data elements might not be TH e-GIF standards compliant, and thus need to be 
changed so that the data can be exchanged. The agencies also need to change their trade- 
and logistics-related laws, which still require documents from businesses and other agencies, 
so that their systems can become paperless. 
5.3 Challenges and Tensions Attending Standardization Efforts 
As the examples above suggest, efforts at standardization in digital government 
development involve transformations that go far beyond the apparently technical sounding 
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language such discussions are usually couched in. Standardization and integration of 
information and services across traditional government boundaries may require, as well as 
result in, deep changes to embedded organizational structures and processes. Integration 
may entail changes in the existing organizational practices, norms, culture, and laws of 
individual agencies. Integration may also require complex calibration between the internal 
and historically layered operations of teams, agencies, information systems, and technologies. 
Each factor may present limits, challenges, and tensions that can delay, alter, or subtly 
influence digital government standardization efforts. 
5.3.1 Structural misalignment of integrated systems with bureaucratic culture 
Interviews with senior officials in all agencies in my study reveal that concern about losing 
control and ownership of information and systems is a common issue among agencies, and 
the major impediment to information integration and standardization efforts.  
The study suggests that agencies have tended to obtain and protect their critical 
organizational resources, which include authority, money, and information, within their 
jurisdictions. The integration of information and systems has threatened individual agencies’ 
jurisdictions. Moreover, government officials have worked based on functional silos, and 
hardly developed cross-functional management skills. Officials typically focus their 
information collection and use only for their line of work, while the information could be 
collected by one agency and shared among functions and agencies. For instance, various 
agencies, including the military, the Ministry of Interior, the Department of Forest, and the 
Land Development Department, have developed their geographical information system 
(GIS) using their own versions of maps for specific purposes. Agencies that need to use a 
GIS also tend to initiate new projects with the development of their own maps because they 
want to have freedom of control over the budget and information, and to receive credit from 
the public, as well as to gain a share in the hardware procurement. 
A senior ICT official explained that large ICT projects often include hardware purchases 
because it is the major source of income for politicians. Reusing existing databases and 
systems would require less hardware. Therefore, agencies tend to initiate new information 
requirements with advanced computer technology. He noted that: 
 
126 
“Integration is the most difficult thing in the Thai public sector. Even at the ministerial level, 
each department tries to come up with projects in different names so that they can avoid 
system integration and overlap. Given different names and purposes written in the 
departments’ plans, the Office of Permanent Secretary cannot integrate or centralize their 
projects into one integrated plan.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
Also, there has been difficulty among agencies in requesting a share of existing information 
items collected by one agency because the owner of the data rarely allows information 
sharing. For example, the Ministry of Interior does not allow the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives to use the citizen registration database for its farmer registration system. 
Information ownership implies autonomy and jurisdictions, which every agency has tried to 
preserve. Therefore, the MOAC has to create its own database for this particular purpose. 
Executive officials at the MICT emphasized that the challenges facing the integration efforts 
involve the agencies’ unwillingness to share information with others. A senior official 
reported that: 
“Most agencies do not want to share their information with others because they do not know 
how others will utilize the information and they cannot monitor that usage. They are 
concerned that others may reuse and alter the information for different purposes without their 
knowledge while they are still liable for the accuracy of information. By default, officials 
always think they are obligated to protect their agency’s information unless the policy says 
otherwise.” 
 (Informant interview, June 2010) 
This tunnel vision, or functional-silos approach, which is also referred to as “localistic” 
attitudes [114, p. 48], of officials has led to extensive collection and storage of duplicate 
information with different standards. The information integration efforts thus face the 
challenge of information sharing and standardization.  
Furthermore, information integration efforts that require changes to current work practices 
or that create new barriers have caused resistance to the technologies. The collaboration 
appears to hardly take place unless agencies share the load of responsibility and obligation. 
A senior network administrator at a ministry reported that the ministry did not want to 
relinquish its existing leased network lines and adopt the GIN because it would have to 
change the entire network and application configurations. As he explained, 
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“Every agency is using the same class network configuration. Adoption the GIN means we 
all have to change our current settings to avoid network collision. But no one wants to 
change theirs unless everyone else also changes them.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
5.3.2 Resource asymmetries 
Government agencies do not have an equal level of technological resources, including 
funding, ICT personnel, skills and expertise, and technologies. For instance, the logistics- 
and trade-related agencies in the NSW system have to build or modify their systems to meet 
the information exchange requirements of the system. While the Customs Department has 
advanced its networked systems and infrastructure for its e-logistics system to facilitate 
business, the Department of Forest has encountered technical resource problems while 
developing its certificate issuing system due to a lack of ICT staff and computer 
infrastructure at the Department. The development of the NSW, thus, is delayed because the 
whole system needs to wait for the Department of Forest to catch up. The interoperable e-
Document system faces similar resource asymmetry issues. Many central ministries have 
offered their e-Document software to other agencies (including their own local offices) for 
free, to build a broader user base and ensure that intra-ministerial transactions will follow a 
single centralized system. In many cases, however, local agencies lack the skills and 
knowledge to implement and maintain the systems.  
Besides lack of technical skills and knowledge, local offices usually encounter the problem of 
insufficient human resources. Provincial offices of the Ministry of Interior, for instance, have 
a limited number of administrative staff members. Thus, the staff needs to perform multiple 
tasks, including documentation work, financial management, and other housekeeping work, 
for the entire office. As physical documents and correspondence remain the primary media 
for official coordination with the central ministry and other agencies’ local offices located in 
the same building, the administrative staff exclusively works with physical documents and 
manual records to fulfill the documentation work without adopting the secondary media – 
the e-Document system provided by the central Ministry. Thus, the electronic copies from 
the Ministry get dropped off at the regional office. 
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5.3.3 Security and privacy concerns 
Efforts at integration may raise certain kinds of security and privacy concerns. As an 
integrated system collects information from many systems performing different tasks across 
agencies, citizens and businesses that submit the information for a specific purpose are 
worried that the information might be shared among agencies that are not relevant to the 
given task. Both public and private actors in Thailand have voiced concern around these 
issues, both in interviews and at public hearings on the NSW National Action Plan.  
For instance, the NSW system includes government functions ranging from registering 
businesses and products to issuing certificates of origin and import/export permits. When a 
business firm applies for import permission at Customs, the invoices containing information 
about the company, its business partners, products, and so on are not relevant to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The NSW, however, retrieves and integrates all 
information regarding the firm and its products, and allows all trade- and logistics-related 
agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, to access the system. Thus, 
businesses require the government to carefully design the system in order to protect their 
information and reveal only what is needed for certain agencies. 
Senior ICT officials in my interviews expressed similar concerns about the information sent 
through the centralized government network (GIN). As the GIN is shared across agencies, 
some officials expressed concern that sensitive information exchanged within the ministry 
and its sub-agencies might be compromised. In addition, they do not trust the security 
management policies of the MICT. Moreover, the MICT does not allow individual agencies 
to modify the policies of their network allocation. Agencies cannot even monitor the 
network utilization and security without MICT permission. Thus, the agencies prefer their 
own established network.  
5.3.4 Redundancy (two systems problems) 
As the story above suggests, the MICT has continued to face challenges of redundancy and 
duplication. Before the GIN project, many ministries built or leased their own information 
networks. The MICT introduced the GIN with the hope of convincing ministries to give up 
such networks and adopt the GIN instead. However, network administrators interviewed in 
this study have questioned the MICT’s network utilization and security management plans 
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given limited experience and expertise of the MICT officials, and poor internal management 
within the Ministry, as well as poor coordination with outsourcing vendors overseeing and 
managing the GIN project. As a result, individual agencies cast doubt on the GIN’s security, 
reliability, and long-term availability. Thus, those ministries have retained their networks, 
using the GIN as a backup line instead. Such duplication results in unnecessary ICT 
expenses. 
Similarly, the implementation of the NSW has been limited to government agencies and 
businesses that have sufficient ICT resources. Some small businesses cannot technically 
and/or financially afford the computerized system for the trade and e-Logistics transactions 
with the government agencies, and thus still need to carry out the task manually. Locked out 
from the NSW, these businesses have sued the Customs Department for unfair treatment, 
leading to a court order requiring Customs to maintain manual channels to accommodate 
businesses unready for such electronic transactions. Customs is therefore tasked with 
running both electronic and manual systems for the NSW in parallel. 
5.3.5 Rigidity of integrated systems 
Standardization and integration sometimes create tensions in the development and use of 
systems within individual agencies. A standardized system interoperates with systems on 
different platforms and structures through a system gateway. The gateway allows an 
interconnection among heterogeneous systems without converting those systems’ internal 
information structures and procedures. Consequently, the standardized system and its 
interoperable systems have limited access to the internal information across independent 
systems. For example, the TH e-GIF allows information exchange among agencies at the 
ministry and department levels through heterogeneous e-Document systems. Adopting the 
TH e-GIF, the interoperable e-Document system enables a ministry to send a document to 
any other ministry or department within the government network. However, it does not 
allow the ministry to keep track of its document once it is sent to other agencies. Thus, the 
ministry cannot trace the documents within other agencies’ boundaries. This limitation of 
TH e-GIF becomes a barrier to document tracking between the ministries and departments. 
Many ministries that have sufficient ICT resources, therefore, reorganize their information 
structures and develop a centralized, ministry-wide e-Document system that allows every 
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agency within the ministry to trace documents at division level rather than just adopting the 
TH e-GIF for interoperability. 
Although all agencies within a ministry adopt the ministry-wide, centralized e-Document 
system, in addition each of them still has different document procedures and flows 
depending on the agency’s documentation policies. The system cannot strictly define 
whether the documents need to go to the General Division for monitoring and traceability, 
as some agencies might have different policies, or whether the divisions are allowed to send 
documents out and issue outgoing document numbers themselves. The centralized e-
Document system, thus, can capture only main functions and procedures, and routinely 
misses or omits detailed procedures and exceptions that are handled differently from agency 
to agency. In response, individual agencies and users adopt workarounds and other tinkered 
solutions to local information needs. 
As the system becomes bigger and more integrated, it tends to provide less flexibility for 
agency users. During the public hearing on the NSW National Action Plan, local agencies 
demanded the system encode trade procedures and policies into the national system to cover 
all trade-related regulations from national to agency levels. However, the Customs 
Department and software vendors cannot meet this requirement as the regulations and rules 
have many exceptions, which would make the national system too complicated, slow, and 
expensive. Therefore, the committee has to decide which functions and features should and 
can be included in the national system, and which will have to be developed in separate, local 
systems. 
Workarounds and local adjustments are also characteristic of other centralized systems. The 
GFMIS and DPIS, for instance, provide the main financial and personnel management 
functions for the agencies for the purpose of monitoring, controlling, and planning at the 
national level. However, the GFMIS does not include cash flow and accounting for non-
procurement budgets. Thus, the financial staff needs to carry out these tasks manually, or by 
creating supplementary systems to manage this budget separately. Then they feed the 
information from the supporting system into the GFMIS. As shown earlier in this and the 
previous chapters, HR divisions similarly create additional files and reports to manage 
personnel records that the DPIS does not support. 
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5.3.6 Ownership, commitment, and control 
Most of the centralized and integrated infrastructure and systems, like GFMIS and DPIS, 
are initiated by a single agency and deployed to all ministries and departments. During the 
design and development of those systems the agencies that act as the project manager 
usually interact with the users in all agencies directly to gather system requirements and 
user feedback. The CGD who works on the GFMIS mostly communicates with officials in 
the finance divisions of agencies; the DPIS developers collect user requirements from the 
staff in HR divisions. The ICT officials at the ICT Center of the agencies barely get involved 
in the design and development process. The involvement of the ICT Centers only occurs 
during the implementation process – when the developers install computer and network 
equipment at the agencies’ location. The ICT Centers, as the agency’s network gatekeeper, 
just provide physical space and network connection for those centralized systems. However, 
the systems are a black box to the ICT staff. They do not know anything about the systems, 
and tend to neglect them. Most of the time, when the users have problems with the systems, 
they contact the development agencies directly. Thus, the interaction regarding the systems 
bypasses the agencies’ ICT Centers. A junior ICT official reported that: “When the DPIS is 
not working, I just help the users contact the OCSC helpdesk explaining what is wrong. Then, I can 
go have lunch.” (Informant interview, July 2010). 
Lack of involvement in the development and maintenance of centralized systems reduces 
local ICT Centers’ sense of system ownership, and creates a distance between the users and 
the ICT staff in the organization. Consequently, some ICT Centers completely ignore the 
existence of the systems and leave local users more or less alone with the systems. Further 
development and cooperation between the developers and government agencies thus gets 
more difficult. 
On the other hand, missing ownership of government-provided networks or systems leads 
to agencies losing, whether willingly or not, freedom in their internal affairs. As discussed 
previously, the MICT does not allow individual agencies to setup security management 
plans for their networks. If the networks fail, the agencies need to contact the MICT as the 
service provider rather than making a direct contact with the vendors who actually provide 
the networks. This causes frustration among local agencies as their network availability and 
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reliability depends on the service contract agreements between the MICT and the vendors. 
An ICT director noted that: 
“When the network is down in the early morning, we have to wait until the MICT folks 
come to their office. That can be as late as 8.30am. In the past, we would contact the vendor 
directly anytime and get the problem fixed right away because we had an agreement for 24/7 
helpdesk with the vendor. Now we have to contact the vendor through the MICT as our 
contract counterpart is the MICT, not the vendor.” 
(Informant interview, July 2011) 
Additionally, redesigning particular systems that have been standardized and interoperate 
with other agencies’ is difficult, as the change may affect other parts of the integrated system. 
Local agencies may be perceived to be losing freedom as they lose autonomy while the 
government gains control over systems and associated work procedures and practices at 
local agencies.  
5.3.7 Legal restrictions 
Inter-agency integrated systems, like the NSW, have attempted to reduce the paperwork 
and documentation process required by different agencies. It aims to require businesses to 
submit information only once, so the agencies need to redesign their processes to reuse the 
information as much as possible. As discussed earlier, there are 30 duplicated data elements 
with multiple data entry points in the entire trade and logistics process. Although the NSW 
has reduced the paperwork and data entry in the system, the relevant agencies still require 
copies of documents from the businesses because the laws and procedures remain the same 
as before the emergence of NSW. There are about 60 laws and procedures related to the 
trade and logistics enforced by 28 agencies. Until these are changed – itself a costly, time-
consuming and politically loaded process – the possibilities of ‘paperlessness’ and single 
window entry will remain unrealized. 
5.3.8 Power and autonomy in standardization efforts 
Integration and standardization efforts require a spearhead unit or agency to perform an 
integrative role among agencies. The spearhead agencies need to have some form of 
authority or power. Otherwise, the agencies may encounter challenges or barriers to 
performing their role. The Comptroller General’s Department, the leading agency in the 
GFMIS development, holds budgetary power over all government agencies, hence being 
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able to enforce the adoption of the nationally centralized GFMIS. Likewise, the Civil Service 
Commission also has direct and indirect personnel power and influence over other agencies. 
Agencies are obligated to comply with the Commission’s standards in public sector 
workforce management systems and reports. Therefore, most agencies have adopted the 
Commission’s DPIS although they still maintain and primarily use their existing systems. 
In the case of GIN and the interoperable e-Document system, as well as the early period of 
NSW development, the MICT plays a leading role. The government empowered the MICT 
to develop information exchange standards for trade-related agencies and to manage the 
central budget of the project. The ministry provides technical consulting and assistance for 
particular agencies participating in the project. It also approved the budget requested by 
those agencies for their internal system development and improvement in order to be 
interoperable with the NSW. An MICT official who was involved in the project noted that 
agencies were collaborative only when the MICT had budgetary power over them. As he 
reported, 
“Agencies tended to listen to us and take our advice until we approved their budget requests. 
After that, we no longer had power or authorization to control their project development. We 
became a helpdesk providing technical support only when needed. They did not listen to us 
anymore. 
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
Similar issues are also seen in the implementation of GIN and interoperable e-Document 
systems. Unlike the CGD or the OCSC, the MICT does not have any authoritative 
directives over other agencies. The coordination and collaboration between the MICT and 
agencies takes place completely on a voluntary basis. It has thus faced challenges in 
deploying GIN and TH e-GIF that the CGD or OCSC rarely has encountered. 
Additionally, the MICT has been faced with the issue of political struggle with other 
ministries. Larger and more powerful ministries often drag their heels over the adoption of 
technologies or systems developed by the MICT because they want to be the spearhead of 
the projects, but the MICT instead takes that role. The Ministry of Interior, for instance, 
would not accept the new citizen ID cards issued by the MICT and tried to come up with its 
own standards. According to a senior official at the MICT, the resistance and all the 
consequential delay have resulted from the MOI not being happy with the MICT’s leading 
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role in the project in which the MOI is supposed to be the leader. From the MOI’s view, 
they own the citizen registration databases and are the citizen ID card issuing unit. 
Therefore, the MOI should be responsible for purchasing the ID cards. As the previous 
Cabinet’ resolution states, though, the MICT, because they are knowledgeable about ID card 
technologies, should make the decisions regarding card type, relevant technologies, and 
vendors in the market. The ID card project is a national mega-project regarding the budget 
as over 60 million cards will be issued. Moreover, at that time the ministers of these agencies 
were from different political parties and it is hard for two ministries charged by political 
appointees from different parties to reach an agreement. Similar competition over project 
ownership and financial resources among politicians has been commonly seen in other 
national ICT projects as well. 
5.4 Summary 
The standardization process deals with coordination among government agencies and, in 
some cases, the private sector [171]. It is a relationship involving numerous actors in the 
government, such as agencies, officials, administrative staff, and IT staff in and across 
individual agencies [183] and comprising various aspects, including technical infrastructure, 
funding, knowledge, skill, and expertise capacity and other resources, local work practices, 
and legal frameworks.  
The system adoption process of government systems illustrates the relational dimension of 
standardization. The notion of information and service integration and interoperability is 
relatively new to government officials who have been familiar with a traditional functional-
silo approach. The integration and standardization efforts, thus, face tensions and require 
changes in the officials’ perception and attitudes. Moreover, the efforts need to be aligned 
with structural elements [142] of the public sector. Otherwise, the misalignment between 
organizational properties and the integration would bring about tensions and barriers to the 
efforts. Public sector agencies enjoy their freedom of control over critical organizational 
resources – budget, autonomy, and information. Information and service integration tends to 
threaten agencies’ budgetary independence and autonomy, and hence are resisted by the 
agencies. Agencies have been inclined to develop their own information systems and remain 
disconnected with others in order to gain and regain control over their own information. 
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While adopting national centralized information systems like the GFMIS and DPIS is 
compulsory for all government agencies, the national interoperable e-Document system is 
likely to be optional. As empirically shown, important adoption factors include whether the 
development and deployment agencies have certain forms of power. While the CGD and the 
OCSC hold budgetary and personnel power over other agencies, the MICT, as a ministry-
level agency, does not have authoritative directives over any other agencies. Therefore, the 
implementation of such systems needs to go through the gateway development trajectory 
connecting different systems for interoperability rather than forcing a new standardized 
system that alters existing work practice, and document formats like the GFMIS and DPIS’ 
approach. 
Nevertheless, both standardized and interoperable systems have shaped local routines and 
practices of the agencies in the network through their embedded procedures in the systems. 
They also require adjustment of local practices and systems at the agency level to be aligned 
and comply with mutual agreement on standardized work practices and procedures among 
agencies [88,90,179,183]. Furthermore, the larger-scale integrated systems accommodate 
only common routine functions across agencies, but not detailed procedures and practices 
that agencies carry out differently. Thus, the integrated and standardized systems cannot 
maintain the flexibility of practices that each small-scale, local system has. Therefore, the 
rigidity of integrated and standardized systems creates a social-technical gap between 
agency requirements and technical feasibility [1]. 
To bridge this gap, the agencies and relevant actors need workarounds or supplementary 
practices and systems to accommodate their transition from current practices and processes 
and connection to the standardized systems. Examples of such workarounds include a stand-
alone financial management system that manages internal budgets of agencies excluded 
from the GFMIS and feeds the information into the GFMIS, separate spreadsheets and 
reports to keep track of the officials’ promotion and transition, and customized manual 
documentation practices at specific agencies in order to meet standardized routines 
embedded in the system. 
To move beyond the momentum of legacy infrastructures and practices to the new ones, a 
number of actors come into play. The government needs to help agencies that do not have 
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sufficient technical and financial resources in order to help them catch up with other 
agencies and fully adopt inter-network systems like the NSW. In addition, the government 
requires a revision of legal frameworks to facilitate the new practices. Some small private 
companies that previously used manual systems on their trade and logistics business also 
need to develop a system connected to the NSW. However, the government still has to 
maintain the manual channel to facilitate those firms until they are ready to move on to the 
new system. The gap between the old and new systems results in keeping two systems at 
the time, creating a classic two systems problem [195]. 
As we see in the case of Thai digital government development efforts, standards and 
standardization of information infrastructures and systems are crucial yet challenging 
problems for digital government development. At a bare minimum, successful 
implementation and adoption will require careful attention to the social and technical limits, 
challenges, and tensions attending standardization processes. Deeper theoretical and 
empirically-grounded understanding of such processes may help both digital government 
practitioners and researchers overcome the obstacles and reach more effective, responsive, 
and accountable information systems in the public sector. 
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Chapter 6 
Boundary Work in Digital Government Development Efforts 
Coordination and communication within and across government agencies plays an 
important role in enabling the accomplishment of government work. Government 
coordination and communication is established, in part, through official document artifacts 
carrying commands and reports vertically within and horizontally across agency boundaries. 
These artifacts travel through formal hierarchical arrangements organized along Weberian 
bureaucratic lines. As we will see throughout this chapter, official documents in various 
forms are crucial artifacts for bureaucracy and officials. They are embedded in routine 
coordination and communication work. They are also resources for understanding 
organizational practices and activities as they tell the users how to approach the documents 
with the objectivity of action [80]. The documents, however, rely on human actors to 
perform the tasks of moving reports and commands within and across agencies. Although 
their collective roles are crucial boundary work in making the foreground work and 
functions perform seamlessly, these human actors have tended to be invisible and hence 
under-recognized by other groups of individuals. In this chapter, therefore, I try to uncover 
the roles and work of human actors in the boundary work of the Thai public sector.  
In the efforts at information standardization and inter-organizational information systems 
development, the culture, norms, and practices of individual agencies and the public service 
as a whole have to be interoperable with the global standards for cross-agency information 
systems and integration, and also may require adjustment before the desired integrative 
outcomes can be achieved. This requires tremendous amounts of collaboration among 
government agencies. There have to be certain groups of individuals and entities to perform 
the crucial role of coordinating, bridging, and linking practices, procedures, and systems of 
individual agencies with the inter-agency government information system requirements. 
Here again these actors and organizations and their background work have been neglected 
and underappreciated among government officials and agencies as the connection between 
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the local and global systems, and as the transition from stand-alone to inter-organizational 
systems is expected to happen without interruption to existing work. 
Star and Griesemer’s concept of boundary objects has been widely adopted in the field of 
science and technology studies, computer supported cooperative work, project management, 
and organizational studies to help understand the integrative role of artifacts linking 
otherwise separate organizations, social worlds, or communities of practice. This work has 
emphasized the role of boundary objects in helping scholars understand socially organized 
practices and reasoning surrounding the use of artifacts, and has theoretical and empirical 
implications for the general design of systems to support collaborative work and information 
reuse. Other scholars have sought to expand the concept of boundary objects to individuals 
and entities acting as boundary agents or boundary organizations in science, technology, 
public administration, and organizational settings. Employing and extending the concept of 
boundary object, I analyze the role of these people and organizations in promoting (and 
sometimes frustrating) information technology and public sector reform efforts or digital 
government in contemporary Thailand. Theoretically, I seek to import insights from the 
sociology of science and technology to the highly relevant context of digital government 
reform efforts, while calling attention to the sometimes invisible artifacts, actors, and 
organizations that enable collaboration, coordination, and information flow across 
traditional organizational boundaries. 
6.1 Boundary Objects, Agents, and Organizations 
As Star and Griesemer [1989] argue, collaboration and coordination across complex fields 
of social and organizational practice depends on partially shared uses and understandings of 
material resources. Crucial to this work are boundary objects, or “objects which are both 
plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing 
them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” [181, p. 393]. They 
emphasize that creating and managing boundary objects may be key to the work of 
developing and maintaining connections between intersecting social worlds. Although 
boundary objects have different specific meanings and details in different social structures, 
their structure is common enough among those worlds to make them recognizable and a 
means of translation. In their empirical research, Star and Griesemer use the boundary 
object concept as an analytical framework to discuss the history of the Museum of 
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Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California during 1907-1939. The museum 
administrators and scientists were concerned by the disappearance of the flora and fauna of 
California, which needed to be preserved and made available to the public. Accordingly, they 
provided a collection service for amateur collectors who brought in materials such as 
specimens, field notes, museums, and maps. The museum workers and scientists shared a 
common goal – preserving and documenting California’s flora and fauna samples for 
conservation and study, while the amateurs’ goal simply was preservation of animals [181]. 
These disparate needs and interests came together around the physical artifacts of the 
collection, which were able to serve as “boundary objects,” bridging and aligning the 
different worlds of zoological research, museums, and amateur naturalists. [181].  
Star and Griesemer define boundary objects as objects that serve as coordinating artifacts 
for members of what Strauss [1978] calls social worlds [185] or what Lave and Wenger 
[1991] call communities of practice [116]. Boundary objects inhabit several communities of 
practice and are able to travel across borders and maintain some sort of constant identity. As 
they are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in local use, they 
can be tailored to meet the needs of any one community [181]. They are working 
arrangements that resolve interruptions of naturalization. Therefore, social structures with 
different protocols, structures, work practices can coordinate through boundary objects. Star 
[1989] points out that boundary objects contain sufficient information to be understandable 
by different groups in an organization, but neither group needs to understand the full detail 
of construct and use by the other [178]. The quality of boundary objects allows diverse 
groups of actors to maximize both the autonomy of local use and communication among 
themselves [181].  
Star and Griesemer categorize boundary objects into at least four types: repositories, ideal 
type, coincident boundaries, and standardized forms. Repositories are ordered piles of objects 
that are indexed in a standardized fashion. Their main feature is modularity. People from 
different worlds can use or borrow from the pile for their own purposes without having to 
negotiate differences in purpose. Libraries and museums are examples of repositories. Ideal 
type is an object that carries a certain degree of abstraction. It is abstracted from all domains, 
and thus is adaptable to a local site. An example of an ideal type of boundary object is an 
animal species. The third type is coincident boundaries, which are common objects with the 
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same boundaries but different internal contents. These objects allow work in different sites 
and with different perspectives to be conducted autonomously while cooperating actors 
share a common reference. Standardized forms are the fourth type of boundary object. These 
objects are devised as methods of common communication across different work groups. 
Standardized forms may be identified as what Latour [1987] would call immutable mobiles 
[110]. 
For Bowker and Star [2000], moreover, information systems are boundary objects, as they 
contain information that resides in more than one context, and their information can have 
multiple interpretations across boundaries [20]. The design of an information system is not 
just about technical considerations, but is also about contextual considerations [20, p. 291]. 
To build a collaborative system, designers need to consider shared context in which to help 
users make sense of the information travelling across different contexts. Information going 
across localities creates tension over its interpretation and representation. As a result, 
databases have tended to be designed for customizability on the fly in different settings for 
different purposes, as opposed to traditional hierarchical databases [189].  
The development of systems is an attempt to transmit and represent information across 
localities [20]. This process includes people, artifacts, previous representations, and 
information about its own structure. The tension in the process is itself collective, historical, 
and partially institutionalized. Star and Griesemer and Bowker and Star offer two potential 
solutions to this tension. Standardization is a common solution. But as pointed out earlier in 
chapter 5, standards can become problematic as they do not remain standard for very long; 
and one person’s standard is another’s confusion and nightmare [180]. As a result, 
boundary objects arise to manage the tension between divergent viewpoints. The creation 
and management of boundary objects (in this case, information systems) is a key process in 
developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting worlds [20]. Such a process is 
complex and simultaneously involves the technical and the political, the abstract and the 
concrete, the foreground and the background, the text and the context, and the subject and 
the object. Objects become natural in a particular community over a long period of time. 
Newcomers to the community become members through learning or naturalizing by 
interacting with the objects, not the people. Once an object is naturalized, it becomes 
invisible and sinks into the community’s routinely forgotten memory. Bowker and Star 
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argue that infrastructural technologies are often naturalized in this way. Any working 
infrastructure serves multiple communities by allowing any given community to interface 
with the information system and pull out the kinds of information objects it needs. Thus, 
technologies replace the mess work, and become a form of collective forgetting. 
Star and Griesemer’s original boundary object concept has subsequently been taken up and 
applied in other fields such as CSCW, organizational studies, and project management. For 
instance, Ackerman and Halverson [1998, 2000, 2004] examine an organization’s memory 
through the use of a variety of information systems and artifacts, including databases, 
electronic documents, paper documents, employee handbooks, notebooks, and post-it notes, 
as they are used as information sources among hotline representatives [2-4]. Each 
representative creates a boundary depending on his or her expertise, and thus a different 
contextualization from others. Boundary objects contain sufficient detail to be 
understandable by all parties, but at the same time, no party needs to understand the full 
context of use by the others. To create shared information artifacts for collective use, 
therefore, an individual agent is required to decontextualize the information before storing it 
for later use by the others. To reuse a memory, the representative needs to recontextualize 
that decontextualized information according to his or her purposes. The memories can be 
rearranged and reused in various organizational contexts. Therefore, the use and reuse of 
information in boundary objects as a memory involves the coexisting requirement for 
contextualization, decontextualization, and recontextualization [2].  
Heath and Luff [1996] study paper medical records and computerized systems for health 
care in the United Kingdom and provide design implications for CSCW system to support 
asynchronous collaborative work [81]. Their study focuses on social practices embedded in 
boundary objects (here paper medical record cards). They argue that the paper medical 
record is a product of the socially organized practices surrounding the use of the records 
within medical practitioners’ daily consultative work. Handwriting, specific writing styles, 
and stylistics devices in the paper record provide a rich array of resources to medical 
practitioners to help them make sense of the consultation. Doctors can recognize those 
characteristics of their colleagues in the cards, and thus who saw which patient for what. 
Practitioners can get a sense of a particular illness and the ways in which various 
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consultations featured in its development. The records also reflect the routine progression of 
particular problems, and how the problems have been treated.  
Compared to paper records, however, Heath and Luff argue that computer systems 
inevitably standardize the information, hence limiting or removing the economy, gestalt, 
and tailorability of the paper medical cards, which is an essential part for practitioners in 
using the records within the consultation [81]. As a result, in their empirical study Heath 
and Luff find that many doctors continue to use the traditional medical record as they still 
depend on those aforementioned properties of the written entries and the records. Therefore, 
when designing a system to support collaborative work, it is important to take into account 
complex practice requirements embedded in and arrayed around traditional objects. 
Computerized systems need to provide capabilities which allow users to flexibly contribute 
and facilitate their (re)use of information holds in the system in the same ways paper record 
cards do. The concept of an object-oriented system emerges to provide such capabilities to 
support the exchange and sharing of objects, and to provide different views of the same 
object while maintaining a collection of static objects. 
The notion of boundary objects has important implications for digital government 
scholarship as it calls attention to a close examination of physical records and other 
information artifacts shared and moved among different groups of government employees 
and agencies in intra- and inter-organizational operations. This examination provides 
implications for our understanding of what and how social and work practices in boundary 
objects are embedded and transferred across agency boundaries. It also helps researchers 
and practitioners create boundary objects to mitigate tensions attending information use and 
sharing, both physically and electronically across contexts. Furthermore, the understanding 
of information systems as boundary objects is useful for government information system 
designers and developers to carefully translate work practices associated with physical 
artifacts when transforming traditional manual procedures to electronic procedures. 
As subsequent scholars have noted, however, this kind of mobile and translational capacity is 
neither a pure product of design nor a ‘natural’ affordance of the artifact. The use of objects 
across intra-organizational and inter-organizational boundaries in collaborative work 
requires a certain group of human actors to perform the actualization of object mobility 
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between intersecting worlds and facilitate their use by other people. These people may be 
referred to as “boundary agents” as introduced in organizational studies and information 
systems realms.  
A few scholars have used the term boundary agents to discuss the role of individuals in 
connecting organizations with external environments. Separate work in organizational 
studies by Organ [1971], for instance, argues that individuals play a major role as boundary 
agents in organizations by helping them adapt to their environment in cross-organization 
interactions [140]. He emphasizes that organizations, themselves, do not interact with the 
environment Rather, individuals perform the interacting. These individuals are boundary 
agents acting as organizational linkages between their organizations and others, whose 
goals, values, and beliefs are different and sometimes contradictory. They need to prevent, 
mitigate, and solve inter-organizational conflicts. They also bring in knowledge, perceptions, 
and evaluations of changes in environment. The role of boundary agents is, therefore, to 
reduce the threats of uncertainty posed by the organization’s dependence on the others. 
Examples of boundary agents include salesman, purchasing agent, labor negotiator, lobbyist, 
liaison personnel, and spokesperson [140]. These agents have to content with the 
expectations and pressures of organizational members and people outside the boundary. 
Within the organization, moreover, different groups of people or communities of practice 
also have different expectations of the role of boundary agents. Therefore, boundary agents 
require job-specific knowledge and skills to balance all conflicting demands and 
organizational issues both within and across organizational boundaries [140]. 
Merali [2002] uses the term boundary agent to refer to individuals who span organizational 
boundaries and regulate information flows in and out of the organization [130]. Similar to 
Organ, Merali argues that organizations are faced with issues of identity, integrity, and 
ownership as they undergo changes in novel forms of inter-organizational relationships, 
sharing resources, information, expertise, and processes across boundaries in new 
information communication technology environments. Organizations must be innovative 
and adaptive in the dynamic and interconnected environments. To achieve this goal, 
boundary agents are engaged in the enactment of the boundary relationship or network both 
within and across the organizational boundary. They enable inter-organizational 
information resource sharing such as know-how, which helps organizations to undergo 
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transformational change in emergent competitive contexts [130]. On one hand, boundary 
agents are potentially key actors in modifying organizational properties, such as values, 
beliefs, and perception. On the other hand, they isolate the inside from the outside by 
reinforcing ownership of organizational resources, preventing internal resources from 
leaking out, and keeping harmful external influences at bay [130 p., 57]. Boundary agents, 
such as customer representatives, filter information coming in and going out of the 
organizations. According to Merali, boundary agents perform a crucial role in which certain 
aspects cannot be replaced by technology. That is, jobs that require judgments about the 
quality of information cannot be automated; and those that require tacit knowledge cannot 
be transmitted without human connectivity either. Instead, human boundary agents may use 
technology to carry out their activities. 
Scholars have discussed issues concerning the identity and integrity of boundary agents and 
the communities where they are members. Boundary agents, on the one hand, are members 
of their organizations. On the other hand, they belong to communities of practice that may 
be virtually located across the organizational boundaries. For example, salespersons are 
members of their firms while they are also members of sales professional associations. 
Oftentimes, the goals and values of the firms and communities of practice they belong to are 
conflicting. Applications of the boundary agent notion coming out of the boundary object 
tradition emphasize the role and nature of human ‘marginals’ in crossing between and 
connecting adjacent environments. Living in more than one social world, and sometimes in 
between intersecting worlds, boundary agents enable boundary objects to travel across 
those intersecting worlds. In the process, they play a major role in connecting intersecting 
communities within and across organizational boundaries by crafting, managing, and 
controlling common standards that all communities can comply with, while leaving some 
flexibility and transparency of communities' local practices and requirements. 
Park [1928] argues that people who live in more than one social world often face tensions 
imposed by multiple memberships and problems of identity and loyalty [154]. Star and 
Griesemer extend the concept of marginality in their boundary notion and discuss the 
strategies that marginal people employ to manage their identities [181]. Those strategies 
include passing and shifting their identities into a single world. They, use the concept of 
marginal people and their strategies as a metaphor for their boundary objects with multiple 
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memberships [181] or what Organ calls role conflict [140]. Following this trajectory, we 
may also employ the problems of marginality to the tensions imposed on our boundary 
agents. 
Other STS and organizational scholars have sought to extend the original boundary object 
concept in an explicitly organizational direction, emphasizing the role of boundary 
organizations in bridging between scientific and political institutions on science-related 
policies [33,34,36,76,77,132,138]. As discussed earlier, scientists need to maintain values 
and interests within their community boundaries that may be threatened by some 
intellectual activities outside the boundaries [67,68,77]. Researchers have pointed out the 
role of boundary objects, and what Fujimura calls “standardized packages” [63], in solving 
such tensions. However, to achieve boundary stabilization, boundary objects and 
standardized packages require the consent of actors on both sides of the boundary. It 
requires researchers to voluntarily engage in patenting and politicians to accept patents as a 
productivity measure. Therefore, scholars have discussed the potential of “boundary 
organizations” for linking the two domains in order to achieving both productive scientific 
research and political decision-making while maintaining each other’s integrity, norms, and 
practices [77,91,135]. 
To address the stability problem, Guston [1999, 2001] characterizes boundary organizations 
as organizations that allow and provide incentives for the creation and use of boundary 
objects that reflect the participants’ perspectives [76,77]. They mediate boundary 
negotiations in their routine work and stabilize the boundary by performing successfully as 
an agent for both scientists and politicians [76]. They will involve participants from both 
sides of the boundary and mediators who are professionals from other institutions [76,77]. 
Boundary organizations allow scientists to present themselves both as members of a 
knowledge community and as advocates. They may also incorporate representatives of 
external groups into their decision-making structure as a bridging strategy. Boundary 
organizations therefore serve as an interface between the social worlds, holding distinct lines 
of accountability to each [76,77]. An example of boundary organizations between scientists 
and politicians is the National Institutes of Health Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) 
[76]. In the 1970 economic crisis, policy-makers began attempting to move the intellectual 
and other products of research from the laboratory toward commercial users. They began to 
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provide incentives for their recruited agents to engage in research activities that the 
politicians hoped would be more productive for the economy. The OTT and other similar 
organizations manage these incentives, which include the redistribution of the royalties from 
licenses and other forms of intellectual property to the individual or institutional researchers. 
The OTT collaborates with scientists regarding the legal and marketing issues of 
innovations, and evaluates technologies for patent protection. The technology transfer 
specialists at the OTT educate and persuade researchers to produce more invention 
disclosures and patent applications favorable to public policy. In conclusion, the boundary 
organization enables both the policy-makers and the researchers to construct the boundary 
between their entities in a way favorable to their own perspectives. Politicians view the 
OTT as aiding their goal of increasing and documenting the productivity of sponsored 
research. Researchers view it as helping their pursuit of performing cooperative research, 
and demonstrating the productivity of their entity. 
Boundary organizations facilitate collaboration between scientists and non-scientists, and 
create the combined scientific and social order (i.e., commercial innovations) through the 
generation of boundary objects and standardized packages [76]. At the same time, they act 
as agents of both parties, and are accountable and responsive to opposing, external 
authorities. Guston further argues that a successful boundary organization is the unit that 
remains stable to external forces astride the internal instability at the boundary [77]. 
While boundary actors and boundary organizations fulfill some of the same translational 
roles in aligning work and resources in complex and distributed organizational settings, 
they do so from significantly different positions; they are different kinds of marginal actors. 
While interacting with external environments, boundary agents are full-time members (or 
employees) of the organization they work for; depending on its salary, as well as existing 
under the influence of the organization’s power arrangements and social statuses. They are 
constrained to maintain good relationships with their bosses and colleagues. Conversely, the 
interaction with outsiders is not formally organized, and the boundary agents may not 
benefit directly from such interaction. In circumstances of conflicting demands, beliefs, and 
goals of the organization and those of people outside the boundary, it is likely that boundary 
agents will choose to defend the benefits of the organization they belong to. The 
organization’s dominant power arrangements and social statuses influence the agents’ 
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decision in favor of the organization’s will. On the other hand, boundary agents may exert 
their influence on the decision-making in the organization through both formal hierarchical 
arrangements and personal connections with their constituents. 
In contrast, individuals residing in a boundary organization exist independently in a 
separate entity; performing the task of bridging and linking different domains to achieve the 
specific goals of everyone involved. Unlike individual boundary agents, members of the 
boundary organization are not part of any of the domains with which they work. Rather, 
they are in a separate unit with their own autonomy and resources. The success of their 
work in introducing and forcing change in goals, values, beliefs, or practices of other units 
depends on their relationships – power and influence – with other entities. With authority 
and resources in their hands, boundary organization members are more likely to force 
change in other entities than boundary agents do in their own entities. Conversely, 
boundary organizations and their members tend to face tensions and resistance to the 
change from entities if they lack authority or power over those entities. 
Structurally, moreover, boundary organizations and their members sit outside of the 
standard hierarchical structures of the organizations they link. When interacting with other 
entities and exercising their authority, however, boundary organizations rely on other 
entities. Therefore, boundary organizations are not fully apart from those standard 
arrangements, although they seem to have their own autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the boundary organization concept has become a recurring analytical 
framework for research in collaboration, management, and administration in several fields of 
study. For example, literature on collaborative management in the realm of public 
administration has discussed the utility of boundary organizations in governance 
[58,93,172]. In their formal or intentional sense, boundary organizations may be established 
by or between government agencies to bring together participants from multiple agencies to 
collaborate, plan, and take action on specific issues [172]. More informally, boundary 
organizations may arise organically, as natural evolutions from instances of sustained joint 
work and (partially) shared purpose between separate organizational entities or sub-units. In 
their ideal form, by bridging and straddling traditional agency boundaries, boundary 
organizations may become key moderators and mediators between otherwise separate 
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organizational contexts, interests, and cultures – though here, as with the original boundary 
objects concept, the overlap is always partial. 
The role of boundary organizations in intra- and inter-organizational communication and 
coordination arises as a particular challenge for public administrative research. It connects 
to many of the novel forms of government organization often claimed as goals or outcomes 
of digital government reform efforts: cross-agency coordination and information integration 
that shifts the organizational forms of government away from traditional bureaucratic silos; 
functional fragmentation; and hierarchies that shift towards forms variously labeled as inter-
organizational networks [153], joined-up government [95], and virtual agencies [59]. If 
we use the architectural metaphor of structure – a representation that Weber’s description 
lends itself to – we can consider such forms as the connectors and expansion joints of 
government. Ironically, by violating Weberian principles of organization, boundary 
organizations make them possible. 
6.2 Boundary Objects in Government Communication 
In their formal guise, Thai government agencies are organized along classically Weberian 
lines. As discussed briefly in chapter 3, a politically-appointed minister is in charge of all 
policy-related decisions at the ministerial-level unit. Among civil servant officials, the 
permanent secretary is the highest ranked executive who performs organization-related 
administration work for the ministry. Intra- and inter-organizational communication of 
government agencies is conducted via various forms of documents and communication flow. 
6.2.1 Paper and electronic official documents 
All formal communication between the minister and officials in the ministry takes place 
through documents between the minister and the permanent secretary. In addition, officials 
within the agency use memos to communicate and coordinate among themselves. 
Administrative staff members of sub-units (“divisions”) within each agency act as document 
gateways, receiving memos from other divisions at the same horizontal level and forwarding 
them to the officials in their division, and vice versa. They also send and receive documents 
(containing reports or directives) upwards and downwards throughout the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, establishing the kinds of paper trails that Weber identifies as the key technology 
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and defining feature of modern bureaucratic authority and accountability [11,65,192,204]. 
All such communications are classed as “internal documents” or “memos.” 
In addition, agencies communicate with each other and the wider public through “external 
documents”. The point unit for such activities is once again the agency’s General Division, 
which classifies incoming external documents from other agencies, along with 
correspondence from outside individuals and organizations (e.g., businesses and individuals), 
and sends them to the corresponding divisions or officials within the agency. 
 
Figure 6 Communication flow within and across agencies 
As Figure 6 illustrates, external documents requiring the permanent secretary’s 
acknowledgement or decision are filtered through functionally assigned deputy permanent 
secretaries (DPS) who evaluate and designate responsibility on each incoming item. In some 
cases, the DPS is granted authority to act directly, including redirecting incoming matters 
‘downwards’ to specific sub-units for action. More commonly, the DPS acts as filter and 
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and passing directives from the permanent secretary down to agency sub-units for action. 
Alternatively, external documents not requiring the attention of the permanent secretary 
may be routed by the General Division directly to the relevant agency sub-units for action. 
As actions are executed, a separate and generally ‘upward’ flow of documents is initiated. 
Completing officials report the results of actions in a memo, along with any comments on 
additional required tasks relating to other divisions or persons. The memo is sent to the 
official’s supervisors hierarchically (i.e., section head, and division director). With each step, 
higher-ranked officials write comments and/or recommendations to their own superiors 
until it gets to the permanent secretary for further orders. In the memo in Figure 7, an 
official reports the outcomes of assigned tasks and recommends further actions for another 
division to his director. The director forwards this memo along with his written notes to his 
supervisor reporting the accomplishment and recommendations. At this point, an official 
response may be offered, whether in the form of inter-ministerial communication or 
correspondence with outside groups. This constitutes, in rough form, all official 
communication flows in the Thai government. 
Due to authority-related restrictions on official communication, formal inter-organizational 
communication is limited to specific authorized officials such as the permanent secretary, the 
deputy, and a few other designated officials. Similarly, the restrictions apply to formal 
documentation-based communication within the agency. Memos sent upwards from officials 
at the low end of the structure to executives must go through the hierarchical 
communication flow. The solid lines in Figure 6 represent this formal communication. Such 
formal and documentation-based flows are supplemented by other less formal modes of 
communication (shown by dashes in the diagram), such as telephone calls, informal memos, 
conversations in meetings, conversations in less formalized settings, and so on. This in-
person communication acts as a back-channel, or informal communication, that the officials 
use to fulfill and speed up both intra- and inter-organizational communication because it 
cuts through the organizational hierarchy. Within an agency, supervisors use informal 
channels to give verbal or informal orders to and receive reports from lower-level 
subordinates. Officials in different divisions within an agency often utilize informal 
communication flows to coordinate their work. At higher levels, top-level management may 
use personal connections and informal communication to seek common understandings 
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before or outside of official cross-agency agreements. Such informal flows tend to fall outside 
of formal document systems (paper-based or electronic) but are crucial to the work of 




Figure 7 An official memo used in intra-organizational communication 
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6.2.2 The e-Document systems 
As documentation is one of the three major operational functions in Thai public 
organizations, along with financial and human resources management, the government has 
encouraged the agencies to use ICT for this work as one of the digital government 
initiatives. Many ministries and departments have developed their own e-Document system 
to serve the routine work procedures of their documentation operation. The systems capture 
the agency’s manual process of documentation practices and procedures and transform it 
into an electronic process. They help the agencies deal with the flood of documents coming 
in, going out, and circulating internally on a daily basis, in addition to improving the speed 
and accuracy of organizational documentation work and formal communication flows.  
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, most agencies have outsourced the system development to 
as many as 25 different software vendors, resulting in stand-alone systems with little, if any, 
compatibility between departments. In 2005, therefore, the Prime Minister’s Office 
embarked on a major effort to restructure public sector communication flows through 
adoption of a new government-wide standardized e-Document system throughout the Thai 
public sector. In the same year, the Ministry of ICT (MICT) officially launched its e-
Document system development and interoperability effort – a government-wide initiative 
intended to bring the cacophony of agency- and department-level document formats and 
systems into some sort of workable alignment. Ultimately, the integrated e-Document 
system will enable electronic document sharing and communication and contain various 
electronic formats, such as word processing, spreadsheets, and PDFs. Also, the system will 
accept digital signatures and thus officials at any hierarchical level can electronically sign in 
and send documents throughout the system corresponding with the bureaucratic chain. 
Therefore, documents can be traced across agency’s boundaries and inter-organizational 
communication will be faster and more seamless, as if it were intra-organizational 
government communication. These features of the integrated e-Document system are meant 
to improve the efficiency and reliability of government operations without sacrificing the 
core values of bureaucratic structure and accountability. 
As illustrated here, documents (both physical and electronic) have been crucial 
communication media for government officials both within and across agency boundaries. 
Documents play a major role in connecting organizations and people for the purpose of 
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administration through one of the main elements of bureaucratic structure – organizational 
hierarchy [192]. Serving as boundary objects in formal government communication, 
documents travel back and forth between agencies, agencies’ sub-units, and officials 
conveying information from one place to another. Parties at both ends of the communication 
coordinate their work through the same documents, but using different portions of them, for 
their own purposes, and to perform different actions, and thus they develop different 
practices surrounding the documents. The documents, hence, contain enough information 
for all the official groups who use the documents for their own specific work. For example, 
administrative staff merely use the documents’ metadata: receiving document numbers along 
with date and time stamp (those rectangular boxes on the document shown in Figure 7) for 
their administrative work and usually ignore the content of the documents. On the same 
document, officials who work with the content of the documents rarely pay attention on 
those stamped numbers and tend to care only about the directions and orders their 
immediate supervisor gives on the documents. 
In a similar vein, e-Document systems act as another form of boundary object between 
officials in different authority levels, positions, and divisions. The systems facilitate 
communication among officials within agencies, as well as cross-boundary communication 
across agencies. As explained below, individual officials and divisions use the systems in 
radically different ways and for different purposes. 
Ideally, the systems are meant to replace the manual communication process, and the 
electronic documents will replace the physical documents in the agencies. In most of the 
agencies I studied, however, the use of the systems since the late 1990s has been limited to 
administrative staff and a small group of staff in the ICT Center. The executives and most 
senior officials prefer physical documents and writing to the electronic version. Besides 
limited computer literacy, the executives and senior officials’ work habits and nature are not 
aligned with the premises underlying the e-Document systems. As a senior official noted, 
“The executives are always either in meetings or commuting from one place to another. 
Physical documents can go with the executives anywhere. Their assistants classify those 
documents, put them in folders and bring them to the meetings and in their car, waiting for 
them to read, think, and take action on the way. In contrast, electronic documents require 
mobile devices to facilitate the access. And those senior people are not usually familiar with 
using computers anyway. Not to mention such small devices.”  
 
155 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
The mobility of physical papers and the help from the administrative staff allow the 
executives to work with the documents anytime. Similarly, officials work with physical 
documents; they bring documents to their bosses’ offices to ask for opinions, to their co-
workers’ desks for discussion and brainstorming, and to meetings. The e-Document systems 
require networked equipment with the application installed. The systems, thus, lack mobility 
to accommodate the executives and officials’ routines. On the contrary, the administrative 
staff works with both forms of documents in bulk for a short period of time – checking in the 
documents and forwarding them to the proper destinations. 
Furthermore, other officials in the agencies do not use the systems as part of their routine 
tasks. Due to the limited number of computers shared among themselves, the officials cannot 
access and work through the e-Document systems, and so have to rely on physical 
documents. Most importantly, the systems were originally designed to be a tool for 
administrative staff, not as a common tool for officials performing other organizational 
functions. The major functions of the systems include registering and initiating document 
numbers. They are a checkpoint when documents come to each individual unit. The 
administrative staff relies on the e-Document systems as a crucial application to generate 
document numbers, track the document trails live, keep document transaction logs, and scan 
and store electronic copies of all kinds of documents as backup to the physical documents 
and for future reference. The only input to the systems is by scanning the documents; the 
systems do not allow documents generated by word processors or other applications to be 
put in directly. Therefore, the systems had been intended as a document tracking and 
repository tool for administrative staff, rather than as a collaboration application for 
everyone in the agency. Hence, officials performing other functions in the agency perceive 
the e-Document systems as a tool exclusively for the administrative staff, not for themselves. 
However, officials are fully aware of the existence of the systems and know how to benefit 
from them. An administrative staffer explained that: 
“They (officials) ask me to search for particular documents. Mostly these are their own 
documents, but they cannot find the original copies. So, they come to get an electronic 
version.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
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This implies that e-Document systems are a working infrastructure for administrative staff 
and disconnected from officials’ daily working environment. Meanwhile, physical documents 
are a primary medium for officials. 
The distinguishing interaction with documents between administrative staff and officials is 
that the staff “work on” both physical and electronic documents as they register, enter 
metadata, and distribute them. Officials do not work directly on the documents. Rather they 
“work with” the documents as they use the content in the documents to make decisions and 
take actions. For this reason, system deployment and adoption have been limited primarily 
to the administrative staff. For other officials, electronic documents and systems remain 
completely invisible in their work. In either physical or electronic form, officials simply 
expect that the documentation will be seamless and rely on its reliability, availability, and 
timeliness. 
Not only do e-Document systems and electronic documents lack physical and mobile 
affordances for officials, they also do not accommodate the associated practices of officials 
working with them. As officials maintain their traditional practice of using physical 
documents, they report their work, add comments, or give orders by writing on the 
documents. Most officials recognize the executives, their supervisors, and their colleagues’ 
handwriting. Handwriting provides a sense of authority, as well as a personal appeal, to 
officials who work with particular documents. Documents containing executives’ 
handwriting often catch the attention of officials first, whereas documents without the 
superiors’ handwriting, such as internal memos from other divisions or sections asking for 
cooperation, do not usually get priority. E-Document systems and electronic documents do 
not provide the same affordance around social practices for officials. In order to enter 
additional orders and comments into electronic (scanned) documents, administrative staff at 
every document checkpoint and/or the executives’ assistants need to either type them in or 
scan the documents with new orders and comments to append the original scanned ones. 
This obviously would take too much time and effort as the staff would have to hold the 
documents until they are scanned, and then would forward them to the destination. With 
their current documentation practice, once the documents leave the executive’s room, the 
staff quickly records the forwarding destination into the system, and delivers the physical 
documents to the destination. They do not record any written commands or comments from 
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the executive. For time-sensitive documents, staff writes down the document registration 
numbers and the destination on scratch paper and delivers the documents right away, before 
coming back and entering the information into the system.  
Dealing with a lot of documents, also, the staff sometimes works with e-Document system as 
a batch process. At the General Division of an agency, the staff develops their own work 
practices to increase the speed of their work. As shown in Figure 8, the staff create 
spreadsheets to record the document numbers and the destination by hand. Then, they 
record the data into the system all at once, before or after the physical documents are 
forwarded, depending on their work schedule. And these sheets are also used for other 
purposes. They are used as a tracking device as well as performance records. A staff member 
reported that she keeps these sheets for one month in case anyone wants to see the trace of 
particular documents, and as proof of her work. At the end of every month, she summarizes 





Figure 8 Batch process in e-Document system 
Interviews with several ICT officials at two ministerial agencies revealed that executives 
had tried to enforce the adoption of e-Document system in the agency. However, the 
adoption was not very successful; officials quickly stopped using the systems and returned to 
their traditional practice of manual documentation. Even the ICT officials, who were familiar 
with and worked on computers most of the time, did not institutionalize, or what Bowker 
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and Star call naturalize [20], e-Document systems, electronic documents, or new 
documentation practices into their work. The failure of the system could be rooted in the 
training and mentoring program of agencies. In most cases, when a junior official is 
recruited, she has to attend an orientation session introducing her to the agency. Then, she 
goes into a weeklong training on official document writing. In this course, she learns the 
different types of official documents and their purposes, the structure and format of each 
document type, and how to begin and end the documents addressing her superiors and 
colleagues at different levels of hierarchy. The official becomes familiar with the pertinent 
documents and associated practices. However, the training does not include use of e-
Document system. The system may be briefly introduced to the class, but not as a tool for 
officials. 
During on-the-job training and mentoring, the official learns that she sends and receives 
physical documents to and from administrative staff. Staff, not officials, performs the tasks of 
document preparation, including structure and format verification (e.g., whether the Garuda 
is in the right position, checking spacing between lines and paragraphs, and so on) and 
arranging documents in order so that the executives can read them easily. Because 
documentation practices have long been institutionalized in the agency, senior officials, 
including her mentor, have been used to working with physical documents and associated 
practices. When the junior official joins the agency, she is taught and coached based on this 
highly organized practice. As a result, the practice remains sticky and is passed on through 
generations of officials. 
Traditional relationships of hierarchy built around bureaucracy have resulted in hidden 
hierarchical classes and status differences among government officials. Besides the seniority 
system in the government, each line of work in a particular agency is valued differently. The 
major line of work tends to be ranked highest, whereas administrative work and 
documentation are consistently ranked as one of the lowest priorities. At the Ministry of 
Commerce, for instance, economists would be considered the most superior officials as the 
permanent secretary has to have an economics background, and is often promoted from 
among those economists. Along the same lines, case officials at the Administrative Court 
would be viewed as doing the highest priority work and possibly having a more successful 
career path at the agency. Among government officials, in contrast, documentation-related 
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tasks, including preparing documents and working on e-Document systems, have an image 
of secretarial work attached to them. This work is inferior to their technical work. 
Furthermore, the executives and senior officials rarely prepare the documents by themselves. 
They may draft their memos and have someone, who may be their assistant or any 
subordinate official, type them up in a proper format. They just have to sign the typed-up 
documents.  
Having assistants reflects the greater power and hierarchical status of a certain official over 
others. Perceiving documentary work as low-grade work, officials tend to delegate it to their 
subordinates or lower-level staff in order to emphasize their power in the hierarchy and to 
focus only on what they view as more important tasks. A senior official expressed his 
concern regarding the relationships between the hierarchical structure and division of work 
in the government. 
“Only 50% of the officials do the actual work of the agency while the other half just do 
whatever to support and please the executives. This cascading relationship has been going on, 
and on, and on. Newly hired officials will then be expected to serve their higher-level officials 
both for professionally and personally… We do not need all of the people here. But this is the 
way the bureaucracy works.” 
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
The above interview concurred with the following one regarding the hierarchical 
relationship in the government. In her 25 years of working experience with the government, 
the ICT director of a ministry also finds that higher-level officials have tended to use 
computers less as they are promoted to higher positions in the agency. As she noted, 
“I noticed that senior officials, when they were in middle ranking positions, were eager to 
learn and use computers. They always raised their concerns about the insufficient number of 
computers and lack of such and such systems. But when they become senior or even executives, 
they just do not use computers anymore. The systems that they requested in the past have been 
implemented. But they don’t seem to use them. They have their staff work on those systems for 
them… How can we expect full IT adoption if the senior folks only pay lip service to 
computers?” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
Furthermore, government employees’ perception of documentation and computerized work 
also affects the hierarchical status of administrative staff and ICT officials in the bureaucracy. 
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The subordinate social status of these employees will be discussed empirically in the 
boundary agents section later. 
Although the director of the ICT Center of a ministry required all officials in the Center to 
check and read internal circulars in the system, and terminated the use of physical copies, 
junior ICT officials reported that they rarely logged on the system, and hence were missing 
a lot of important matters the director wanted them to know. When there was a negligence 
issue, both ICT officials and administrative staff were held responsible for the problem. 
Therefore, the administrative staff tried to avoid being blamed for the officials’ negligence by 
feeding information through physical channels and requiring officials’ signatures so they 
could make sure that the officials acknowledged important announcements. As a junior ICT 
official explained, 
“We know that if there is a document that specifically addresses us, or requires our actions, 
the director will send it directly to us both physically and electronically… As to circulating 
news that the administrative staff puts up on the systems, we normally do not pay attention to 
it. If there are very important matters, the staff will print it out, put it in a binder, circulate it 
around the division, and ask us to sign and date it to make sure those pieces of news reach 
us.”  
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
The interview with the director emphasized that the physical information channel is still the 
primary one, as she reasons that it is almost impossible to rely merely upon the electronic 
systems since not everyone has institutionalized the new document practice on electronic 
media. She cannot afford to have anyone in her division miss crucial assignments or 
information. 
As e-Document systems do not provide the same level of accommodations and affordances to 
everyone, officials and administrative staff develop work practices around the systems 
differently, according to their routine tasks. Traditionally, officials worked with physical 
documents from the origin of the documents – creating them using a word processor, 
printing them out, and signing them before sending them to the administrative staff in their 
divisions who then send them to their destinations. This practice has continued since the 
period prior to the development of e-Document systems. The administrative staff registers 
and scans the documents, then sends both physical and electronic copies to the destination. 
While the introduction of the systems adds new documentation procedures and changes 
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current practices of the administrative staff, it does not modify or replace the officials’ 
practice due to their limited access and use of the system. Moreover, the government has not 
yet widely recognized and adopted digital signatures for use in government business, 
including documentation procedures. 
Even among the administrative staff, most of them do not work with the electronic 
documents until the physical documents are present on their desks. They also have to 
maintain their traditional documentation practices to serve other officials’ communication 
and coordination. Their traditional practice around physical documents thus remains their 
primary procedure. As the e-Document systems are their secondary working artifacts and 
they have to give priority to other officials in their documentation service, the administrative 
staffers cannot and often times do not fully exploit the systems. The interview with a staff 
member emphasized the higher level of mobility of physical documents over electronic 
documents in the documentation practice. As she noted,  
“Sometimes physical documents travel faster than their electronic counterparts because the 
director’s assistant usually asks the cleaning lady to deliver the documents to us 
(administrative staff at the General Section) while she is busy with something else and 
cannot record the director’s orders and release the documents in the system right away.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
Moreover, the administrative staff views the computerized procedures in the e-Document 
systems as additional steps to their existing manual work practices. To maintain the speed of 
their service, the staffers use their judgment on what documents they will scan into the 
system for future retrieval. The staff restrict themselves to scanning only the official 
documents, not relevant attachments or supplements which are often over 50 pages (Figure 
9). Therefore, the attachments and supplements, which appear to be significant documents 




Figure 9 The in-agency delivery method of physical official documents with a lot of 
supplementary material. 
For this reason, files contained in the e-Document system may be less essential to individual 
officials and their work than physical ones. The General Division director in a departmental 
agency justified the scanning restriction that: 
“We scan only important incoming documents such as seminar and meeting invitations 
addressing the executives. There are 200-300 documents coming to the department daily. 
Due to the limited number of scanners and staff members, we cannot scan all those documents. 
Besides, the servers’ capacity will not be able to store all the scanned papers.”  
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
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The ICT Center directors are not satisfied with the justification that is commonly used 
when a system is not fully adopted, as it pins the blame on their estimation of effort and 
resources. A director responded to such claims, and expressed her disagreement: 
“They (system users) usually blame it on ICTs – there is not enough disc space. There are not 
enough computers and scanners, or systems are slow and unreliable. Those are their 
conveniently classic excuses for not wanting to use the systems or do additional work. OK, I 
admit that those problems used to occur in the past. But that was years ago.”  
(Informant interview, June 2011) 
As a result, even in the presence of functional e-Document systems, physical documents and 
traditional handwritten signatures remain the dominant mode of communication for both 
officials and administrative staff in all of the agencies I studied, with e- documents used as a 
supplementary method by the administrative staff and as a tracking tool for a small number 
of other officials. In either physical or electronic form, officials simply expect that the 
documentation will be seamless, and rely on its reliability, availability, and timeliness. 
Both physical and electronic documents and systems function as boundary objects in 
bureaucratic organizational communication. While documents flow between officials at all 
levels in the organizational hierarchy, e-Document systems and electronic documents may 
limit their functionalities and properties as boundary objects to specific groups of workers. 
Whereas physical documents are widely used as communication artifacts containing 
necessary information for every group of workers throughout the agency, the systems and 
electronic documents carry out the functions of boundary objects only as points of reference, 
information repositories, information carriers exclusively for the administrative staff, or as 
topic for system administrators. Although both physical and electronic documents contain 
the same information and travel between the same actors, electronic documents and e-
Document systems do not have coordinating properties among officials other than 
administrative staff. Despite their limited coordinating properties, electronic documents and 
systems are perceived and used as information repositories by the agencies. Other officials 
rely on the systems and stored electronic documents when they refer to old documents. 
They ask the administrative staff to search and retrieve retired documents in the system 
using specific keywords in the metadata of the documents. 
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Thus, on the one hand, physical documents fully perform functions as boundary objects 
across the whole government arena. On the other hand, electronic documents’ boundaries 
are limited in their communication function to groups of administrative staff within and 
across agencies, yet they carry out an organizational memory repository function for wider 
groups of users. Essentially, they are unable to replace how officials conduct formal and 
informal communication through physical forms of documents. The manual documentation 
system is still the main practice for government formal communication while the electronic 
system acts as a supplementary practice for specific groups of officials. Nevertheless, the 
systems and electronic papers perform as coordinating and collective artifacts used by all 
groups of officials to achieve the common goals in documentation – tracking and retrieving 
– although certain groups do not use or interact directly with them. 
6.3 Boundary Agents in Government Communication 
Documents, as boundary objects, connect officials in various agencies and divisions through 
horizontal and vertical flows of communication. They perform certain kinds of government 
coordination work within and across agencies in a communication channel through specific 
hierarchical orders. In addition, e-Document systems link agencies and divisions through an 
electronic channel for faster and more accurate communication flows. However, these 
boundary objects cannot perform their mobile and translational functions without the 
assistance of specific actors, or boundary agents. The boundary agents make boundary 
objects travel between official communities within and between agencies’ boundaries. They 
also serve as a bridge between intersecting social structures with different norms and 
practices. The boundary agents create a gateway, or standardized practice, that translates 
local practices and norms of individual social worlds to allow cross communication, 
coordination, and interoperability. Each social world, thus, can focus on only their own work 
practices and norms when coordinating with each other. 
6.3.1 The administrative staff 
To make the mobility and coordination properties of documents possible, administrative 
staff in the General Division and General Sections of the agencies carry out the information 
translation and carrier functions for government documentation. The documentation work 
requires the administrative staff’s knowledge and experience in classifying and determining 
where the documents should go when external documents come to the agency. The staff 
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need to have knowledge of the organization’s internal structures and enough understanding 
of job functions within divisions to know who is responsible for a particular matter 
addressed in incoming documents in order to determine the destination and its associated 
hierarchical channel. 
In my interviews at the General Division of four ministries and departments, experienced 
administrative staff members reported having to memorize the organizational structures and 
the executives who oversaw those divisions, as well as understanding functions of each 
division throughout the agency. They also had to understand the nature of the issues 
addressed in the documents in order to map them with the scope of work that each division 
performs when deciding who should be receiving and taking action on particular incoming 
documents. An administrative staffer with over ten years of experience in documentation 
work stated that: 
“My job requires me to memorize the organizational structure, each division’s document 
number, and which deputies supervise what divisions... I have always gotten requests from 
officials asking for a particular document. They want to know with whom it currently is; or 
they need a copy of it. But they do not know the exact subject title of the document. So, I ask 
them what the document is about, approximate date when it was initiated, or some keywords 
in the content of the document.” 
(Informant interview, June 2010) 
The administrative staff uses the metadata of the documents, e.g., from, to, date, or subject, 
when receiving and forwarding them to their destination. They do not need to know in 
detail how each division uses the documents to carry out their task, nor other agencies’ local 
documentation procedures or work practices when sending or receiving the documents. 
They are not concerned about what action the division or person needs to perform as 
requested or directed by the senders. Rather, they need to translate other agencies’ 
document practices into their own local practices when dealing with inter-organizational 
communication. Another staffer in the same agency explained: 
“Each department within the ministry has its own document procedures, like whether or not 
they scan the outgoing documents sent to the ministry. Here we scan all incoming documents 
into the system because the permanent secretary wants it that way. And although we, and all 
departments under the ministry’s supervision, are now using the same e-Document system, we 
still do not use the same document numbers. Individual departments customize the systems to 
fit our own document procedures.”  
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(Informant interview, July 2010) 
As the staff has seen many documents coming in and going out of the agency, they can 
identify immediately where they should send the incoming documents. In addition, the 
administrative staff would memorize the documents previously sent from other agencies on 
the same issues in order for them to send the follow-up documents to the appropriate 
recipients. Because it takes time to gain this necessary experience, the longer they work at 
the Division, the more valuable their experience is to the agency. Therefore, the 
administrative staff at the General Division has usually been assigned to work on the same 
task for a long period of time, and has a much lower turnover rate than other agency staff, 
for example, financial officials in the study of the Government Fiscal Management 
Information System (GFMIS) discussed in chapter 4. 
As mentioned earlier, different work practices in different agencies and divisions do not 
automatically travel across the organizational boundaries. The administrative staff bridges 
those different practices when moving documents from one place to another. Although the 
administrative staff plays a critical role in enabling cross-division and cross–agency 
translation and in accomplishing the major operational function of the agency, they 
unfortunately seem to be invisible to other officials in the agency. In the interviews, a 
number of members of the administrative staff mentioned that they tend to be ignored by 
other officials as they perform organizational tasks, though document transition is expected 
to be seamless, timely, and uninterrupted. “Our (administrative staff’s) work is just like 
Cinderella’s. No one has ever recognized us or our work” (Informant interview, July 2010). This 
point is well portrayed in my fieldwork during the government crisis of 2010, when 
prolonged anti-government protests shut down much of central Bangkok, including most 
centrally-located government ministries and departments. All other officials could leave the 
office, while the General Division had to have staff on duty to take documents coming from 
other agencies or by mail. The staff at the General Division of an agency located in the 
protest zone reported:  
“Even during the protest, we were the only division in the agency that had to come to work 
until the executives said otherwise while the others were relocated or worked at home. We 
had to be here because other agencies did not know our situation and assumed that we were 
operating as usual. They still needed to communicate with us – by mail and carriers. So we 
were here getting the postal documents, sorting them, and sending them to the relocated 
officials through the e-Doc system and our delivery guys.”  
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(Informant interview, July 2010)  
When there is a power outage, or the communication network or e-Document system is 
down, moreover, the General Division needs to immediately deploy manual procedures so 
that the communication between divisions and agencies is not disrupted. In addition, as 
officials still prefer working with physical documents to typing their comments directly into 
the e-Document system, administrative staff are often required to carry out an additional set 
of tasks – scanning incoming documents and entering the hand-written comments of 
government officials - before forwarding them to another division.  
In addition, the administrative staff’s hierarchical and social status is arguably inferior to 
other positions in the government. The staffers at the General Division are expected to 
perform a housekeeping function of the agency, and the staff at the General Section in other 
divisions is supposed to be general assistants to everyone else in the division. Other officials 
view the administrative staff as their personal assistants, for example, expecting staff to 
deliver personal packages to their desk, even though there are mailboxes for the officials at 
the General Division. Feeling outclassed, a staffer who delivers documents within the 
agency complained that: 
“Those letters and packages are personal stuff. But we are expected to deliver them to the 
officials upstairs. The officials are always too busy with their work to come down here. They 
just do not want to come to the General Division.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
When officials have documents to send to the director, moreover, the administrative staff 
has to prepare and organize the documents in a preferred order. The document organization 
preference varies from person to person. Some directors may require documents to be 
organized by section in their division; others may prefer them by urgency level; yet others 
may demand that each document needs to have proper message flags taped to it to help them 
go through documents easily (Figure 10). These flags include “Please sign,” “Attachment 1,” 
“Attachment 2,” “Original document,” and so on. Again, having someone prepare her 
documents with message flags and put them in the folder for her to read and sign is another 
representation of the higher hierarchical status of a particular official. Although it is not 
written in any Document Procedures, this practice seemed to be institutionalized across all 




Figure 10 Message flags (attachments 1-5) are attached to the memo for easy access 
The administrative staff usually prepares these flags by printing messages on pieces of paper, 
putting transparent tape over the flags for durability, and cutting them into proper-sized 
pieces (Figure 11). Officials may ask the staff for these flags if they want to prepare the 
documents for their supervisor. However, instead of doing it themselves, they usually just 




Figure 11 Message flags ready to be used in document preparation and organization 
In their documentation work, experienced staff have adopted a variety of local workarounds 
to tailor standardized systems to their and their agency’s needs: for example, the 
development of spreadsheets (Figure 8) or the use of logbooks (Figures 12, and 13) to 
register and track incoming documents. The logbooks are generally separated by division 
and there is a logbook specifically for the most urgent documents. These workarounds help 
the staff efficiently manage and track document flow in the agency. As one of the 
administrative staffers noted,  
“Although the ICT Center told us to stop using these printed logbooks, we still print them out 
and hand them to the recipients because we need them to confirm that they have received the 
documents. When original documents are missing, everyone points fingers at each other. 
Their signatures on our reports help us point the finger at them saying that it is definitely 
their fault… The records in the system do not help us to get away from this loop because 
many users do not check out the documents, leaving them as unread documents although they 
actually received the physical documents. We need some hard records outside the system to 
prove that it is no longer our responsibility.”  




Figure 12 A document logbook with recipient signatures to keep track of documents passing 
through the General Division of an agency 
 
Figure 13 When delivering documents, the administrative staff brings the logbooks to the 
destination divisions and asks for the recipients’ signature 
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Another agency has similar documentation practices relying on physical document logs. A 
staff member also noted: 
“We (administrative staff at the General Division) create our own logbooks to keep track of 
all documents passing through the division, and where they are sent. We keep these logs for a 
month in case officials ask about the documents’ whereabouts. Logbooks that have their 
signatures when we deliver the documents are kept for ten years. Officials can’t claim that 
they have not received the documents as long as we have their signatures to prove otherwise. 
These signed logbooks are determined as official records that we need to maintain for a 
certain period of time… But if it happens to be that the executives have lost the document, we 
will ask the director of the Division that issued the document to issue a new copy and sign it 
to replace the missing one.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
The knowledge and skills are tacit, yet can be informally transferred among staff sharing 
similar duties. When a staffer comes by to deliver physical documents, she sees and learns 
how other people use the system, and may then adapt such workarounds to his/her own 
practice. This sort of informal borrowing becomes an important site of coordination across 
traditional agency lines, and a track through which loosely standardized forms of 
documentary practice may emerge. 
6.3.2 The ICT officials 
Another crucial group of boundary agents in digital government development for public 
organizational communication is ICT officials in the agencies. Local ICT officials act as 
boundary agents in two ways: first, within their own agencies by introducing e-Document 
systems to individual divisions; and second, in inter-agency interoperable e-Document 
system efforts by coordinating with the MICT and bridging local procedures and practices 
with government-wide systems and protocols. In the first case, the e-Document system 
translates shared local document procedures of every division into a standardized digital 
process. Again, the system itself, as another kind of boundary object, does not have 
translational capacity without being actualized by the boundary agents, i.e., the ICT officials. 
The ICT officials standardize mutual practices and allow the system enough flexibility for 
individual divisions to use it corresponding with their local practices while still being able to 
share documents and information among themselves. For instance, some divisions require 
their administrative staff to scan every document passing through to the General Section 
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while others do not due to the limitation of scanners. Thus the system cannot make scan 
function a mandatory step in the procedure. 
From the system administrators’ perspective, they maintain the system’s availability and 
ensure that the document flow reflects the actual organizational hierarchy, though the 
practices and routines of the documentation in the system may be abstract for them and they 
may not know how each individual user uses the system. 
More broadly, local ICT officials act as boundary agents between their own agencies and 
others, bridging their e-Document system and others’ in the cross-agency e-Document 
system integration. As discussed earlier, the systems were developed by different vendors, so 
many of them are not compatible with each other. Hence, the local agencies’ ICT Centers 
collaborate with the Ministry of ICT (MICT) in an attempt at integrating the e-Document 
systems. The staff members at each ICT Center translate their agency’s documentation 
routines, requirements, and their system’ structures and formats into the integrated system 
while implementing national information and procedure standards, identified by the MICT, 
into their local system and practices. On the one hand, the ICT staff is working for and 
physically living in their local agency’s boundary, which makes them members of the agency. 
They provide the system that facilitates and accommodates local procedures and practices. 
On the other hand, the officials are also members of the national integration and 
interoperability effort task force organized and led by the MICT. The task force aims to 
standardize the procedures and accommodate only common routine functions in the e-
Document system. Therefore, the ICT officials act as the interface between the agency’s and 
the task force’s boundaries. Their goal is to minimize change in local documentation 
procedures and practices, meanwhile making them interoperable with those of other 
agencies. Hence, they need to bridge the gap between national technical capabilities and 
local requirements by crafting and managing national information standards, and offering 
some informal workarounds and adjustments, such as supplementary systems and practices, 
for their local staff. 
Both administrative staff and ICT officials serve as boundary agents for their own local 
organization, performing tasks of moving and translating boundary objects between their 
agency and others. The administrative staff enables communication and coordination within 
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and across agencies through their hierarchical arrangements. They act as a sort of glue 
within the formal communication structures of complex bureaucratic orders. They also 
bridge different documentation practices of individual agencies and sub-units to make 
communication flows seamless for other officials. However, their role and contributions have 
always been under-recognized and taken for granted by other officials.  
ICT officials at local agencies act as boundary agents by making possible large-scale 
integrative boundary objects, e.g., e-Document systems, and by creating and managing 
standardized procedures for the integrated system in their local agency. The creating and 
managing process is crucial to developing and maintaining the compatibility of 
documentation practices across agencies. In the meantime, the ICT officials need to 
minimize the impact of the shared standards on their local staff’s practices. More specifically, 
they have to maintain the current work practices of their local staff. Therefore, they are 
boundary agents in the form of a translator of shared standardized and local practices. 
6.4 Boundary Organizations: The MICT and Government-wide e-Document 
Integration Efforts 
In government communication and coordination, boundary objects (here, documents and e-
Document systems) play a major role in bridging the separate worlds of organizational 
practice. Boundary actors (here, administrative staff and local system administrators) also 
help these objects to ‘travel’ across division and agency boundaries. But some of this work is 
performed at a higher level of aggregation and formalization, in the form of boundary 
organizations. Boundary organizations bridge agencies and link boundary objects (here, e-
documents and e-Document systems) that previously had remained within individual agency 
boundaries, allowing them to travel across these boundaries while still maintaining their 
distinct local uses. To achieve the government’s goal of a fully interoperable e-Document 
system, there must be an organization that spearheads action in bringing collaboration 
across geographically and functionally dispersed agencies, as well as across their fragmented 
systems. To date, this role has been performed by the MICT. It plays a collective role in 
cross-agency information sharing and integrating e-Document systems among agencies. It 
acts as a bridge for formal communication and cooperation between over 100 agencies, each 
with varying documentation flows and procedures. Those procedures and practices are 
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embedded in the e-Document systems, which are, themselves, different in technological 
platforms, data structures, and detailed functions. 
The boundary organization role of the MICT is constrained by its organizational structures 
and managerial elements. Established in 2002, the MICT is one of the newest ministries. 
National ICT policies and most digital government initiatives have been relatively unstable 
due to repeated changes in political appointees heading the ministry. Since the establishment 
of the ministry, nine ministers have held the position. In consequence partly because of this, 
many ICT policies and projects initiated by the MICT have been discontinued or altered. 
When asked about the role of the ICT in digital government development, an executive 
official at the MICT mentioned a hidden agenda of the establishment of the MICT: 
“The MICT was established specifically to facilitate Thaksin and his family’s 
telecommunication business. During the Thaksin government, the MICT and the minister 
were assigned to take care of the Thai Telecommunication Act of 2006 revision (which raises 
the limit on foreign holding in telecom companies from 25% to 49% -- the author). This law 
facilitates Thaksin’s selling his corporation to the Singaporean company. After the 
transaction was successfully made, there has been a suggestion of abolishing the MICT. So, 
the role of MICT has been always unclear in the national ICT and e-Government 
development…  
There is the NBTC,15 which regulates national ICT policies and laws. This commission’s 
roles are very similar to the MICT’s. Yet the commission has its own independent financial 
resources by collecting fees from broadcasting- and telecommunications-related auctions and 
license issuing, while the MICT has to get money from the government.” 
(Informant interview, August 2010) 
Moreover, the ministry is a small agency with a limited number of ICT officials, most of 
whom work on ICT policies rather than system development or administration, or are newly 
recruited and inexperienced graduates. Technical matters, thus, are outsourced to vendors 
                                                
15 NBTC, standing for the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission, is an independent 
convergent regulator. Regulating the national broadcasting- and telecommunications-related policies and laws, 
the NBTC is divided into two sub-commissions: telecoms and broadcasting commissions. Retrieved from 
http://nbtc.nbtc.go.th/, and “Current Development in Thai Telecommunications Laws” 
http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/Thai_telecomm_law.pdf on April 15, 2012. 
Interestingly, six out of 11 NBTC commissioners, including the chair, are either current or former members of 
the military. The media criticize the strong military role in the NBTC, suggesting that the Commission may 
focus more on broadcasting than on telecommunications, as the Royal Thai Army has owned many 
broadcasting spectra, and has granted concessions to private firms to operate radio and TV businesses on its 
frequencies. Retrieved from “Strong military role in NBTC” http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/topic/495973-
strong-military-role-in-thai-nbtc/ on April 15, 2012. 
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or consultants in academic institutions. When the MICT implements its projects and 
policies, these vendors and consultants interact with users and ICT officials at local agencies. 
Users and local ICT officials have closer contact with the vendor and consultant teams than 
with the MICT officials. These constraints impose and are imposed by the MICT’s approach 
to the system and network integration efforts. 
At the beginning, the MICT developed a national centralized e-Document system aiming for 
every agency to adopt the system. The new system standardized the documentation flows 
and procedures. As the agencies were required to change practices and procedures that had 
long been in use, the agencies were not willing to switch systems. The MICT has 
subsequently moved to a gateway strategy, promoting the Thailand e-Government 
Interoperability Framework (TH e-GIF) information exchange framework to build 
interoperability between the legacy local systems. The system relies on web services that 
retrieve information from a given system and transfer it to the recipients. In developing the 
gateway framework, as discussed in detail in chapter 5, the MICT has adopted a bridging 
strategy, incorporating representatives of other agencies and experts in academic 
institutions into its TH e-GIF standards committee and holding public hearings to gather 
feedback and comments from the agencies’ ICT officials, ensuring shared goals and meaning 
among agencies. The MICT manages, crafts, and controls information sharing standards 
that the various local systems should comply with. The standardized information gateway, 
in theory, acts as a bridge that makes connections between agencies seamless and the 
translation and flow of information across agencies’ systems transparent to most officials in 
the agencies. As intended by the MICT, this translation process is meant to be invisible to 
end users, including the administrative staff working most directly with the systems. Indeed, 
some staff members I interviewed were not even aware of the integration efforts. 
During the framework development, the MICT has established communication and 
coordination with other agencies through national ICT standardization task force meetings 
and public hearings. As there are 25 different e-Document systems with various 
technologies, platforms, information structures, and formats, most agencies do not share 
information standards, and so the cross-agency cooperation has not necessarily been 
successful. Also, the MICT provides the Government Information Network (GIN) as a 
centralized high-speed network linking all ministries and departments in the public sector. 
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The GIN is intended as the primary backbone supporting information exchange for common 
back-office applications, including the interoperable e-Document system. To promote 
switching from the agencies’ existing networks to the GIN, all costs are borne by the MICT 
for an initial three-year period. After that, agencies will be billed on the basis of network 
utilization. But such switching can entail serious costs in efficiency and control. As one 
senior ICT official of a ministry explained,  
“Each individual agency has already set up its own networks, applications, and data 
structures. No one, us included, is willing to change the system and work configuration to fit 
with one another for government integration because it would affect the whole system and the 
staff’s practices.”  
(Informant interview, July 2010)  
Therefore, the MICT has initiated negotiations with each individual agency. It works with 
local ICT officials to put their data elements in the e-Document system in an XML schema 
meeting TH e-GIF standards. The MICT provides information repositories for agencies to 
send and retrieve data elements with one another, without having to be compatible with 
others’ information standards. 
As empirically shown in this account, the MICT acts as a boundary organization for inter-
organizational information integration efforts linking agencies and their different 
information structures and data elements in a hub-and-spoke fashion. Involvement and 
collaboration among government agencies mostly depends on the MICT’s connective role. 
The MICT works with ICT officials at individual agencies to translate the national 
information standards into their local e-Document systems, while gathering local practices 
and standards from all relevant agencies to make sure that each of the systems is 
interoperable with the others through the established information gateway. 
The degree of freedom of local agencies (through their boundary agents) in developing 
adjustments around and negotiating with the systems depends on their relative power to the 
boundary organizations that develop the systems. In the e-Document system integration 
effort, as discussed previously in chapter 5, the MICT does not have any power or authority 
over other agencies. Local ICT officials and administrative staff (or the boundary agents) 
have more negotiating power with their agency than does the boundary organization (here, 
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the MICT), and so are able to maintain their documentation practice and current system, 
information structures, and procedures.  
Unlike the MICT, the CGD has budgetary power over all individual agencies, and so can 
enforce the adoption of the GFMIS and associated new financial and accounting procedures 
and practice. A MICT executive official stated that: 
“The MICT is a policy regulator, and trying to be an implementer unit as well, with no 
authority to enforce other agencies. We do not control agencies’ ICT budget either. It is 
almost impossible to get cooperation from other agencies. Look at the CGD. It has successfully 
enforced from top to bottom, from central to regional units of all agencies to use the system. 
Although the system is not perfect yet, the CGD eventually manages to create one single 
centralized financial database of the public sector. But the e-Government development 
projects like the large information networks are duplicate among the MICT, the Ministry of 
Transport, and the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the MICT tends to build new systems 
over existing systems because we cannot achieve integration” 
(Informant interview, August 2010) 
6.5 Challenges and Tensions Attending Boundary Work 
As the discussion above has shown, boundary objects, agents, and organizations play crucial 
and underappreciated roles in the e-Document system development in Thailand, and intra- 
and inter-organizational coordination more generally. They bridge agencies, and their 
actors, in complex bureaucratic organizational communication. They mediate artifacts that 
consist of enough content for the needs of various actors in the coordination work within 
and across agencies. By creating and managing shared standards, they are able to translate 
otherwise incompatible local practices into formats through which sharing can, at least in 
principle, be achieved. In this sense, the boundary objects, agents, and organizations 
involved in digital government development in Thailand have blurred traditional agency 
boundaries and enabled innovative forms of inter-organizational coordination which cross 
and connect traditional bureaucratic silos, hierarchy, and fragmentation.  
But this sort of boundary work also imposes certain kinds of costs and tensions. 
6.5.1 Problems of multiple memberships  
In the interoperable e-Document system efforts, the ICT staff – the boundary agents – at 
local agencies live in two communities and hold multiple roles across the overlapping 
communities – as ICT persons of their local agency and as national ICT staff of the national 
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digital government development, thus encountering identity and loyalty problems. Work 
requirements of both communities may be mutually exclusive. Many ICT officials mentioned 
in the interviews that the ICT staff always gives priority to their local agency and its routine 
work, as well as other internal development projects, over the national government ICT 
community, led and organized by the MICT, as they create a stronger identity in the agency 
than they do in the task force, which they perceive as an ad-hoc community. 
Consequently, the problems of membership, identity, and loyalty in local ICT officials 
become a major challenge for the MICT in collaboration attempts at standardizing and 
integrating e-Document systems and other government ICT applications. The MICT has to 
minimize the impact caused by changes that the integrating efforts may bring about in local 
practices and systems, and diminish additional work requirements for the local ICT staff to 
maintain the cooperation from the agencies. A senior ICT official at a departmental agency 
reported that: 
“We (the ICT Center) have to be 100% sure that the MICT can link its national centralized 
databases across different e-Document systems before we connect our networks and e-
Document system to the interoperable ones. We have to make sure that the transition is 
seamless and the users are not at all affected by this transition. If we are not absolutely 
certain, it is better to delay the national project than to have problems on our end. The 
internal operation is our priority. The reliability and continuity of the system are more 
critical here than connecting the system with other agencies. If the users report any problems 
with the system to the Director-General, we will be dead.” 
(Personal Communication, July 2010) 
6.5.2 Problems of invisibility 
The administrative staff and their tasks have always been under-recognized, if not invisible, 
to most of the officials in the agency. While officials, including executives, value documents 
as an intra- and inter-organizational communication tool, they perceive the e-Document 
systems and electronic documents in a narrower scope in terms of its functionality and the 
numbers of relevant organizational actors. To them, the systems and electronic documents 
serve as tools for the administrative staff, not for them. The systems, thus, tend to be 
invisible to them and their role as important boundary objects less emphasized in 
organizational communication. As a result, the adoption of the systems seems to be limited 
in a small group of actors, i.e., the administrative staff, while the majority of officials are not 
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widely involved in its adoption and use. Therefore, the government’s hope to transform the 
communication forms from physical documents to electronic formats remains frustrated. 
6.5.3 Problems of authority 
With their status as the agency’s officials, ICT officials often find themselves in the difficult 
situation of fulfilling their users’ requirements while meeting criteria for national integrated 
or standardized systems. Also, many interviews with ICT officials revealed a problematic 
implication for the authority of the ICT Center, suggesting that other officials who are 
computer and system users in the agencies perceive ICT officials as technicians rather than 
professionals. Like administrative staff, ICT officials usually have an inferior hierarchical 
status to the ministerial line of work. The underemphasized status of the ICT officials in the 
government is also reflected in the officials’ limited career advancement. Their career path 
hits the ceiling when they are in the middle ranking (or what is referred to as Class or C6-
C7) or early senior ranking (C8), as opposed to that of those working in the main functional 
line which can go to the executive level (C10-C11) in the agency. The highest possible 
position for ICT officials is director of the ICT Center (i.e., C8 or C9 depending on the 
agency’s organizational structure).  
The CIO position in a particular ministry is formally attached to one of the deputy 
permanent secretaries or senior consultants (C10) by default. The way in which CIO 
positions are attached to the executive position implies that the government doesn’t 
recognize the importance of having an official with qualified ICT expertise or experience in 
the government as the agency CIO. Rather, the government tends to emphasize the 
management skill and decision power of the CIOs. Among the six agencies in my study, the 
CIOs of all except one are the deputy permanent secretary, and do not have any ICT-related 
educational background. Not having knowledge about ICT, the CIO (or the deputy 
permanent secretary) usually appoints the ICT Center director as her assistant on CIO-
related work. 
In the users’ view, ICT officials are supposed to provide technical support when requested, 
as opposed to enforcing new systems and associated practices. Unless additional procedures 
or new practices are requested by the users or demanded by the executives, the ICT Center 
barely succeeds in introducing new systems that require a change in procedures or practices. 
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Although information and technology infrastructure is practically feasible for a fully 
computerized documentation process, many manual practices with physical documents 
remain the primary ones in government agencies. Among the six agencies in which I 
conducted interviews and observation, the Ministry of Transport was the only one where 
most officials in the ministry checked incoming documents through the e-Document system. 
The director of the ICT Center explained that the permanent secretary was engaged in ICT 
development and use in the organization. Therefore, he issued an official order determining 
that every official was required to check his or her email and document inbox every day 
through the agency Intranet system. The ICT Center’s effort at deploying the e-Document 
system as a part of integrated internal communication system thus went relatively smoothly, 
though physical documents are still the main artifacts in the intra- and inter-agency 
communication at the Ministry. 
In contrast, the ICT Centers of other agencies, such as the Ministry of Commerce, have 
faced barriers and challenges attending the e-Document system implementation effort both 
within and across the ministries. In interoperable e-Document system development, the ICT 
Center of the ministry as a whole (that is, the ICT Center for the Office of Permanent 
Secretary) serves as the de facto ICT Center for each of the ministry's departments. 
However, each department is still legally required to have an ICT Center of its own with 
equal authority as its counterparts in the other departments. The supervising ministry does 
not have any directive authority to enforce changes in internal documentation practices of 
its supervised departments. Perhaps a simple explanation to the structural difficulties and 
barriers in any information system initiated by a ministry ICT Center lies in the interview 
with a senior ICT official of the ministry: 
“The major cause of failure of deploying new technologies is that the Ministry’s ICT director 
is outranked by the department director-generals and the deputies. We (the Ministry ICT 
Center) cannot ask or order the department ICT Centers directly to do such and such. We 
have to go through hierarchical communication channels – asking the department director-
generals for permission and cooperation. If the director-generals agree with the ideas, they 
will order their ICT Center to adopt and implement the technologies. But if not, that is the 
end. The decision power is theirs. Unless it is an order from the permanent secretary, other 
departments’ ICT Center will never listen to us.” 
(Informant interview, August 2010) 
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At the national level, collaboration and cooperation in large-scale interoperability efforts 
among agencies are formally centralized through the connection between individual 
agencies and the MICT. Therefore, the MICT links and leads other agencies in the digital 
government development initiatives. As a boundary organization, however, it has 
encountered issues of authority. In this relationship, the MICT is perceived as an 
organization that identifies national information and other technological standards, which 
typically require other agencies to do additional tasks in order to comply with those 
standards. Authority-wise, as a ministry-level agency, the MICT does not have authoritative 
directives or budgetary power over any agencies to enforce compliance and coordination. 
The collaboration is purely based on the consent of other agencies through the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the MICT and each agency, rather than 
directives. Inter-agency collaboration is thus limited in both the number of agencies and the 
specific types of collaboration. The MICT gains such collaboration mostly through the 
implementation of inter-organizational integrated systems that do not require changes in 
the current systems or practices of local agencies. Therefore, the systems that go through 
the gateway development trajectory for interoperability tend to gain more cooperation from 
agencies than those that are forced as a new standardized system on the agencies.  
Furthermore, there were also ICT-related commissions and agencies established prior to the 
MICT, and that still perform jobs similar to the MICT’s. Consequently, the MICT has 
never had a clear job description or role in digital government development in Thailand. 
6.5.4 Problems of trust  
The MICT encounters trust issues among other agencies due to the political structures in 
the ministry. Not only linking local ICT staff and applications, the MICT also has special 
characteristics in its boundary organization role, i.e., providing information and 
technological resources and assistance for other agencies. The availability and reliability of 
its resources are critical for other agencies. As a new ministry with uncertain administrative 
policies and organizational practices, however, it performs the function of boundary 
organization with some uncertainties and discontinuity. Often, many development projects 
were initiated and then terminated, or forced to undergo a major revision. Thus, other 
agencies’ ICT Centers are not confident about the long-term availability of the technological 
assistance that the MICT provides, such as information repositories for the interoperable e-
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Document system. As one of the directors of ICT Center questioned the continuity of the 
MICT’s operations that: 
 “They (the MICT) never guarantee that they will keep the applications running forever. 
They can’t promise us anything. Then who will want to give a shot using their applications? 
How can I trust them? If they can answer these questions, I am pretty sure that everyone will 
want to use the systems.” 
(Informant interview, February 2010) 
Besides the uncertainty as to whether or not the ministry will remain in existence, the 
internal organizational structure of the MICT has been problematic. The division 
responsible for the Government Information Network (GIN) is the Bureau of e-Government 
Development, whereas the division in charge of the e-Document system integration and TH 
e-GIF is the Ministry’s ICT Center. These two divisions report to different deputy 
permanent secretaries. Although both divisions are supposed to coordinate in the effort to 
integrate the e-Document systems running on the GIN, the separation of authority and 
reporting structures makes it difficult for them to coordinate horizontally. This problem 
results in confusion at the end-user agencies and local ICT officials who have coordinated 
with both divisions separately. An ICT official reported that: 
“The other day, the MICT contacted us saying that they would come by to update the 
database configuration. I told them that the GIN was not working, and asked them to 
contact the network team to check the problem for us. They promised they would. But I did 
not hear back from either team for a while. When the network came here for scheduled 
maintenance, I asked why didn’t they come to fix the problem. They claimed that they did not 
get any request from the TH e-GIF team. I guess they never talk to each other.” 
(Informant interview, July 2010) 
The MICT senior official whom I interviewed also admitted to having internal 
communication and management problems, which results in a failure to earn trust from 
other agencies. Human resources-wise, additionally, the MICT lacks skillful, experienced, 
and knowledgeable staff. Most of the officials at the ministry are policy analysts rather than 
computer or ICT specialists or experienced technicians. All ICT-related projects initiated by 
the MICT have to be outsourced to academic institutions or private-sector system vendors. 
Thus, the MICT is heavily dependent on outsourcing expertise, becoming just a project 
coordinator between the outsourcing parties and the user agencies. This issue tends to raise 
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questions among individual agencies about the MICT staff’s knowledge and expertise in 
large-scale ICT initiatives. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have sought to apply lessons from STS, including elaborating boundary 
objects, agents, and organizations, to bear on the empirical case of intra- and inter-
organizational communication and cross-agency coordination efforts in the Thai public 
sector. As the above discussion has shown, boundary objects, agents, and organizations play 
crucial and underappreciated roles in e-Document system development in Thailand, and 
intra- and inter-organizational coordination more generally. They bridge and link between 
agencies and actors in complex bureaucratic organizations. They mediate among 
organizationally disparate actors by producing and circulating artifacts used to coordinate 
work within and across agencies. They create and manage shared standards while 
translating otherwise incompatible local practices into formats in which sharing can, at least 
in principle, be achieved. In this sense, the boundary objects, agents, and organizations 
involved in interoperable e-Document system development in Thailand have blurred 
traditional agency boundaries and enabled innovative forms of inter-organizational 
coordination which cross and connect traditional bureaucratic divisions, silos, and 
hierarchies. 
But as the case of e-Document system development in Thailand also shows, this sort of 
boundary work faces distinctive challenges and limits. A series of common problems, 
including those of multiple memberships, invisibility, and incompatibility and asymmetries, 
attend the boundary work and the agents who perform it. Boundary agents in Thai e-
Document development have, for the most part, been organizationally subordinate to the 
groups with which they interface and connect. This has limited their power to compel 
change in norms and practices among many of the groups that digital government reform 
efforts are ostensibly targeting; although the administrative staff has adopted the electronic-
based documentation, their practice has not had significant impact on other officials’ 
documentation practice. As a consequence of the invisibility and authority issues of the 
boundary agents, e-Document system adoption has proceeded slowly, and where it has 
moved forward it has tended to operate as a shadow system with limited reach outside of 
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administrative staff – a minor augmentation, but hardly a replacement, for document flows 
of the paper type.  
In this regard the work of boundary agents, by holding together an otherwise untenable 
situation, may enable a certain kind of organizational conservatism that preempts rather 
than encourages change. It also poses new and often severe burdens of work, as failures in 
the more widespread adoption of the new digital systems leave boundary agents tasked with 
effectively running two systems in parallel.  
The MICT, as a relatively recent and consciously integrative agency, also faces some 
crippling problems of its own – problems of authority and of trust. These problems have 
become barriers in coordinating between worlds and integrating systems and practices 
across agencies empirically seen in the efforts at e-Document interoperability in this chapter, 
and the efforts at information infrastructure standardization and integration of Government 
Information Networks (GIN) and the Thailand e-Government Information Framework (TH 
e-GIF) in chapter 5. 
A possible implication of this study is that when introducing new information systems and 
associated practices, boundary agents and organizations may require additional authority 
and visibility for their work, including new authoritative or budgetary powers to persuade 
or compel more thorough changes in practice. This point is illustrated well in the 
comparison between the development and deployment of the integrated e-Document system 
and the GFMIS (discussed in chapter 4). But this in turn may undermine their ability to 
bridge and connect between worlds, undermining their boundary-spanning functions and 
turning them instead into new tools and instruments of centralization and control, just, as 




Since the early 1990s, computerized systems have become part of Thai government 
operations, varying from common internal functions, such as financial management, 
personnel management, and document management; to more specific tasks like case 
management; and to online public service delivery, such as vehicle registration service, e-
Customs, and trade- and logistics-related services. The fundamental goals of the stand-alone 
system include automating some work processes; increasing the speed, accuracy, and 
efficiency of operational procedures; collecting and storing information; and reducing the use 
of physical documents. Computerization efforts so far have made important contributions to 
government goals, such as developing the organizational repositories of information and 
digitizing fundamental work procedures of the main government operations.  
But as shown throughout my thesis, the development and implementation of the 
government ICTs is not a simple process. On the one hand, the design of information 
systems involves, and is a result of, a struggle over political and bureaucratic power and 
control among government officials and elected politicians. Information systems developed 
and used within an agency usually represent and emphasize top-down hierarchical control 
and decision-making structures. They are a consequence of the executives’ decisions 
regarding the work procedures, oversight, and approval processes. The case tracking system, 
for example, allowed executive judges to track the status of pending cases, and the 
performance of individual judges. Similarly, the inter-agency information systems have 
enabled politicians to gain oversight and control over the government’s main resources, 
including budget and expenditures and the workforce, through line agencies, such as the 




On the other hand, the adoption and use of the systems also involves a contest for power and 
autonomy between the executives and lower-level officials. It reveals the work processes 
that are captured and encoded into the systems. It also demonstrates how the systems are 
designed and supposed to be used, and how agencies and officials actually use or do not use 
them, which may deviate from the design goals, in response to managerial directives, work 
requirements, and control from top agencies and higher-level officials. For instance, most 
officials in the studied agencies avoided updating their task progress in the performance 
management information systems because they did not want their superiors to know how 
much they were running behind schedule. They also did not want to use the systems as their 
supervisors appeared to reap benefits from their achievements whereas they perceived that 
the monetary bonus they would receive for their achievements was not worth the effort they 
had to devote.  
Interestingly, the implementation of information systems in the government has resulted in 
informal job allocations between supervisors and subordinates around the systems. Most 
system users were junior officials who interacted with the systems on behalf of themselves to 
prepare information for their supervisors: acknowledging, reviewing, and approving 
documents and transactions. A few junior officials were also assigned to use the systems on 
behalf of their supervisors, as high-ranking officials tended to delegate their computer-
related tasks to middle managers or junior officials due to their busy schedules and/or 
limited computer proficiency. Therefore, a number of junior officials were given access to 
their bosses’ accounts to acknowledge documents or approve transaction requests, as 
required by the systems hierarchical levels in order to proceed further. This common 
practice was seen in several cases, including the use of GFMIS, DPIS, e-Document systems, 
the performance management information systems, and the case tracking system, across the 
studied agencies. In the e-Document systems, for example, the administrative staff would 
acknowledge incoming documents addressing executives and enter executive orders using 
the executives’ user accounts. In the GFMIS, financial section heads approved budget 
requests on behalf of the financial director, using the director’s access card. And in the case 
tracking system, the case officials logged in to the system as their supervising judge to print 
out case progress reports for their boss upon request. Although the design of government 
information systems emphasized the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy, the actual 
practice of government officials in the systems was misaligned with the structure of the 
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computerized systems. Therefore, system adoption has mostly been limited to the lower 
levels of the agencies. 
Task allocation and the supervisors’ dependence on the lower levels for the work around 
information systems have also led to changes in the relationships among the government 
officials within agencies, and in specific practices around computerization. As their 
computer-related work has been delegated to their subordinates, the executives and high 
ranking officials still maintained or invented other means inside and outside the systems to 
retain their supervision and control authority over the junior staff. As a consequence, the 
executives usually required physical records, such as official forms and documents or 
printout reports, that could have simply been viewed and approved electronically. For 
instance, the approval authorization for budget requests and money transfers had to be 
granted on paper by the financial director before the corresponding electronic transactions 
in the GFMIS could be made. The financial staff also needed to make a copy of every 
transaction submitted electronically through the GFMIS and registered those documents 
with the agency’s document numbers for their internal reference and auditing purpose. 
Likewise, the General Division director signed and had a small note on every document as 
an endorsement that she had reviewed the content of the documents and had ensured 
his/her staff’s accuracy in addressing the document to the appropriate destination before the 
document would be forwarded to the executives for directives, while the junior 
administrative staff may have already sent the electronic information of that document to 
the executives and its appropriate destination. 
The empirical findings show that physical documents have remained the preferred media, 
over electronic records, in most operations across agencies. Administrative staff still carried 
registration books and logbooks when delivering official documents; case officials heavily 
relied on their personal case docket logbooks; and HR officials kept the personnel 
information in the OCSC#7 more up-to-date than in the electronic systems. One may even 
argue that physical documents have not yet lost their significance in government operations 
to any extent and that the manual practices associated with physical documents around the 
computerized systems will remain active for a long period of time, and might prevent full 
ICT adoption. New information systems are likely to operate in parallel to, rather than 
replace, traditional manual routines and paperwork. Physical documents may not be 
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eliminated unless higher-level officials use the systems themselves, and/or higher-level 
agencies officially require the termination of the documents. On a larger scale, inter-
organizational information systems like the GFMIS, DPIS, and the Customs Department’s 
National Single Window underline the government’s efforts at standardizing work practices 
and procedures across government agencies, and decreasing the redundancy of information 
infrastructure development. These systems were designed with the goal of replacing the 
stand-alone systems developed and used by individual agencies and eliminating duplicate 
information resources by allowing agencies to share with others. Nonetheless, rarely have 
the legacy versions of such systems been retired from individual agencies. Agencies found 
that the government-provided information systems were too limited to accommodate work 
procedures and practices at the local level. Thus, they kept their existing systems running to 
serve their internal operations while using the national systems to comply with the 
government requirements as they were forced to adopt them. Most agencies in my study 
still maintained their legacy financial management information systems in order to manage 
the agency’s internal bookkeeping and budget allocation because the GFMIS did not provide 
such functions at the micro level. Similarly, all agencies have used their legacy personnel 
record management systems and spreadsheets, alongside the DPIS, to manage their internal 
organizational structures and informal job allocations, which are different from the official 
ones in the DPIS. 
Moreover, the inter-agency systems were not designed to allow any connection with the 
agencies’ individual systems and databases due to the differences of information structures 
and work procedures among agencies, as well as concerns about information security. 
Therefore, the inter-agency systems and the legacy systems have been coexisting in the ICT 
development efforts. 
For numerous reasons, the duplication and accumulation of information systems and 
databases have resulted in the persistence of two system problems [195], and electronic red 
tape [155] discussed earlier in chapters 4 and 5. The electronic red tape in interoperable 
system development efforts accurately fits the development trajectory of the National Single 
Window development, as seen in my study, where the system required only one data entry 
point for businesses but it duplicated the data to all the databases of individual agencies 
needing it. In other systems using a gateway strategy for interoperability, such as the 
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interoperable e-Document systems, the same data had at least two copies – one was at the 
agency of origin, the other was at the gateway database. 
Additionally, the problems of electronic red tape and two systems have remained true in 
government agencies. Physical documents associated with manual practices still represent 
the primary process and infrastructure among the officials. Although they imitate the 
fundamental manual procedures, and have gradually become part of their routine work, 
information systems have not been fully embedded into officials’ operations. Specifically, 
senior officials who were trained to conduct their work with physical documents have found 
that computer-related work procedures and the associated practices add additional tasks to 
the existing manual work they are familiar with. As discussed in chapter 5, a systems’ 
invisibility or transparency of use, and its embeddedness into the officials’ work practices, 
reflect the relational quality of information infrastructure [183]. Although documents, as 
artifacts, are physically visible to every official, their use and functionality provide invisible 
support to the work and goals of the officials. They provide objectives and instructions 
allowing the individual officials who approach them to recognize related work and practices. 
In contrast, officials are less aware of the work associated with electronic documents and 
systems, as e-Document systems are primary used for tracking and back-up purposes. 
Therefore, paper documents remain the primary medium.  
Moreover, computers and information systems have barely become embedded in the existing 
work of the officials. That is, officials can fully perform their work through manual practices 
and documents when the systems are down. In contrast, computerized processes still require 
a fair amount of manual tasks and information outside of the systems. Computerized 
processes could be interrupted or discontinued as long as the manual practices and 
documents are still in use. The officials, whether consciously or not, tend to work and rely 
on the physical documents unless they are required to perform their tasks with the 
information systems as empirically seen in the cases of document preparation versus e-
Document systems, and case docket management versus the case tracking system. Much like 
governments all over the world, these two-system and electronic red tape problems have 
remained in ICT development and use patterns in the Thai public sector. 
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Nevertheless, I do not argue that the delay in ICT development, the limited and slow 
adoption of systems, the continuous use of physical documents and their associated manual 
practice, and the redundancy of information infrastructure development represent the failure 
of digital government development efforts in Thai bureaucracy. Rather, they emphasize the 
tensions and challenges of the efforts resulting from particular organizational dynamics and 
socio-political factors in the Thai government, in addition to the technological difficulties. In 
this chapter, therefore, I want to draw practical and policy lessons for digital government 
development efforts concerning limits, tensions, and challenges of ICT development and 
deployment, especially in Thailand, as well as in a wider government context. These lessons 
may be useful for both practitioners and scholars in the digital government community to 
anticipate and minimize, or even overcome, such difficulties in their efforts at ICT 
development, adoption, and use in bureaucracy. 
Throughout the three main thematic chapters in my thesis, I have compiled a comprehensive 
list of limits, barriers, tensions, and challenges facing efforts at digital government 
development both at the local and national levels. Suggested by the analysis thus far, this 
series of problems can be classified into five interconnected elements: people factors, 
organizational and bureaucratic factors, political factors, legal factors, and technological 
factors. 
7.1 People Factors 
The people factors involve two main components that contribute to the challenges and 
resistance to computerized systems. The first component involves long-established practices 
and old habits of the government officials. For over two decades, digital government efforts 
have led to officials adopting and using information technologies and computerized systems 
as part of their routine operations. As pointed out earlier, though, the information systems in 
the early computerization period did not redesign the existing work process, transform 
government operations to eliminate unnecessary processes and forms, or fully automate 
work with electronic documents. Instead, the systems merely imitated manual procedures 
and duplicated corresponding documents into electronic form. Additionally, the deployment 
of information systems has been an incremental process, as opposed to one of radical change, 
to allow the officials to adapt and adjust. In my study, senior officials, who were then junior 
or middle ranked, reported that they were forced to learn and use computers and 
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information systems in the middle of their career while they were used to traditional manual 
procedures and not at all comfortable with the new technologies. Therefore, they tended to 
hang on to physical documents and maintain their manual practices, outside the new 
systems, in case there was a technological or human error. Thus their work has been a 
mixture of manual and electronic practices with paper and digital documents, but with a 
strong emphasis on paper documents.  
Government officials have been notorious for their slow adaptation and inflexibility to 
change. Their work has been based on a rule-driven basis, rather than a results- or goal-
driven basis, regardless of the government’s administrative or performance reform efforts. 
Although computerized systems promised to increase the speed of operations, the actual 
work associated with the systems did not do much in this regard because most officials have 
maintained the manual practices to which they were accustomed. These manual practices 
have been passed down from generation to generation of officials through on-the-job 
training and mentorship. Consequently, most officials in my study stated that computerized 
practice actually slowed down their work as it duplicated their primary practice – manual 
work – as shown in the documentary work and performance evaluation across the agencies, 
as well as case status tracking at the Court. 
The second component is related to the officials’ perception of computerized systems versus 
physical artifacts. The officials, particularly those in senior groups, tended to have more 
trust in physical records than their electronic counterparts. Compared with electronic 
records, physical artifacts provide greater flexibility for officials in that they are accessible 
from anywhere and can be transported easily. They also were seen as a more reliable 
repository. The officials had a sense of ownership over physical records, while feeling that 
they owned virtually nothing of the electronic records. As some officials reported, they were 
concerned about losing specific pieces of information or entire records in the system without 
their knowledge. They would never be able to track or retrieve the lost information by 
themselves, and would not know where the information had gone. According to the officials, 
it was beyond their knowledge and power to control information access and security in the 
computerized systems as opposed to physical documents and files, which were kept in a 
secure room in their sight. They were concerned that electronic records, such as personnel 
records in the DPIS, may be not valid, and human resources officials were likely to be found 
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liable if the incorrect information resulted in a wrong decision made on a particular 
employee. Therefore, they tended to depend on physical evidence for their own protection 
from any liability from information loss and invalidity. For them, hard-copy records were 
more visible and accessible, yet more secure and reliable than soft-copy ones. Paper records 
were also traceable with proper logging methods. The administrative staff created official 
logbooks or personal log sheets requiring the recipients’ physical signatures and timestamps 
in order to keep track of documents passing through them. Similar incidents occurred at the 
Administrative Court where the great concern among case officials was losing a case docket. 
Therefore, they had to strictly keep track of the dockets’ whereabouts on their personal 
logbooks, which were always accessible and never left their presence. They required officials 
who took the dockets away from them to sign and date their personal logbooks. The 
logbooks enabled them to identify the persons or divisions responsible in the case of missing 
documents. In addition, the use of logbooks has de-emphasized the necessity of using the 
corresponding systems (i.e., the e-Document systems and the case tracking system), which 
provide identical information for tracking purposes and managerial control, hence requiring 
the officials to input the information they already had on hand. 
Another benefit of the physical records is to prevent the officials from being blamed for poor 
performance. Officials have often avoided or misused the tracking mechanism for 
performance monitoring and evaluation purposes in several of the computerized systems. 
For example, most administrative staff members tended to avoid using the e-Document 
systems to check out the incoming documents, so the senders had trouble tracking their 
outgoing documents. They could not depend on the checkout time in the system to assess 
the senders’ performance because the receiving staff did not pick up the correspondence in 
the system until they had the physical copies on their desk. This misleading information may 
have caused the senders to fail their performance evaluation because the system indicated 
that the correspondence was still in process. Officials thus perceived that the information 
that was recorded and shown in the electronic systems was completed, and out of the staff’s 
capability to control or modify it. In contrast, it was easier for the staff to negotiate among 
themselves and with their bosses to edit or omit any information on physical records. As a 
consequence, the staff had to maintain the physical logbooks, and have the recipients sign 




The underlying premises of the systems were misaligned with officials’ perceptions and 
practices. The officials’ old habits around physical records and manual practice, and the 
lower level of affordances concerning accessibility, reliability, and protection mechanisms of 
electronic documents in comparison with physical documents, have put the electronic 
systems and associated practices in an inferior position. Government work, thus, has 
remained a paper-dominant practice. 
7.2 Organizational and Bureaucratic Factors 
The second element of the tensions and challenges of ICT development and adoption is 
related to bureaucracy’s organizational culture, values, and traditional work practices. First, 
it has to do with a misconception about the values given to computer and technology work 
in bureaucracy. Among Thai government officials, computer and computer-related tasks 
have been considered supporting work. Computers were first introduced to non-computer 
officials as a replacement for typewriters, to be used in data entry and documentation work, 
in addition to data processing. Prior to the computerization period, this type of work 
involved lower-level staff, i.e., data entry clerks. Superiors and management officials would 
hand their written drafts to the data entry clerk, now referred to as administrative staff, to 
type and prepare them in an official form. Because computers were very expensive in the 
early computerization age, individual agencies could only afford a limited number so they 
pooled them among the administrative staff to help other officials by typing their written 
documents. Thus, computer-related work became associated with data entry work, and 
unfortunately gained a poor impression as secretarial work, as opposed to technical work 
carried out by officials in the main lines of work in an agency. To maintain their crucial 
image as important personnel, the non-administrative officials tended not to do that kind of 
secretarial work themselves. Yet, computers had a certain cultural value attached to them as 
modern, cutting-edge tools. Management-level officials usually demanded to have 
computers installed in their office for such symbolic associations, even though they may not 
have known how to use them in any functional way, hence allowing their subordinates to use 
the computers in their office. 
Second, the findings from my study suggest that officials were likely to be distant from 
computers as they advanced in their career, although most officials had access to a computer. 
Government organizations highly value hierarchical class systems. Ranks, the number of 
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subordinates, and personal assistants, among other perks, represent the class and career 
advancement of a particular official. Senior officials, with high ranking and management 
positions in particular, had their subordinates and assistants do the work requiring 
preparation and redundant tasks, such as documentation, reporting, and making 
presentations, while they performed the thinking or planning tasks. Those tasks assigned to 
the subordinates usually involved the use of computer and information systems on behalf of 
the ranking officials. It was not unusual to see subordinates in their boss’s office working at 
the computer. Again, the bosses still retained their close supervision outside of the electronic 
world through official documents and physical records. Bureaucratic values, priorities, and 
work practices resulted in the delegation of tasks and the limited patterns of ICT adoption, 
resulting in most users being junior officials, as empirically shown in the use of the systems 
in the study. 
The distance between senior officials and computer-related work is also a consequence of the 
system development not taking into account the management-level use of the systems in the 
design. Knowing that executive and senior officials rarely used computers, system 
developers tended to focus the design of the systems for use by officials at the lower 
hierarchical levels, aiming at daily operations such as data entry or transaction processing, 
rather than executive decision support. The design was thus packed with immensely detailed 
input screens to serve entry-level functions. During the implementation, the management-
level officials were only briefed on how the systems worked, and what information the 
systems would provide them. They were never trained on how to use the systems. Rather, 
the training programs for junior officials, who were the target user groups, focused on how 
to use the systems screen by screen. Given little understanding of how to use the systems 
and provided only small benefits for using them, the senior officials were even more unlikely 
to work with the systems. 
Third, as emphasized in chapter 5, collaboration among government agencies has always 
been a challenge. This is partly due to the localistic attitudes of officials [114], and partly 
because of political instability and struggle in Thailand. In the infrastructure development 
and standardization efforts, agencies were not willing to share their information or 
information infrastructure with other agencies, as much as they did not want to piggyback 
on other agencies’ existing information and systems. Even within the same ministry, each 
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department wanted to collect their own data, and develop their own databases and systems. 
Owning information and infrastructure allowed the agencies to gain exclusive sources of 
incoming budget for system development, procurement, and maintenance; autonomy over 
the collection and use of their own data; as well as credit and a better reputation with the 
public.  
Furthermore, individual agencies were not willing to relinquish their existing information 
resources and rely on other agencies’ information and systems because they could never be 
sure whether the development agencies would allow the use of the information and systems 
forever. Requests and offers to share information resources were usually made based on 
informal and personal, yet strong, connections between executives among the agencies 
through memorandums of understanding (MOU). This sort of relationship might last as 
long as these officials were in their positions, but any change in management positions was 
likely to affect prior arrangements between the agencies, as policies of the new executives 
may be different and could jeopardize the previous connections and MOUs. The transition of 
the politicians overseeing the agencies often resulted in subsequent changes in the 
bureaucrats in managerial positions. Agreements on sharing and exchanging information 
made between former officials were likely to be dropped.  
7.3 Political Factors 
The state of Thai politics may intensify the issues arising from organizational and 
bureaucratic forces. Firstly, ministers from different political parties are not usually in 
agreement, especially when it involves power and benefits from the projects. An example of 
such tensions is the conflict between the Ministries of Interior and ICT over ownership of 
citizen ID cards procurement, including the purchase of over 60 million microchip-
embedded smart cards. The ministries were each overseen by ministers from different 
parties both tried to claim relevance to, and expertise on, the cards. The Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) claimed responsibility of the citizen registration database and the ID cards issuing 
units. Thus, it wanted to take care of the smart cards procurement. The Ministry of ICT, on 
the other hand, claimed its expertise on smart card technology. Although the cabinet 
demanded that the MICT acquire the ID cards, the MOI dragged its heels raising issues 
concerning the cards’ compliance with the MOI’s regulations and specifying the colors and 
some small details on the cards, ultimately rejecting the whole batch of ID cards from the 
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MICT. The conflict and contest over the procurement prevented the MOI from being able 
to issue the cards to citizens, thus requiring the issue of temporary documents until the 
problem was resolved months later when the cabinet determined that the MOI should revise 
its regulations so that the acquired cards could be accepted.16 The solution also brought 
transitions, demotions, and punishments to some management-level officials at the MOI 
who did not obey the politicians’ wills. This incident illustrates the great dependence of the 
bureaucracy on political struggles, and the subsequent difficulty and uncertainty around 
ICT-related policies and projects, particularly cross-agency ones. 
Anticipating political tensions and contests, therefore, each government agency tended to 
acquire and develop their own systems to ensure the permanent availability of information 
and systems for their operations, and the accessibility and control of financial and 
technological resources. 
Secondly, there is a hierarchy and class system among the agencies, which affects the 
deployment and adoption of ICTs in the public sector. Among politicians and officials, 
government agencies may be informally classified by their size, funding amount, and their 
impact on national and governmental policies. For example, the Ministry of Transport and 
its dependent Department of Land Transport are considered A-grade agencies because they 
are in charge of several mega-projects, generate large income through their service fees, and 
have regional offices throughout the country. The Ministry of Interior is one of the oldest 
and largest ministries, holding the national citizen registration databases and overseeing 
local municipal offices, hence it is listed as one of the top agencies, as well. The Ministry of 
Finance (and its Comptroller General’s Department) is another first-class agency, 
formulating the country’s financial policies and holding budgetary power over other 
agencies. These top agencies tend to develop their own information infrastructure as they 
can access large amounts of funding. Both MOT and MOI are the first and only ministries 
to have their own physical networked infrastructure. 
Lower-status ministries include the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Ministry 
of Labor, and the Ministry of Culture. They are considered second-class agencies because 
                                                
16 “Yongyut proposing to Cabinet for smart cards purchase,” Komchadluek newspaper (April 10, 2011). 
http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20111004/110855/ยงยุทชงครม.ซื้อสมารทการด.html Retrieved from on August 18, 2012.  
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their public policies and programs have little impact on other agencies and/or their annual 
budget plans are smaller than those of the top agencies. Other lower-status agencies are 
relatively new and small, like the Ministry of ICT, which has been established for less than 
10 years and has only two dependent departments. 
My study suggests that the MICT suffered from its low status and lack of power over other 
agencies. While it was supposed to be the government ICT development spearhead and the 
boundary organization in the inter-organizational integration system development efforts, 
the Ministry was faced with challenges of information standardization and integration 
efforts. It did not have any budgetary power or directive authority over other agencies. In 
addition, the staff of the MICT was not system developers or system engineers. Rather, they 
were policy-oriented officials with little technical skill or expertise. Therefore, the MICT 
had to outsource its integration system development to government-owned companies or 
private firms, and its staff only performed the roles of project manager or coordinator. Given 
the little knowledge and expertise the MICT staff had, computer officials in the other 
agencies did not have confidence in the MICT, and thus hesitated to give up their own 
information systems and resources and switch to the MICT-operated infrastructure.  
Besides the technical limitations of its staff, the MICT also suffered an inferior status within 
the government agency community. As a relatively junior and small-scale agency, the MICT 
failed to force or convince other agencies to adopt and use the Government Information 
Network (GIN) it provided and originally planned for the information integration initiative. 
In my interviews with officials at the MICT, the MICT had to propose its plan to the 
Cabinet for its authoritative directives and to the Finance Ministry for its budgetary power 
to force the adoption of the GIN. The Cabinet issued a resolution to forcibly seize the 
infrastructure budget of particular agencies dedicated to network leasing from private 
companies and bypass that budget to the GIN lease instead, so that the agencies would have 
to switch to the GIN. In the e-Document system interoperability effort, the MICT 
developed a new version of the e-Document system for full cross-agency information 
exchange and information format standardization, hoping that most agencies would adopt it. 
But without any incentives or power to force the adoption, the MICT encountered a major 
barrier in that no agencies would voluntarily relinquish their existing systems. As a 
consequence, the MICT had to adopt the gateway strategy for interoperability with limited 
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functions and information retrieved, converted, and passed on across different e-Document 
systems of individual agencies. 
Lastly, ICT officials across the government have been in doubt about the long-term 
existence of the MICT and the continuity of its policies and associated ICT initiatives. As 
reported in chapter 6, an MICT official pointed out that one of the actual goals of 
establishing the MICT was to favor the former prime minister’s telecommunication business. 
The Ministry’s roles and responsibilities were very similar and oftentimes overlapped with 
those of other agencies and commissions, like the National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission. ICT officials in the other agencies were skeptical and 
hesitant to adopt the systems developed and provided by the MICT partly because they 
were uncertain about the future of the MICT; they did not trust the MICT’s capacity to 
operate such sophisticated information systems; and because they had to give up exclusive 
control of their network utility, system configurations, and information access management. 
The agencies that could afford their own physical information networks, for instance, 
adopted the GIN as a backup system without giving up their primary networks. Most 
agencies did not give priority to the e-Document system integration and information 
standardization efforts over their in-agency projects. 
The combination of organization, bureaucratic, and political tensions and challenges has 
created a redundancy of information and systems throughout the government, leading to 
problems of information incompatibility for the government as a whole. This also makes it 
even harder for agencies to collaborate and share information. 
7.4 Legal Factors 
Another serious impediment to computerization efforts comes in the form of the legislative 
process and numerous legal restrictions. The Thai public sector has long been widely 
criticized for its slowness, inefficiency and resistance to innovation – a kind of general 
organizational plodding captured in the Thai phrase ‘meal in the morning, meal in the 
evening’ indicating a kind of generalized monotony, complacency, and lack of imagination on 
the part of government officials. Critics also charge public sector organizations with 
excessive rules and regulations, and slow and redundant procedures. Digitizing work 
process required change in many relevant laws and formalized procedures. In order for 
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electronic documents to have a legal effect equivalent to that of physical documents, the 
government needed to revise the current Government Document and Archives Procedure, 
which had not been updated since 1983, to recognize electronic documents and digital 
signatures. In addition, each individual agency had to update their document procedures to 
comply with the new government procedures. 
Although the Act of Electronic Transactions was enacted in 2001, agencies lacked interest 
in revising procedures to accommodate their internal processes or cross-agency transactions, 
and thus continued their work with traditional practices. A few transactions and processes 
have been digitized, though, as a result of external pressure from citizens and the private 
sector, or to be competitive in world markets. These include government interactions with 
external entities like e-Tax filing, or the Customs’ trade-related transactions and the 
implementation of the National Single Window (NSW). 
Reducing paperwork and promoting electronic transactions required the revision of many 
laws and procedures that were issued and enforced by different agencies, who were not 
necessarily willing to put high priority on such work. The Department of Land Transport 
(DLT) reported that they could not implement their electronic vehicle registration renewal 
through an automated kiosk service because the relevant procedures did not facilitate the 
process. The renewal service involved the revision of the Ministry of Finance’s procedures 
on payments: when a payment was received, two copies of a receipt with an authorized 
official’s signature were issued at the same time – one was given to the payer, the other to 
the agency for auditing. This requirement made it almost impossible for the DLT to deploy 
the automated kiosk service, but the Finance Ministry did not give priority to the revision 
that would have solved it. Therefore, the DLT had to put the project on hold. Also, 
department-level agencies were subject to laws and regulations by their supervising 
ministry. Their operational procedures were thus constrained by ministerial regulations. To 
modify their existing work process might require change that was beyond the agencies’ 
autonomy. The amendment of ministerial-level laws involved an even more complicated 
process because the revised laws had to be approved by the Council of State and then the 




Consequently, legal restrictions have impeded the innovation of public service delivery and 
information systems, as traditional laws and regulations did not usually facilitate or 
authorize new practices or channels of communication within the public sector or between 
the government and citizens. These restrictions, along with the other aforementioned 
factors, have also given rise to the slowness and delay of information standardization and 
integration efforts across the agencies, because all relevant organizations had to modify their 
internal procedures and associated practices to comply with the government ones. 
The legislation revision also needed commitment and a big push from the top of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, or even higher. For instance, information system development 
projects initiated and forced by the minister or the permanent secretary were likely to be 
carried out more successfully and the systems more likely to be adopted than those initiated 
by a department or mid-level officials. Similarly, the cross-agency legislation revision may 
require political power from the elected government, as seen in the deployment of national-
level projects like the GFMIS or the NSW. As computerization usually involved 
complicated legal procedures and regulatory amendments, officials were inclined to use this 
difficulty as an excuse to delay the system development of a particular system that would 
affect and/or was not aligned with their existing work procedures and practice, autonomy, 
and power structures.  
7.5 Technological Factors 
Technological factors are the last category of limitations and barriers that impede efforts at 
standardization and integration of information and services in digital government 
development, such as the development of NSW for agencies engaged in trade- and logistics-
related functions and the interoperable e-Document systems in this study. These 
technological limitations and barriers include issues of technological resource asymmetries, 
concerns about information security and privacy among the agencies, and the rigidity of 
integrated systems.  
Technological resources for ICT development include ICT personnel, skills, and expertise; 
current technologies; and system development and maintenance funding. The government 
has encountered the issue of resource asymmetries among individual agencies. Information 
integration or interoperability projects usually required more advanced hardware and 
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software, but small agencies tended to have less updated technologies and a small number of 
ICT officials, and so found it hard to keep up with the larger agencies whose technological 
resources were more advanced and abundant. The integration efforts, therefore, were 
constrained by the resource asymmetries.  
Among many others, an effort that suffered from resource asymmetry is the e-Customs and 
NSW implementation. Each individual agency in the effort operated different functions for 
trade and logistics services, but they needed to share and exchange information across the 
agencies. Therefore, there were heterogeneous systems performing specific functions at 
individual agencies that needed to be interoperable. Customs was thus unable to provide a 
new centralized system or technical aids for individual agencies. Yet, it had to develop an 
information gateway for all of those systems to exchange their information that complied 
with the information standards using the government information framework (TH e-GIF). 
The effort crucially depended on the collaboration among local agencies, and the 
technological readiness of each agency. It was prone to slowness and delay as the 
deployment had to wait until every agency was able to catch up technologically and 
operationally. 
Alternatively, the agencies responsible for or leading the efforts could employ different 
strategies subject to their system deployment plans and available resources. The leading 
agencies could provide all agencies with technological infrastructure, including information 
networks and equipment, application servers, computers to connect to the centralized 
databases, and client systems at local agencies, as well as technical support through their 
own technical staff and service centers. With this provision, the spearhead agencies would 
reduce the workload and involvement of ICT officials at the local agencies, and thus not 
require any local resources. It would also ensure the standardization of information and 
practices, as well as symmetrical technological resources because each agency would use the 
same system developed by one agency on the same infrastructure. However, this strategy 
requires sophisticated system configurations and substantial financial and technical 
resources. The agencies that could adopt this strategy needed to have some power or 
authority over other agencies to enforce the system adoption. The Comptroller General’s 
Department (CGD) used this strategy to deploy the GFMIS. The CGD and its outsourcing 
system development firms were responsible for the development and implementation of the 
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GFMIS. As empirically shown in chapter 5, the ICT officials at local agencies had very little 
involvement with the processes before or after its deployment. 
Another alternative strategy is to provide the standardized system for all agencies, but 
deploy it on the local agency’s infrastructure. The Civil Service Commission (OCSC) 
developed and deployed its DPIS to all agencies, but individual agencies could choose to 
adopt the systems only if they had appropriate infrastructure – network and hardware – at 
their offices. The ICT officials at local agencies installed the system on their servers, and 
configured the connection with the OCSC’s remote servers. Once the system was operating, 
though, they tended to be bypassed for technical support from the OCSC. Similar to the 
development process of the GFMIS, the ICT officials were barely engaged in the system 
design, development, or operation of the DPIS.  
Although these two system deployment strategies seemed to mitigate the problems of 
resource asymmetries across agencies, they have given rise to the problems of ownership, 
commitment, and control of the local ICT officials over the centralized and standardized 
systems discussed in chapter 5. In addition, lacking ownership and control of the 
government-provided systems also has led to users losing trust in their local ICT staff, as 
they perceived that the ICT division was not capable of solving technical issues. 
Consequently, the issue has reinforced the distance and created tensions between users and 
ICT officials in agencies. 
Furthermore, inter-organizational system development has raised concerns over information 
security and privacy. As explained earlier, officials, particularly senior officials, relied on 
physical documents since they were more confident of controlling the access to and 
modification of those documents than of electronic records. This perception has impacted the 
concerns even more in the inter-agency context. The officials were concerned that the 
information that was shared and exchanged across the agency boundaries was beyond their 
control, but may still be their responsibility if misused. With the lack of trust in the MICT’s 
technical capability of information system management and security policies, individual 
agencies were not willing to switch their existing information network to the centralized 
government network (GIN) provided by the MICT. In the cases of inter-agency integrated 
systems such as the NSW or the interoperable e-Document systems, most agencies in my 
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study were hesitant to allow the exchange or sharing of information related to their internal 
operations. For example, Customs had to make sure that other agencies that were not 
relevant to the logistics business did not have authorization to access the business 
registration information of the Ministry of Commerce, which was shared only for logistic 
purposes through the NSW gateway. Individual agencies also allowed the MICT’s gateway 
to retrieve only specific information about the outgoing documents, without accessing their 
internal e-Document systems.  
Such access limitations hampered the efforts of seamlessly interoperating into one large 
system, with full functionality, the different systems across the agencies. Additionally, they 
also led to rigidity in the integrated systems. The integrated systems could only share 
specific functions across the heterogeneous systems due to the limited amount of 
information allowed to be shared. The integrated systems were developed mostly to achieve 
the government and/or the leading agency’s goals of information integration at the national 
level. They could not meet all requirements of the individual agencies; the systems would be 
cumbersome and overly complicated in their development, use, and maintenance. As a result, 
individual agencies still had to maintain their systems to fulfill internal operations. Local 
staff also needed to develop workarounds and adjustments, or even supplementary systems, 
including paper systems, to satisfy the agency’s operational and managerial requirements 
that the integrated systems could not. Ultimately, this led to constant redundancy and two-
system problems.  
These five non-mutually exclusive elements have explained the socio-political and 
technological limitations, challenges, and tensions in the digital government development of 
Thai bureaucracy. Such complications have caused delay, redundancy, and barriers to system 
adoption and desirable practices. But these difficulties are not always unsatisfactory or 
excessive. As Lindblom [120] discusses, incremental change allows the officials to adjust to 
a new work environment. The traditional practices around paper and legacy systems that 
have been carried into the digital and inter-organizational environments provided a bridge 




7.6 Implications and Contributions 
Throughout my thesis, I have tried to map patterns, tensions, and dynamics in digital 
government development in Thailand, identifying a series of social and political factors that 
affect and are affected by the adoption and use of ICT in the Thai public sector.  
The development and design of ICT is related to political agendas. Such agendas involve 
administrative reforms, organizational structure rearrangements, and control and political 
power reinforcement. Struggles over political power and organizational and information 
resources among politicians and officials, specific attitudes and characteristics (e.g., 
localistics) of the officials, and the management approaches (e.g., traditional rule-based, goal-
driven, and functional-silos approaches) of government operations have shaped the 
distinctive design and development of the government’s information systems and 
infrastructures.  
In bureaucratic contexts where hierarchical norms and traditional seniority systems are very 
rigid, ICT adoption and use patterns are likely to be aligned with the long-established 
hierarchical rankings and statuses of the officials in the organizations. As a particular official 
moves up to higher positions and statuses, his/her practices around ICTs also change to 
align with the practices of the new group to which he/she now belongs. For example, the 
arm’s length relationship to technology and the delegation patterns among senior officials to 
their subordinates are the consequences of bureaucratic culture and norms. Such patterns, 
however, also develop a covertly upward relationship between the supervisors and their 
subordinates in which the supervisors depend on their junior staff for ICT-related work. 
This relationship is parallel to the formal downward flows of command through the 
bureaucratic hierarchy between senior and junior officials. 
Also, political contests, the officials’ attitudes, the inflexibility to change of the bureaucratic 
organizations and their members, and the misalignment of existing work practices and 
requirements to the new ones have resulted in the challenges, limits, and tensions attending 
the development and adoption of ICT in the government. In many cases, officials invent 
practical adjustments and workarounds to facilitate their needs and soften the tensions and 
challenges. In the cases of more serious clashes between the new and traditional practices, 
the issues may lead to resistance to the technology.  
 
206 
In this final section of the dissertation, I want to bring together the findings and analysis 
from chapters 4, 5, and 6, and consider the larger implications for technology development 
and adoption. Drawn from associated concepts from the literature reviewed in the thesis, 
these three analytical implications extend the understanding of ICT development and use in 
the public sector for digital government scholarship and the broader field of information 
science 
7.6.1 Organizational hierarchy 
Technology development and deployment is highly associated with hierarchy in 
organizations. Design of information systems reflects hierarchical chain of command and 
communication in the organizations despite the fact that the systems either reinforce 
centralization or promote decentralization. The systems underline the hierarchy in the 
organizations by centralizing information upwards (e.g., the DPIS), monitoring and auditing 
operations through hierarchical supervision and control (e.g., the GFMIS, the performance 
management information systems, and the case tracking system), and facilitating 
communication through the hierarchical flow of authority (e.g., the e-Document systems). 
Specifically, bureaucratic organizations, which have long established strict authority orders 
and traditional seniority systems, are inclined to develop and deploy information systems 
that emphasize such arrangements, and discourage the use of computerized technologies 
that do not have, or violate traditional hierarchy in bureaucratic organizations.  
The information systems in Thai bureaucracy are designed to support the vertical line of 
control and communication although some systems decentralize a certain level of decision-
making power to mid- and lower-level staff, and allow local database management and 
information access. For instance, the GFMIS authorizes mid-level officials to approve some 
financial transactions. Yet, the hierarchical monitoring and auditing functions of the 
financial director and the permanent secretary are executed through users and authorization 
levels. The design of e-Document systems also strictly follows hierarchical flow of 
document-based coordination and communication. In contrast, email for internal 
communication is a non-hierarchical communication technology as opposed to e-Document 
systems. Email communication can break the chain of command as messages can be sent to 
anyone without following the vertical flow of authority, while long-established 
communication in the government is strictly rigid through hierarchical orders with very 
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specific formats and protocols. As a result, officials are discouraged to communicate via 
email with their supervisors or the executive. Email, rather, is mostly used for informal 
communication among colleagues horizontally with similar ranks. 
The implications of organizational hierarchy also play an important role in technology 
adoption and use, as it plays a role in determining work practices associated with technology. 
The executives and senior staff rarely use any of the systems due to their limited computer 
proficiency or the misalignment of their work practices and the systems’ affordances. 
Nevertheless, they still exert their decision-making power and control authority through 
hierarchical monitoring and reporting tools. This authority is often exercised outside of the 
systems in a paper form used in parallel to its electronic counterparts. The executives and 
supervisors may give up their control and supervision authority in the system by delegating 
the tasks to middle managers and their lower-ranked assistants. But they maintain their 
decision-making and control power through manual work, hence requiring the paper-based 
documents to be processed along with the electronic process.  Consequently, the mixture of 
paper-based dominant and computer-based work practices has remained the main ICT 
adoption and use patterns in the Thai public sector. 
7.6.2 ICT and organizational change: Organizational structures 
The technology development and adoption patterns, and ICT-related practices discussed 
above carry consequential implications regarding the relationship between ICT and 
organizational change. Computerization efforts in Thai bureaucracy of which organizational 
structures are strictly based on hierarchy reflect and enhance the existing decision authority 
structures, which is top-down dominant approach. One of the primary goals that are 
common among the studied systems (i.e., GFMIS, DPIS, performance management 
information system, and case tracking system) is to tighten the management’s oversight and 
control power, and to provide information supporting decision-making. 
On a national scale, the prime minister determines the development of the GFMIS to 
monitor the budget spending of individual agencies and the government as a whole, and to 
exercise his/her decision power regarding real-time budget allocation through the system. 
Similarly, DPIS is designed to allow the Civil Service Commission, under the prime 
minister’s supervision, to oversee the government workforce of each individual agency for 
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planning. These systems underline the top-down management approach and centralization 
of decision-making power and structures of the government. Exerting their budgetary and 
personnel power over other agencies, these line agencies successfully deploy the GFMIS and 
DPIS although individual agencies may face challenges and tensions attending the system 
adoption and use. Conclusively, hierarchy reinforces managerial control through technology. 
These findings and implications support previous literature discussing the correlation 
between ICTs and organizational structures. My study substantiates the findings that 
existing organizations’ power structures shape computing technological development rather 
than the other way around [96,103,105,106,160].  
7.6.3 ICT and organizational change: Work practices, and roles and relationships 
among individuals 
Another implication relates to change in the roles and relationships among government 
officials. According to the findings, such change takes place at particular levels among 
limited groups of actors in the organizations. ICT in the Thai public sector is considered as 
a tool to support daily operations and secretariat work, rather than a critical tool for 
decision-making and planning. This perception has implications that ICT-related skills and 
competency are only required for lower-level staff, while high-ranking officials can perform 
their work in a non-ICT work environment. 
Supervisors often have to depend their ICT-related work on their subordinates, or rely on 
the information provided in electronic systems from their staff. The dependency on their 
subordinates may undermine the superiority of the senior-ranked staff. However, the 
symbolic association and social status gaining from the ICT-related task delegation and 
arm’s length ICT adoption underscore the values of hierarchy, authority, and seniority that 
have been deeply rooted in the bureaucracy, hence outclassing the professional advantages of 
ICT proficiency. Although ICT competency is required for junior officials, it adds very little 
value to career advancement of the officials to the management level. While ICT adoption 
and use is required for junior officials, it becomes less relevant as the officials proceed to 
higher positions. This superiority of bureaucratic status suggests the adoption and use 
distinction between the group of junior and middle-ranked officials, and the senior staff. 
Consequently, the officials’ common perception and attitude towards computer use in the 
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government have inevitably become a barrier to ICT adoption generally and digital 
government development efforts specifically. 
Accordingly, changes in work practices resulting from the implementation of new ICT 
merely affect the junior up to mid-level staff, as they are required to adopt and use the 
systems, and have to deal with subsequent changes in the associated tasks. The changes may 
be involved adopting new practices associated with the technology, maintaining the existing 
ones, and inventing new practices as a bridge in the transition from the legacy to the new 
technology. Such changes barely affect the work of the higher-ranked officials or the 
executives. Similarly, changes in the relationships between supervisors and junior staff in 
which the superiors have to rely on their subordinates’ performance regarding ICT-related 
work are likely to occur between the lower and middle levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
as opposed to between the middle and high rankings.  
7.6.4 ICT and government efficiency 
The final point I would like to make is relevant to public sector efficiency. Although 
computerization promises to increase the speed and efficiency of public administration and 
service provision, it does not necessarily expedite government operations. Rather, the speed 
of computerized work essentially depends on and is equivalent to the speed of its 
corresponding paper-based work. The Thai public sector has maintained its long-established 
paper-based documenting practice running in parallel with the electronic process, hence 
resulting in the mixed paper-electronic ecology of information and communication practice 
today. Electronic documents can be delivered to the destination division or department 
instantly through the e-Document systems. In practice, however, the registration process 
and subsequent work do not begin until the corresponding paper documents arrive at the 
administrative staff’s workstation.  
Besides the speed and efficiency of government work, computerization efforts do not seem to 
improve the accuracy of government information either. In the case of integrated 
information systems like the DPIS, electronic information transfer and exchange across 
agencies is possible in theory, but quite limited practically. Personnel officials rely on the 
accuracy of information on the physical artifacts (OCSC#7), as the OCSC#7 is updated 
immediately when there is a change in the information about a particular official whereas the 
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information on the DPIS may not be updated until the Commission requests the information 
from the system. When an official moves from one agency to another, the human resources 
division of the new agency always refers to the information on the OCSC#7 rather than that 
transferred electronically. 
In addition to sticky practices, traditional norms, and legal restrictions in the bureaucracy, 
the impediment to public administration improvement is due to the insufficiency of work 
process transformation. The design of computerized systems is inclined to duplicate existing 
manual process rather than transforming the work process to cut down unnecessary steps in 
the manual work that can be automatically processed in the systems. Also, electronic system 
is designed based on the reliance on physical documents. The government has stalled the 
termination of physical artifacts such as correspondence documents in government 
communication, and the OCSC#7s in personnel work, even though there are electronic 
copies of the same documents. The mixed paper-computer work ecology naturally impedes 
the improvement of public administration speed and efficiency. 
Last but not least, I would argue that some socio-political characteristics of Thai 
bureaucracy will persistently remain challenges and barriers to ICT development efforts. 
Hierarchy has been strictly enforced in the Thai public sector, and does not appear to be 
lessened through generations of government officials. Hierarchical patterns play a crucial 
role in determining the design of information technologies, and how the technologies are 
actually used in the organizations. At the national level, the deep-seated individualistic and 
bureaucratic- and functional-silos characteristics of government agencies have impeded 
efforts at information and system integration and interoperability. Individual agencies 
compete to gain and retain information infrastructures because information ownership 
means autonomy, authority, and financial resources. Inter-agency information sharing and 
interoperability threaten the agencies’ control over the infrastructures, and often cause 
change in work processes and practices at individual agencies. Therefore, efforts at 
information and system interoperability usually invoke tensions and resistance at the local 
level.  
These socio-political and technological conditions substantially contribute to the description 
of ICT development and adoption trajectories of particular bureaucracy. My hope is that my 
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work will inform researchers and practitioners in the communities of information science, 
organizational studies, digital government, and public administration of the need to 
understand and account for those factors when designing, developing, and implementing 
government information technology in the specific national context of Thailand, and a wider 
government bureaucratic context. Such factors, drawn from organizational and bureaucratic 
history and contexts, have resulted in distinctive ICT development trajectories in Thai 
bureaucracy. They also yield work practices around technology development and adoption 
in Thai public sector organizations that are different from those of other organizations in 
different bureaucratic contexts although the technologies are similar functionally. This work 
may also present a useful case study for international comparative studies in digital 
government development efforts among countries whose organizational and bureaucratic 
histories and contexts are similar to Thailand’s, though they may result in different ICT 






In the preliminary study and the first round of fieldwork, I wanted to gain a better 
understanding of how IT is developed, adopted, and used in a government setting. I was also 
interested in what government officials perceive and how they interact with the IT in their 
organization. 
The format of the interview was a one-hour long, semi-structured interview. The interview 
was conducted in Thai to be later recorded, transcribed, and translated to English by the 
researcher (me). During the interview, I also took notes. 
There were three groups of interviewees: 1) IT staffers who work in the ICT Center; 2) non-
IT, junior officials who have worked at the agency for less than 5 years; and 3) non-IT, 
senior officials who have worked at the agency for over eight (8) years. 
The following questions were asked of all subjects: 
1. Could you walk me through your computer use on a daily basis?  
a. What do you use a computer for? 
b. What types of systems do you use?  
2. How often or how long do you need to use a computer in your daily work? What types 
of software or systems do you use? 
3. When a system is broken, what do you do? How do you cope with the problem? 
4. When a computer or a system breaks down, can you diagnose the symptom? Can you 
identify it as a hardware, software, or network problem? 
5. Who are the main people responsible for IT adoption and use? Who (such as initiators, 
decision makers, influencers) is involved in the processes of budget allowance, selection, 




6. Currently, what are the major parts of departments/tasks of the organization that IT is 
supporting? 
7. What types of IT services do you think the organization is lacking or needs 
improvements? 
8. When you find a need for improvement of a system you are using, do you inform anyone 
such as your colleagues, your boss, or IT personnel? 
9. Do you or your co-workers ever develop any application or tool such as an Excel or 
Access application to facilitate your own work functions? 
10. Are there any collaborative projects such as integrated services between your 
organization with other departments or ministers? 
a. If so, what is the type of project? How do people in the taskforce or the 
committee meet and communicate? How do you share information among each 
other? Is there any physical office or location for this particular project in order 
to deliver service to the public or to host the computer equipment? 
The following questions are intended for non-IT, senior officials: 
1. When were the first IT system (hardware and/or software) initiatives established? For 
what purposes? In which departments/tasks of the organization? 
2. Who or what initiated the ideas of using IT in the organization? 
3. How were those initiatives developed and implemented? 
4. Did you use the system the same way it was initially proposed? 
a. If not, why not? How did you use it differently? 
5. Did you encounter any barriers and limitations in the early stages of IT adoption in the 
organization? 
6. Are those barriers and limitations still ongoing issues these days? 
a. If yes, have there been any attempts to solve those issues? And why did those 
attempts not work? 
b. If no, how has the organization resolved those issues?  
The following questions focus on IT personnel: 
1. Could you tell me the process of getting an IT project approved starting from initiating 
the project until the implementation of the system? 
2. What are the purposes of the systems/projects currently used in the organization?  
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a. Do the officials actually use the system in the way it is intended to be used? How 
do people use it differently? 
b. Do you need to readjust (alignment and resistance issues)? 
3. Regarding system development, does the ICT Center develop the system, and maintain 
the services itself? Or does it hire or outsource the projects? 
4. Who is involved in the system development process? 
5. Who owns the license over the application and source code? 
6. What do you do when you need to modify the application after implementing the 
system? 
7. Have you noticed any changes in IT adoption and use among the non-IT staff members? 
In what way? 
8. Do the officials in this agency know how to use IT and the systems you provide 
correctly and is their use actually aligned with the underlying premises of the systems? 
a. If not, do you provide any additional services/training programs to help them 
augment their perception and ability regarding IT adoption and use? 
9. What is the annual budget for this project? Is it increasing or decreasing each year? 
How do you allocate the budget? 
10. Are there any IT services or systems that your organization collaboratively develops 
with other agencies within the same ministry and/or outside the ministry? 
11. What are the differences between the IT development, adoption, and use trajectories for 
the projects developed and used within your own organization and the collaborative 
projects?  
12. As to the hardware and software problems, how do you deal with these issues? How do 
you help the users when their computers or applications break down? 




For the second round of fieldwork, I explored the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the 
MICT and/or the E-Government Agency (EGA) in Thai digital government development – 
information and network integration and interoperability efforts, particularly in 
interoperable e-Document systems, and the TH e-GIF (Government information 
interoperability standards framework) development and implementation. This would 
provide policy implications for the Thai government regarding boundary organizations in 
digital government development. 
 
Questions for the MICT and EGA staff: 
1. What are the purposes of transferring the Division of E-Government Development and 
Support from the MICT and establishing the EGA? 
2. What are the organizational and reporting structures of the EGA to the government, 
e.g., the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Ministries, and the MICT?  
a. Are there any government officials physically working at the EGA? 
b. What is the status of the EGA staff in relation to government officials? 
c. What are the EGA staffers’ qualifications (i.e., computer specialists, programmers, 
engineers, etc.)? 
d. What are the EGA staffers’ job specifications? 
i. Do they offer technical advice to government agencies? Or do they 
outsource the consulting task to education institutions? 
ii. Do they develop and/or provide any software to government agencies? 
e. Does the EGA have any authoritative power over government agencies? 
f. What happens with the Government Information Technology Services (GITS)17 
after the establishment of the EGA and the transfer of GITS’ staff? 
3. Is or will (and how) the MICT be involved in digital government development after the 
establishment of the EGA? 
                                                
17 GITS is an organization under the supervision of the National Science and Technology Development 
Agency (NSTDA), which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
 
216 
a. Is the MICT still practically working with any digital government development 
projects? 
b. How do both organizations divide the responsibilities in digital government 
development? 
c. How do both organizations coordinate? 
4. What are the roles of the MICT and the E-Government Agency (EGA) in the e-
Document system integration efforts? 
 
Questions for local government agencies (CIOs, Directors of ICT, and ICT officials): 
1. Did you expect any changes in the way your agency and your ICT officials coordinate 
with the EGA, compared with the MICT? 
2. Do you (CIOs/ICT directors, agency officials) notice any change in working and 
coordinating with the EGA, compared with the MICT regarding information 
integration and interoperability efforts? 
a. Are you more cooperative with the EGA than with the MICT or vice versa? Or 
about the same? 
b. Do you think the establishment of the EGA creates higher level of 
trustworthiness and reliability of the boundary organizations and long-term 
government-provided infrastructures? 
c. Does the EGA’s performance look promising to you so far?  
3. From your perspective, what is not working at the MICT (and the EGA)? 
4. How would you change the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the MICT, the EGA, 
or other agencies that perform similar tasks in national digital government 
development? 
Furthermore, I wanted to investigate the adoption of e-Document systems and the 
implications for hierarchical structures of Thai government. I wanted to explore the 
implications for roles of administrative staff and the General Division. Example empirical 
questions: 
Questions for officials who create or receive documents: 
1. When you are to write a memo to someone in your agency, do you talk to that person 
discussing or explaining what you are doing or needing first? 
 
217 
a. If you are to write a memo to someone in another division who is in a similar 
position/rank as you, do you contact him/her in person first? Do you discuss 
what you are to write in your memo with your boss? 
b. If you are to write a memo to someone in another division, who is in a higher 
position, do you contact him/her in person first? Do you discuss what you are to 
write in your memo with your boss? 
c. If you are to write a memo to someone in another division, who is in a lower 
position, do you contact him/her in person first? Do you discuss what you are to 
write in your memo with your boss? 
d. If you are to write a memo to your immediate supervisor, do you contact him/her 
in person first? 
e. If you are to write a memo to the permanent secretary or the deputy, do you 
contact him/her in person first? Or do you discuss the purposes of your memo to 
your immediate boss before writing it? 
2. When you receive or expect a document from someone within your agency, does the 
document owner talk to you in person before sending the document to you? 
3. Do you use the e-Document system? For what purpose: retrieving documents, sending 
documents, tracking your documents, reading agency circulating announcements, etc.? 
4. How often are you logged in to the e-Document system, compared to other electronic 
media like Facebook, email, news sites, etc.? 
5. Do you work with documents in physical or electronic form? For example, do you wait 
for physical documents to arrive at your desk to start working with them or do you view 
and/or print them out from the system? 
6. Have you ever thought of using the e-Document system regularly just like you use other 
electronic media? 
a. If so, but you do not use it regularly, what constrains the use? How do you wish 
to use the system? 
b. What feature would you wish the e-Document systems to have in order to help 
your daily work? 
 
Additional questions for higher-position officials (e.g., division directors, deputies, 
and permanent secretaries): 
1. Do you prepare your own document drafts (whether by writing or typing) or let your 
subordinate prepare them for you? 
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2. Do you prefer working with physical or electronic documents? Why? 
a. What types of documents (i.e., memos, external documents, and circulating 
announcements) do you think should be digitized and used in electronic format 
only? Why? 
b. What types of documents can be digitized and used in electronic format only? 
Why? 
c. Do you encourage the use of the e-Document system? How? 
3. Do you think it is possible that all government documents will be used electronically? 
Why or why not? What facilitates and/or constrains the use of electronic documents? 
4. In what way do you think the e-Document system helps the agency’s documentation? 
(e.g., speed, traceability, track-ability) 
5. Have you ever been logged in to the system? How often? Or do you have someone log in 
to the system on your behalf? 
a. If you have someone use your account and password, why do you do so? 
 
Questions for administrative staff: 
-­‐ For those who previously worked with a manual system (i.e., who have worked in 
General Division or documentation work for over 10 years) 
1. Do you notice any change in document flows compared between the manual system and 
the electronic system? What has changed? 
2. Do you (your agency) still work with the same number of documents in terms of the 
number of copies of each document? 
3. Do officials rely on your work as a documentation worker more or less after the adoption 
of the e-Document system? 
-­‐ For all administrative staff 
4. What are major pet peeves you have found working with the e-Document system? 
5. What are problems you have encountered such as miscommunication, loss of physical 
documents or electronic documents, different data element standards among divisions, 
etc.? 
a. How do you solve these problems? 
6. In the effort at integrating e-Document systems within your ministry (among 
departments) and with other ministers,  
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a. What are the major concerns for you? 
b. What are the major problems you are facing? 
c. Do the integrated systems reduce or increase your workload? In what way? 
7. Do you think it is possible that the e-Document system will be used by all officials, and 
all documents will be sent electronically without physical papers? 
a. If not, why not? 
b. If so, how do you think your roles in documentation work would change? 
8. Do you think current document practices should or could cut down some steps, 
procedures, or people involved in the documentation process? If you could change the 
practices and procedures, for example, when you receive an incoming document from 
another agency, would it be possible to bypass documents from your immediate 
supervisor (section head) to the Director of General Division or even send the document 
directly to the Deputy? 
-­‐ For middle managers, e.g., section head, and General Division Director: 
9. Do you think it is possible that the e-Document system will be used by all officials, and 
all documents will be sent electronically without physical papers? 
a. If not, why not? 
b. If so, do you think there will still be a need for administrative staff for 
documentation work? And what roles would the administrative staff shift to? 
Lastly, I investigated change in work, professional roles, and career paths of government 
officials. I was looking at how computing-related Key Performance Index (KPI) system, 
Performance Management Quality Award (PMQA), work agreements, and work evaluation 
have changed government officials’ work, roles, and the relationships among them.  
Questions for non-ICT officials: 
1. How do you use computers in your daily work? 
2. How does computerization help your work? 
3. Without a computer, would you be able to perform your work manually? What would 
change in your existing practices?  
4. What are computer-based skills that you were required to develop in order to work with 
tasks that need such skills? 
a. How did you develop those skills? 
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b. Were you afraid that you might lose your job or get transferred to other 
positions if you did not have or develop those skills? 
c. Were there any officials who had to leave because of lacking those skills? 
5. What is your strategy to select what tasks you list in the agreement forms? 
6. Do the tasks listed in your agreement and evaluation forms involve any 
computerization? If so, what are they? 
7. Does the KPI system require you to change the way you worked previously? How? 
8. Does the PMQA and KPI systems facilitate or constrain your and your Division’s work 
and goals? How? 
9. How would you perform the same tasks you are currently performing 20 years ago 
(before computerization)? 
10. Do you think in the next 10 years, your job might be fully computerized? 
a. What do you see yourself in the next 10 years? Next 20 years? 
b. What if your job was to be fully computerized, what would you do? 
 
Questions for the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) and the Office of the 
Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) staff: 
1. What are the objectives of the implementation of KPI, PMQA, agreement, and 
evaluation systems? (e.g., manpower, structures, downsizing, efficiency, etc.) 
2. What are the short-term and long-term objectives of the implementation of these 
agreement and evaluation systems related to government computerization? 
a. Is one of the objectives related to downsizing? 
i. If so, what does the OCSC/OPDC plan to do with the human resources in 
individual positions (lower, middle, and higher positions)? 
b. Is the OCSC/OPDC trying to computerize government tasks? 
i. Will some of government tasks be fully computerized in the future, say in 
the next 10 years? 
ii. What kinds of tasks would that be? 
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3. What are the goals of adding computerization requirements such as databases, 
knowledge-based systems, and decision-support systems into government agencies’ 
PMQA measurements? 
a. Has the OCSC/OPDC achieved its objectives? 
b. Do you think government agencies meet those computerization requirements and 
really make use of the systems they create for the requirements? Or do they 
develop the systems just for passing the evaluation, and then ignore them? 
c. If agencies develop the systems to meet the evaluation, but never use them, do 
you think the KPI and PMQA measurements are effective tools? How can you 
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